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Threat and catastrophe highlight the impossibility of providing perfect security, and 
demonstrate the limitations of risk-based security practices. This thesis presents an 
argument in three parts. First, the dangers homeland security agencies confront are 
increasingly beyond the reach of measures for control. The character of security risks is 
complex and volatile, while worst-case possibilities—not merely probable accidents and 
disasters—are particularly relevant to domestic security agencies and organizations. 
Second, the security response to such unbounded risks has been the creation of 
unconscionable maps—tools and concepts that presume a greater degree of knowledge, 
uniformity, and control than is available. Finally, there is a body of knowledge and 
capability better suited to security uncertainties, and homeland security agencies must 
find ways to cultivate these capacities. Contrary to current security practices, national 
adaptability is more desirable than perfect knowledge, control of crisis, or national 
uniformity. 
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Each of us is all the sums he has not counted...the seed of our destruction 




The staircases in medieval castles often spiraled upward clockwise around a 
central newel. The reasoning for this design tendency, so the theory goes, was to give the 
advantage to the (right-handed) defender, who had more room to swing his sword from 
above.2 There is elegance to this idea. Fortifications may be complicated, but the 
principle of fortification is simple. Thinking about castles this way conjures up images of 
attackers and defenders, the forces of good arrayed against the forces of evil, civilization 
versus barbarism and the outer dark. It is a simplicity that homeland security agencies 
might envy. 
The crash of Germanwings 9525 in March of 2015 illustrates a more uneasy 
insecurity. When the captain left the cockpit during that flight, the co-pilot locked the 
cabin door and intentionally crashed the aircraft into a mountainside in the French Alps, 
killing the 144 passengers and 6 crewmembers.3 The subsequent review of safety 
protocols in hindsight belies a darker concern: procedures must consider more fully how 
to protect against the pilot. The professional most directly responsible for the safety of 
the plane must be thought of as a liability. “The irony of risk here,” says Ulrich Beck, “is 
that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, encourages anticipation of the wrong 
                                                 
1 Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929; New York, 
NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 5. Citations refer to the Simon and Schuster edition. 
2 Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Dictionnaire raisonné de l’architecture française du XI au XVI 
siècle [dictionary of French architecture from the 11th–16th century] (Paris, FR: A. Morel, 1869), 296. 
3 Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile (BEA), Rapport préliminaire 
Accident survenu le 24 mars 2015 à Prads-Haute-Bléone (04) à l’Airbus A320-211 immatriculé D-AIPX 
exploité par Germanwings [Preliminary Report on the Germanwings Flight 9525 Crash] (Paris, FR: BEA, 
May, 2015), 11. 
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kind of risk, the one we believe we can calculate and control, whereas the disaster arises 
from what we do not know and cannot calculate.”4 This is what it means for risk to be 
unbound. In the concentrated, unaccountable example of Germanwings, the pilot was 
able to create astonishing tragedy, not despite complicated fortification, but because of it.  
In order to understand the probability and consequence of a risk, the analysis of 
that risk must establish an area of study and an area of impact. Catastrophe, like the 
Germanwings crash, has a knack for acquainting security organizations with previously 
unforeseen dimensions. As Beck points out, what we do not know becomes the central 
figure in risk decision-making, not what we know. In 2013, through a series of startling 
and unseen connections, crude oil from the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota exploded 
during a train derailment, resulting in 47 fatalities in the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec. 
The Lac-Mégantic accident demonstrates the way that complex risks can span political 
boundaries and professional disciplines, challenging the available tools of risk 
calculation.5 
Homeland security risk, it seems, is often not fully risk at all. It remains as 
uncertainty and danger. And this is at the heart of a modern challenge to risk-based 
security practices. If homeland security is predominantly in the business of the unlikely, 
then it is problematic to think of ordering its capabilities against likely outcomes—even a 
suite of likely outcomes. So, homeland security professionals must consider and decide 
whether their work is fundamentally about the management of outliers, and what 
corresponding shifts this recognition requires in doctrine, theory, and practice.  
Politics is well said to be the art of the possible.6 Increasingly, homeland security 
may be the art of the impossible. Unable to be selective about the risks they are asked to 
                                                 
4 Beck, Ulrich, “Living in the World Risk Society,” Economy and Society 35, no. 3 (August 1, 2006): 
329–45. 
5 Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Railways Investigation Report R13D0054 Runaway and 
Main-Track Derailment of Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic Railways Freight Train MMA-002 MILE 0.23, 
Sherbrooke Subdivision Lac-Mégantic, Quebec 06 July 2013 (Gatineau, QC: August, 2014), 1. 
6 Otto Von Bismarck, Fürst Bismarck: Neue Tischgespräche und Interviews [prince Bismarck: new 
table discussions and interviews] (Stuttgart and Leipzig, DE: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1895), 248. 
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manage, homeland security agencies must organize against threats and catastrophes that 
progressively outstrip efforts at control. The predominant security response has been to 
either meet the uncertainties of threat and catastrophe with tools designed and better 
suited for certainty, or address unbounded risks with unbounded precaution. Such 
arrangements promise a greater degree of security than is possible. Thus, far this has 
meant that the purpose of homeland security is progressively redefined by perceived 
failures—as security organizations fail to deliver the promised level of security. 
However, the wilderness of catastrophic possibility suggests an alternate answer to the 
question of what the purpose of homeland security could be. 
In the insurance industry “adverse selection” occurs when the only purchasers of 
an insurance product are at an elevated risk of needing it. That is, they are particularly 
exposed to the threat or hazard being insured against. Adverse selection concentrates risk, 
and makes it extremely difficult to spread risks or distribute losses, illustrating the plight 
of homeland security agencies. The only individuals under the protection of the United 
States Secret Service, for instance, are at an elevated risk of needing such protection. Nor 
can the Secret Service absorb potential losses. It is difficult to apply traditional risk 
management concepts to such risks. 
Largely, the security response to unbounded risk has been the creation of 
“unconscionable maps”—tools and concepts that presume a greater degree of knowledge, 
uniformity, and control than is available. Such maps display two problematic tendencies: 
the pretense of applying risk management when the information necessary to support 
such calculation is not available, and boundless precaution. In the first case homeland 
security lives with a false assumption that it has exerted control over a risk, in the second, 
homeland security has little assurance or measure of success and surrenders decisions to 
threat politics. 
Unconscionable maps have a tendency to pave over uncertainty—to render 
organizations insensitive to it. Much of homeland security theory and practice is 
organized around presumed control, rather than presumed surprise. However, the 
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research of this thesis supports the notion that homeland security theory must develop 
better tools for living with enduring uncertainty, danger, and possibility. 
The operating environment for domestic security is the complex of authorities and 
jurisdictions inherent to American federalism. Security agencies have tended to treat this 
networked landscape as a security liability, exploring means to create uniformity in 
security practices, and even alignment of command and control structures in the wake of 
disasters. The network of federalism may be a security asset, not a liability. American 
government functions to decentralize strengths and distribute vulnerabilities, and, while it 
often stymies attempts at national security architectures, is uniquely positioned to develop 
adaptive systems for managing uncertain security risks. Federalism provides the 
architecture for decentralized preparedness, and yet homeland security agencies are 
pursuing an end state of centralization and uniformity in practice, in the process stifling 
adaptability and innovation. Centralization—even the centralization of strengths—creates 
certain vulnerabilities. 
As security agencies inherit complex and uncertain risks, they require a 
corresponding change in approach. Such a shift will require incremental adjustments to 
unbounded risks, increasing the capacity of security organizations to explore 
uncertainties and work with uncommon partners. It will also require more dramatic shifts 
away from heavily scripted plans and the pursuit of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). In place of unilateral security doctrines, homeland security requires a 
multivalent security doctrine that stresses adaptability over control and uniformity. 
The word “end,” says Neil Postman, has at least two important meanings: 
“purpose” and “finish.”7 If the purpose of homeland security is to manage the 
unmanageable, abandoning a grand design for homeland security may improve our ability 
to live with danger, and achieve greater security. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Neil Postman, The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School (New York, NY: Vintage, 
Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 1996), x. 
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This thesis is critical of established methods and dominant security practices. 
Done poorly, criticism is an easy task. Done properly, polemic places a special burden of 
rigor and humility on the writer, both to fairly consider and state the principle and 
practice he is criticizing, and to acknowledge that even the most flawed practices usually 
come about from good faith efforts. This thesis is written from a deep well of respect for 
the responders and operational innovators who have designed and built existing national 
preparedness systems—as well as those who have worked around them, hacked them, 
and reformed them. I have labored to faithfully represent the intent and purpose of 
existing doctrine and theory, and to propose reforms that this research suggests are 
needful. While I owe an impossible debt to the thoughts of many others whose work is 
referenced in this thesis, any shortcomings in my research and writing are, of course, 
entirely my own. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Faced with risks that increasingly defy temporal, spatial, social, and rational 
boundaries, what could be the purpose of homeland security? 
Much of the effort of homeland security is a struggle for knowledge and control. 
But how should homeland security manage what it cannot control? Despite more than a 
decade of applied expertise under the banner of homeland security, bad things—from 
tornadoes to terrorism—continue to impact America. Security, we know, will never be 
absolute, but exists alongside enduring insecurity. Here homeland security professionals 
must confront basic assumptions about the purpose and final state of domestic security. 
And in response, should our theory, doctrine and practice refocus away from controlling 
uncertainty—and toward disciplined irregularity, exploration, and improvisation? Are we 
to be precautionists or pioneers? Faced with the enduring character of insecurity, 
catastrophe and uncertainty, how has homeland security responded, and what tools are 




I will consider whether the dominant mode of managing these borderlands of 
capacity has been to presume control over things beyond control, and whether the 
emphasis on imagination in the wake of the 9/11 Commission report only generated 
fantasies of control.8 Pervasive uncertainty and insecurity may require something 
different of homeland security professionals. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Three dominant pillars of homeland security theory and practice—knowledge of 
threat and danger, control of crisis, and national uniformity in security practices—have 
not overcome intractable risks in over a decade of aspiration, suggesting that 
contemporary security problems are not responsive to these measures.9 
Analysts are equally unable to predict terrorist attacks, fathom the impact of 
nuclear or environmental catastrophe, or manage the blossoming complexity of 
pandemics. This in turn suggests that the homeland security enterprise must earnestly 
begin to shift its attention, its theory and practice, toward the problem of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty, then, is not a problem to be eradicated, but is an enduring feature to be lived 
with. 
In this thesis, I will consider how the homeland security enterprise has 
conceptualized and managed unmapped security situations at the edge of its 
understanding. I will propose some refinements that move security theory away from 
aspirations of unattainable degrees of knowledge or total control and toward a view of 
uncertainty that relies on organizational self-knowledge, improvisation, and exploration 
in a security wilderness. 
                                                 
8 Lee Clarke, Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999), 99. 
9 I have in mind here the way security organizations pursue knowledge of threats through crisis 
situational awareness and risk calculation as well as intelligence collection and analysis. In conditions of 
high uncertainty, the pursuit of such information is insatiable and organizations often presume to attain 
greater degrees of knowledge than are available to them. In doing so, they lack a limiting principle to the 





In some vital ways, homeland security organizations are not built for such 
wilderness. They are not structured for it—organizing around presumed control rather 
than presumed surprise. They are not ready for it—planning and exercising against 
controlled scenarios. The tools of national preparedness have a utopian character to them, 
expressing a promise of perfect, real-time awareness of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
system performances. Conversely, I will also argue that a certain kind of irregularity is a 
security asset, not a liability, and governmental structures in place that hinder national 
uniformity may in fact be powerful protections against disaster, attack and crisis. For 
instance the lack of uniformity inherent in the American Federal system, while frustrating 
to efforts at national interoperability, may contribute significantly to American security 
by spreading out risks, creating a network of federal and concurrent powers and 
capabilities. 
To adequately assess this problem I will consider the nature of unbounded risks 
and enduring uncertainty, evaluating the security response to each. Ultimately, I will 
propose a revised approach to theory and doctrine that develops new capacity for 
managing worst-case possibilities. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This summary of research reviews major contributions to understanding the way 
homeland security has responded to the unknown. This review considered literature on 
the concept of providing domestic security against mercurial threats and apocalyptic 
possibilities. There is a growing body of academic literature forwarding the perception 
that the modern era is one dominated by pervasive security uncertainties and 
unpredictable catastrophes: in short, the idea that we occupy an era of insecurity. Equally, 
there is a literature that responds to and tempers or counters this view in multiple ways. 
The approach to this research has been to understand the major statements of what might 
broadly be called cultural theory within the context of security. As such, this literature 
review is broad. The research conducted in support of this review considered legislation, 
policy, operational doctrine and security theory, in particular since the attacks of 




to security, as well as important cultural precursors in the form of eschatological myths, 
and differing approaches to the idea of tragedy and the monstrous. Such literary examples 
are not presented simply as invocations of poetry or imagination, but to augment the way 
homeland security professionals might think about the unknown, and to widen our view 
by considering how others have faced the same problem. 
Literature in these areas is primarily qualitative. Where studies are quantitative, as 
in the actuarial and mathematical evaluation of complex risk, the main interest in this 
literature review has been the qualitative responses and policy arguments stemming from 
such probabilistic data, not the data themselves. Additionally, in looking outside strictly 
security-focused literature, this research considered ways in which navigational science, 
anthropology and natural science combined with the explanatory and artistic impulses of 
mapmakers to produce objects that can inform the viewer about the limits of knowledge 
and the potential dangers of the unknown. 
Security theories considered include attempts to formally define and analyze 
catastrophe, evaluate the idea of a society living with catastrophic possibilities, and 
establish new methods of responding to security unknowns. Of particular interest is the 
notion of “worst cases,” and literature exists on both the utility of worst-case thinking and 
its shortcomings in both public opinion and public policy. 
This literature review partitions research results into three broad thematic 
categories: Unbounded Risks (uncertainty and possibility), Unconscionable Maps (our 
current response to enduring insecurity), and Unseen Doctrine (proposed tools for 
managing unbounded risks): 
• Unbounded Risks: Security risks increasingly defy our ability to control, 
prevent or compensate the losses associated with them. 
• Unconscionable Maps: The dominant mode of current security theory, 
doctrine, and practice pursues unattainable degrees of knowledge, control 
of crisis and uniformity in operations. 
• Unseen Doctrine: There is significant and under-appreciated literature 
which should serve to renovate our response to unbounded risk by 




1. Unbounded Risks 
HC SVNT DRACONES 
—Inscription from the Hunt-Lennox Globe, 151010 
First, things that have never happened before happen all the time in 
history. 
—Scott Sagan11 
The idea of confronting and securing society against the unknown does not begin 
with homeland security, or the attacks of 9/11. Around 1539, Swedish cartographer and 
church historian Olaus Magnus printed his Carta Marina, or “map of the seas.”12 
Adorning the margins of the known world, Magnus included iconic depictions of sea 
monsters, coiled and dangerous in the vast deeps of the ocean. It is easy to think of early 
cartographers as superstitiously filling in the margins of their maps with the horrors of 
fantasy. But, cartographic experts argue that while the depictions of dragons appear to be 
mere whimsy to the modern eye, they were based on reliable, academic accounts and 
scientific literature of the day.13 They were the best expressions available concerning the 
many unknowns and dangers of the open sea. Moving into the 18th century, depictions of 
sea monsters were largely supplanted by depictions of ships—indicating a shift from 
regarding the sea as unknown and monstrous, to viewing it as a resource to be exploited. 
In at least one Portuguese map of the 18th century, the king is depicted astride a tamed sea 
monster. 
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Many later maps continued this trend, demonstrating a cartographic response to 
the limitations of certainty in as yet unknown worlds.14 
The Latin phrase HC SVNT DRACONES, meaning “here be dragons,” appears 
on several globes and maps, while TERRA INCOGNITA adorns others, often 
accompanied by depictions of dangerous and (to the modern eye) fantastical creatures. 
Map expert Chet Van Duzer and others have argued that this may serve a similar purpose 
of explanation and warning in spaces unknown.15 
Beyond cartographic concerns, early explorers confronted persistent myths among 
their crew concerning the dangers and unknown perils of uncharted waters. Early 
Portuguese explorers’ log books recount the challenge of sailing beyond navigational 
charts with crews who believed that monstrous magic lay there.16 
Security theorists in a variety of applications have picked up this notion of 
undiscovered country, and operating beyond the boundaries of the familiar. Patrick 
Lagadec has written extensively on the role of crisis managers and responders in “sense 
making” within the unknowns generated by crisis situations.17 Likewise Claudia Aradua 
and Rens Van Munster have argued that catastrophe by definition represents a rupture 
with the normal that brings governmental structures to the very limits of their knowledge 
and ability to respond.18 These authors use the phrase as more than metaphor–
emphasizing the strategic and governmental mechanisms necessary for navigating in 
unfamiliar places. 
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Central to this body of literature is the idea of a security landscape that contains 
many unknowns and uncertainties. Security specialists have looked to the idea of an 
unmapped landscape as a way of expressing uncertainties about space and time, and as an 
expression of the current limitations of knowledge. Likewise they have viewed crisis and 
catastrophe as unique situations that augment or generate unknown operational 
landscapes. 
His argument echoes that of Ian Hacking, whose 1990 work The Taming of 
Chance argues that the growth of probabilistic thinking in the 19th century eroded the 
notion of determinism.19 
Risk is a modern invention. It is variously defined as, “the probability and 
magnitude of a loss, disaster or other undesirable event,” or, “when it is possible, at least 
in principle, to estimate the likelihood that an event (or set of events) will occur.”20 
Contained in definitions of risk is the idea of calculated likelihood, which is born out of 
probabilistic science. In Against the Gods, Peter Bernstein argues that the modern world 
can be well understood through the story of the birth, growth and dominance of 
probabilistic thinking, and the calculation of risk.21 Similarly, in his book The Taming of 
Chance, Ian Hacking has described the invention of risk as a shift out of the world of 
pure causality. “Causality,” says Hacking, “long the bastion of metaphysics, was toppled, 
or at least tilted: the past does not determine exactly what happens next.”22 Probabilistic 
thinking changed the relationship that humans had with the future. Whereas in more 
primitive times, so the thinking goes, the past was the force dominating the present, the 
concept of probability allowed the future to govern the present. Risk undermined the long 
held view of causality that dominated Aristotle’s Physics and critiques of Aristotle in the 
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middle ages.23 Rather than emphasizing the inevitabilities of causation, risk presumed 
regular, but uncertain elements of chance. To Hacking’s thinking, this meant something 
radically different even than the Enlightenment era pursuit of universal laws of nature, 
and opened the way for regular, and yet uncertain patterns. Says Hacking, “A space was 
cleared for chance.”24 
And this concept of chance in turn opened the door for the development of more 
robust measures of taking and controlling risks. From the beginning, risk was not simply 
a way of understanding what bad things might happen, but a means of governing 
decision-making. “Chance” Hacking writes, “made the world seem less capricious: it was 
legitimated because it brought order out of chaos. The greater the level of indeterminism 
in our conception of the world and of people, the higher the expected level of control.”25 
Hacking’s observation may be no less revolutionary, almost paradoxical. Understanding 
that the future was uncertain—thus unwritten—society had the right to expect greater 
control over it. Only knowledge sufficient to calculate was wanting.  
Risk, then, might be properly conceived of as a means of control based on known 
probability. It is a wager on the future. As Hacking’s title suggests, it is the taming of 
chance. This makes an exciting prospect. Knowledge of world phenomena could provide 
sufficient information to make rational assessments about what might occur in the future. 
This was the origin of systems of credit, insurance, and a dramatic shift in society’s 
relationship with uncertainty. And this relationship with uncertainty is central to 
homeland security doctrine and practice. Risk is an idea in opposition to politics, fear, 
and mindless security musculature. Risk is synonymous with sobriety. In this frame, and 
the doctrines that have followed, risk is a tool for ordering security capabilities by a 
disciplined assessment of the threats they are arrayed against. “The decentralized nature 
of today’s threat,” says the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, requires an 
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emphasis on risk-based security as a means to, “shrink the haystack.”26 Security is no 
longer a question of the tectonic contests between nation states, but radically 
decentralized networks, insurgencies, technological and natural hazards. The question of 
chance and uncertainty is central to the way we must think about security.  
In Normal Accidents, Charles Perrow observed that modern high-risk 
technological systems are increasingly complex and tightly coupled.27 Perrow is careful 
with his terminology, explaining that complex interactions in a system follow an 
unexpected sequence and may be invisible, as opposed to linear interactions, which may 
be complicated, but are discernable and regular. In complexity, one part of a system may 
interact with another part in a way that was not designed. 
In the term “tightly coupled” he is describing the inevitability of sequencing, and 
the deliberate design of system redundancies. This makes systems more efficient, but it 
also makes room for catastrophe. The result of these two characteristics is that seemingly 
small mistakes can be amplified as their interdependencies are revealed. Increasingly 
dense infrastructure and urban areas allows the impact of seemingly small mistakes to be 
amplified across a system. It is the nature of complex, tightly coupled, socio-technical 
systems however that such “normal accidents” do not remain small, or escape notice. 
Magnified across a system, they can produce catastrophic results. The hidden interactions 
of complexity are revealed in catastrophe.  
Perrow generalized normal accident theory in The Next Catastrophe, which 
combined the principles of Normal Accidents with the imagination of Clarke’s Worst 
Cases. In examining the larger scale social arrangements in the United States particularly, 
Perrow perceives an increasingly tightly coupled society.28 The tendency in everything 
from infrastructure to the construction of housing is towards higher density, more 
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centralized control, and tight coupling. Perrow highlights that the explosion of a single 
chlorine tanker outside of Los Angeles could poison 4 million people.29 Power grids, 
transportation routes, and perhaps even governmental institutions indicate increased 
consolidation and seamlessness, meaning the modes of failure are increasingly drastic, 
such as the massive power outage of 2003 that affected upwards of 50 million people 
across the east coast, and was caused by a sagging power line somewhere in Ohio.30  
Writing on the nature of modern insecurity and globalization, Christopher Coker 
argues that there has been a shift in language, or the way in which we talk and think 
about the threat of terrorism versus the known enemies of the cold war. “The language of 
danger,” says Coker, “has now turned into the language of risk.”31 Security policy 
makers and professions now face the shift from a clear and present nation state threat, to 
a networked, chimerical terrorist threat, and the ideas of this shift have generated a 
significant body of literature. The attacks of 9/11 in particular forced a reexamination of 
security postures not focused on defeating or subverting a discrete threat, but protecting 
against omnipresent, unpredictable, and not wholly eradicable risks.32 Amy Kaplan, 
Michael Barkun, and Mikkel Rasmussen have each written critically that the implication 
of omnipresent risk sets limitations on the amount of security that a government can 
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possibly provide.33 Within this context, these authors, especially Kaplan, have hinted that 
the notion of “homeland security” contains an element of insecurity as well.  
If Pre-modern dangers were attributed to gods and monsters, German sociologist 
Ulrich Beck sees risk is an essentially modern concept—”a systematic way of dealing 
with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.”34 Beck 
explains the societal relationship with risk this way: 
The concept of risk reverses the relationship of past, present and future. 
The past loses its power to determine the present. Its place as the cause of 
present-day experience and action is taken by the future, that is to say, 
something non-existent, constructed and fictitious. We are discussing and 
arguing about something that is not the case, but could happen if we 
continue to steer the same course have been.35 
According to Beck, modern risks create a rupture in this relationship with the 
future. In Risk Society, Beck examined the way that the catastrophic impacts of modern 
risks are curiously separated from their causes. Modern societies have become victims of 
their own successes as advances in technology result in catastrophic potential damage 
e.g., nuclear accidents or environmental risks.36 More recently, Beck addressed the 
attacks of 9/11 as a symptom and exemplar of the idea of a “risk society.” Beck argues 
that the losses resulting from terrorism (and the impending catastrophes of environmental 
and technological crises) are impossible to compensate, defy prediction, and thus defy the 
actuarial and insurance basis of our society. They defy probabilities, and represent, if not 
increased risk, then what he calls unbounded risk. Beck describes modern risks 
(technological risk, terrorism etc.) as de-bounded in terms of social, temporal and spatial 
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attributes.37 Where scarcity disproportionately affected the poor in pre-industrial society, 
modern risks have the potential to leap across political boundaries, and endanger us 
democratically. Says Beck, “poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic.”38 In contrast to 
the knowable world of probabilities, a “risk society” is shaped by omnipresent, 
delocalized, incalculable, and non-compensable dangers. This body of work has proven 
to be a dominant sociological view of what societies do when confronted with the 
knowledge that they cannot calculate a risk. Terrorist threats target society’s 
vulnerabilities, replacing chance and accident with malevolence. This creates a troubling 
rupture in our relationship with risks. And Beck argues that the risk society challenges 
the idea that liberal nation states can be responsible for providing security for their 
citizens.39 The costs of the Chernobyl disaster now impact children who were not even 
born yet in 1986, and it will impact their children.40  
The style of thinking about the unthinkable, and pondering the impossible that 
came with security analysis against nuclear threats has a great deal in common with the 
conjectural, apocalyptic imagination that informs worst-case scenario planning, and 
precautionary security measures.41 And yet surprise endures. Fukishima, Ebola, 
Hurricane Katrina, each educate us about ourselves. They lay bare the available tools for 
responding to manifested impossibilities beyond maps and plans. They are instructive for 
understanding how security organizations respond to the unknown, how they frame it, 
live with, and feign control over it.42 
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But this view is not universally agreeable. Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle have 
disputed Beck’s notion that terrorist threats are either incalculable or non-compensable. 
They argue that the combination of government and private sector capabilities established 
under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) has opened up mechanisms for the 
private sector to insure against catastrophic terrorism losses.43 This argument asserts that 
there can be a response both from private industry and government to maintain control 
over the complex (though not, in this argument, impossibly unpredictable) threat of 
terrorism. Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster share this view, and further claim that 
even the unknown and uncontrollable may be subject to some of the same principles that 
inform insurance of complex risks.44 Where Beck sees the liberal nation state 
undermined by risk, Ericson and Doyle see it reinforced. 
In this thesis, I consider threat and catastrophe as exemplars of unbounded risk. 
For this reason, they bear defining.  
(1) Threat 
I consider “threat” both in terms of the way it is used in intelligence doctrine, and 
in terms of the sense of danger and uncertainty that are contained in the word “threat.” In 
the context of weapons of mass destruction, the FBI has a, “formalized process to assess 
a potential threat in the field, called the threat credibility evaluation (TCE) process,” used 
to align operational decisions to the assessed character of threat.45 In each case, 
assessment provides an analytic certification of danger. Threat is inseparable from the 
regimes of analysis that perceive and consider it. In the national security context, it is the 
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means of determining whether a danger poses a threat. So, in this thesis “threat” includes 
the uncertainty around possibility. 
(2) Catastrophe 
Governmental definitions of catastrophe express a continuum. The National 
Response Framework describes, “incidents that range from the serious but purely local to 
large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters.”46 Examining the 
dimensions of “worst cases,” Lee Clarke considers the tendency to think of catastrophe 
as, “rare, if not unique, and as striking randomly and without warning.”47 The etymology 
of the word catastrophe, note Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, “(as opposed to 
disaster, crisis or emergency) hints at this sense of rupture, surprise or novelty,” literally a 
reversal, or overturning.48 For this thesis I want to settle on the idea that catastrophe 
contains both the idea of rupture (surprise, breaking the relationship with risk) and of a 
scale that defies our available tools. 
2. Unconscionable Maps 
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the 
Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of 
the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following 
Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their 
Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without 
some Pitilessness was it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of 
Sun and Winters. 
—Jorge Luis Borges49 
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So we now use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does 
nearly as well. 
—Lewis Carroll50 
 
Accordingly, the Federal Government will…continue to enhance the 
ability of…Federal information-sharing resources to produce and share 
cross-sector, near real-time situational awareness while protecting 
sensitive information. 
—National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 201351 
 
This thread of literature review considers the ways homeland security 
professionals have generated maps in response to threats and hazards. In grouping 
literature beneath this banner I consider the term “maps” broadly to include the 
expressions and tools that homeland security agencies have developed to represent and 
respond to danger. Such maps include plans, threat assessments and the doctrines that 
inform and orient security actions in the context of national preparedness. 
The term “securitization” was coined by Barry Buzan as a way of describing the 
modes of thinking which frame issues within a security context.52 This is an influential 
conceptual frame of reference that has supported widely divergent views of the homeland 
security enterprise—from critiques of the governmental structures in place for security 
and crisis response, to harsh criticism of governmental, public and media over-
emphasizing of low probability security threats, and finally refinements that argue that it 
is perhaps irresponsible to ignore low probability threats. Securitization is an expression 
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of the politics of security. For writers examining the way political power structures 
influence security, the work of Michel Foucault is also influential.53 
In response to a culture of securitization, John Mueller has sought to assert 
probabilities back onto public perception, and emphasized that the threat of terrorism is in 
decline, and that politicians and profiteers continue to exaggerate the threat posed by 
terrorism.54 His work argues both that government spending on combatting a relatively 
minor threat is excessive, and that governmental approaches to addressing terrorism have 
resulted in a paranoid inflation of the threat, which results in thinking about too many 
things from a perspective of danger. Mueller’s approach is essentially actuarial—
considering principally the likelihood of terrorist attacks, and the ways in which societal 
opinion and response to low probability events may be shaped by a governmental 
overemphasis on these threats. Conversely Mueller also considers whether a government 
that worked harder to frame threats in a low-probability context would do more to sway 
public fears to match fact.55 Jef Huysman also examines what he terms the “social 
construction of danger,” where societal fears and concerns over terrorism and other 
security threats are translated into governmental action to provide security.56 
Research for this literature also considered existing laws, doctrines and national 
preparedness architectures outlined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and the 
National Preparedness System idea refined under Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 (HSPD-8), and Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-
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8).57 The creation of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed a series of 
primary missions for the department, including, “acting as a focal point regarding natural 
and manmade crises and emergency planning.”58 HSPD-8 and PPD-8 directed the 
construction of a National Preparedness System. The National Preparedness architectures 
within the system now include five mission areas of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, 
Response and Recovery, and establish a complex of Federal Interagency Operational 
Plans for each mission. Together, the production of these documents pursuant to PPD-8 
served as a means of organizing the capabilities of the Federal Government to anticipate, 
and manage crisis and catastrophe. The responsibilities of the DHS Secretary laid out in 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 also include the development of a National Incident 
Management System.59 The development of this system was generated in part due to the 
challenges of interoperability and coordination exhibited in the response to the attacks of 
9/11. And the challenge of executing this task has generated extensive public and private 
sector doctrines, plans, and supporting literature. 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required, “consolidating existing Federal 
Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response 
plan.”60 Among the many challenges implicit in this charge was to reconcile different 
methodologies for conducting incident planning. 
The prevalence of scenario-based planning in the civilian sphere owes a great deal 
to Herman Kahn. Working for RAND Corporation following World War II, he pioneered 
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the application of military war game models to domestic security planning.61 Scenario 
planning—a term meant to invoke Hollywood film scenes of imagined possibilities—
focused resources and operational plans around the potential impacts of plausible enemy 
actions. Perhaps the conjecture and imagination necessary to confront evolving risks are 
to be routinized through the development of such scenarios. Scenarios, like risk, consider 
the past, evaluate the present, and propose a possible future and there is literature to 
suggest that scenarios can serve as “strategic conversation” that allows organizations to 
consider and adapt to potential outcomes.62 While an immensely influential planning and 
decision-making model, scenario-based planning is a troubled concept within national 
preparedness. For a homeland security enterprise challenged with facing multiplicity of 
risks with limited resources, and organizing effort across a wide range of Federal and 
other public sector entities, capabilities-based planning (also adapted from Department of 
Defense (DOD) models) is now the prevalent model for developing plans.63 Capabilities-
based within the national preparedness system is defined as, “Planning, under 
uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards while 
working within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and choice.”64 
The essential distinction between these two models of planning is that while scenario-
based planning optimizes decisions upon considering plausible futures, capabilities-based 
planning is properly the development of diverse capabilities and detailed organizational 
knowledge. In practice however, scenario-based methods continue to influence the 
development of national capabilities assessments, and plans—as plans within the national 
planning system rely on scenarios to identify capabilities in hazard specific plans.65 The 
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principal challenge of planning systems is to develop capabilities and coordination 
mechanisms that allow homeland security organizations to respond to contingencies. But 
faced with a complex array of dangers, the state of planning relies on a combination of 
scenario and capabilities-based approaches designed to prepare organizations for the 
increasingly complex list of possible futures.  
Lee Clarke describes the way that, “to make a plan is to claim expertise,” and, 
“since claims to expertise are always claims that somebody should be left out of the 
decision loop, planning is deeply, unavoidably political.”66 Both scenario planning and 
capabilities-based planning are subject to this political character, and the way in which 
homeland security organizations plan ends up reflecting their beliefs and claims about 
specific hazards and organizational capabilities.  
When security organizations must act, the organizational arrangements and 
doctrines in place face similar challenges. The Homeland Security Act further required, 
“building a comprehensive national incident management system with Federal, State, and 
local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, to respond to such attacks and 
disasters.”67 The corresponding National Incident Management System (NIMS) doctrine 
is developed and maintained by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
and encompasses the Incident Command System (ICS), which has emerged as the 
national doctrine for incident management.68  
First published in February of 2003, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5) addressed the management of domestic incidents. Its purpose was succinct: 
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To enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents 
by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management 
system.69 
HSPD-5 directed the adoption of the NIMS by all Federal agencies, and made 
NIMS a requirement for the receipt of Federal preparedness grants and contracts. By 
tying preparedness grant funding to the implementation of NIMS among grantees, FEMA 
commenced a disciplined shift toward, “institutionalizing the use of ICS, across the entire 
response system” including non-federal responders.70 Within the NIMS document, 
FEMA included the ICS as the, “standardized incident organizational structure for the 
management of all incidents.”71 Likewise, the 9/11 Commission Report recommended 
the adoption of ICS to, “enhance command, control and communications capabilities.”72 
Much like the planning systems in use, NIMS and ICS are inherited doctrines. 
Deadly and destructive wildfires in 1970 illustrated the enormous challenges around 
interagency coordination and communications for responding to complex wildfires with 
disparate resources. As a result, Congress, “mandated that the U.S. Forest Service design 
a system that would ‘make a quantum jump in the capabilities of Southern California 
wildland fire protection agencies to effectively coordinate interagency action and to 
allocate suppression resources in dynamic, multiple-fire situations.’”73 At root, NIMS 
and ICS are management systems designed to balance standardization and flexibility. 
Both confront the enormous challenge of how best to permit different organizations to 
jointly address the complexity of incidents. And the sustained effort to nationalize the 
standardized adoption of NIMS is underscored by the relatively long history of the 
organizational models and planning processes instantiated in ICS. 
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However, writing in 2013, Cynthia Renaud argued for a crucial limitation to the 
structures of incident command outlined in the NIMS doctrine. The relevance and 
usefulness of command and control architectures, especially the ICS that is part of NIMS 
may, according to Renaud, effectively have a lower bound. In the initial moments 
following incidents, or at a highly localized level, the prefabrication of the ICS system 
may not lend itself well to the undiscovered and ill-defined parameters of an incident.74 
Organizational studies conducted of urban search and rescue teams using the ICS model 
similarly have concluded that, “ICS does not create a universally applicable bureaucratic 
organization among responders but rather is a mechanism for inter-organizational 
coordination designed to impose order on certain dimensions of the chaotic 
organizational environments of disasters.”75 In other words, rather than creating a 
universally adoptable system, ICS is a means for organizations to work together, and it 
functions by providing an organizational illusion of orderliness to what is, and perhaps 
remains, chaotic and complex. 
If ICS possesses such a “lower bound” of utility, others have argued that it may 
also be subject to an “upper bound” where incidents approach such organic complexity 
that emergent organizations produce greater effects than command and control models.76 
The enormous complexity of interacting state, local and federal authorities and 
catastrophic dangers puts additional strain on organizational arrangements within the 
command and control model of ICS.77 This in turn highlights the way in which the 
federalism model of American government can combine with national policy, doctrine 
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and law to erode the necessary conditions in which command and control might 
flourish.78  
Perhaps surprisingly, military doctrines of command and control have begun to 
experience significant evolutions toward greater decentralization and field level 
improvisation in response to volatile and evolving counterinsurgency missions.79 
Even in a state of such disciplined readiness, the unthinkable continues to happen 
to us. After action reporting in the wake of security crises further reveals aspirations to 
control, knowledge and uniformity within response operational arrangements and 
doctrines. The Navy report on the 2013 Navy Yard shooting in Washington, DC 
concluded that local and federal law enforcement failed to share key pieces of 
information such as the availability of live video within the building.80  
The final thread of this literature review, however, may temper the creation of 
unconscionable maps. “Unseen doctrine” is a term that describes a set of theory, 
capability, and practice that may significantly renovate the security response to 
catastrophe and threat. 
3. Unseen Doctrine 
The landscapes I have in mind are not part of the psychic sense, nor are 
they part of the Unconscious. They belong to the world that lies, visibly, 
about us. They are unseen merely because they are not perceived; only in 
that way can they be regarded as invisible. 
—Paul Nash81 
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The poetic Edda is an ancient collection of Norse mythology—including an 
account of Ragnarok, the, “traumatic climax” and, “great global catastrophe of the 
future” resulting in a new and better world.82 This is a theme echoed in literature, 
including the provocative poetry of Beowulf and subsequent studies in the nature of 
tragedy and terror in human experience.83 
There is a parallel literature in the realm of national preparedness built on the 
exploration of worst-case scenarios. Worst-case thinking, according to sociologist Lee 
Clarke can serve a utilitarian purpose, but is also subject to distortion.84 As argued by 
Clarke, regulators and security professionals must consider low probability events such as 
airplane crashes despite their likelihood, and that security agencies need to augment 
probabilistic thinking with possibilistic—e.g., investigating an airplane crash even though 
the probabilities of planes crashing are already sufficiently low. But possibilistic 
thinking, says Clarke, can be misused. Fear of worst cases can justify invasions of 
privacy or abandonment of risk-based decision-making. The value of plans, however, 
which articulate government responses to highly complex, catastrophic or uncertain 
incidents is twofold—it both encourages creative and possibilistic thinking in responders, 
and assures the public that the government is ready to respond and protect against 
dangers.85 But, says Clarke, these are not necessarily cynical documents. The 
organizations the produce them can be just as susceptible to the rhetorical qualities of this 
type of plan. In cases where planners have sufficient information to transform 
uncertainties into manageable risks, plans may well govern the actions that organizations 
will take. But where this level of rationality is not attainable, plans may become fantasy 
documents. Clarke calls for a tempered approach to catastrophism, and for organizational 
humility in assessing the ability to manage ubiquitous worst cases. In his estimation, the 
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Cassandra impulse of fear and dread has in fact grown too rare. American society has 
difficulty accepting loss or disaster that cannot be compensated. Meanwhile disasters 
continue to exceed our capacities.  
Man-eating predators have occupied, according to David Quammen, a unique and 
fearful place in human cultural symbols, myths and social structures.86 From the 
“crooked serpent” of the biblical leviathan to ancient tiger and lion symbolism, 
Quammen argues that these “monsters of god” served as fearful symbols of strength as 
well as human mortality. There is a parallel here with Clarke’s measured catastrophism, 
in understanding how human culture has responded to the enduring presence of possible 
danger. 
Similarly, Paul Slovic has worked extensively to examine the way in which the 
perception of risk can define our reactions, and may even present a danger by itself.87 
Considering how people respond based on feelings rather than simply data, Slovic has 
emphasized the social and cultural amplifications of risk.  
Nassim Taleb’s The Black Swan argues that unpredictable, high consequence 
events have a disproportionate influence on human affairs.88 And, he argues, this 
severely erodes the idea of risk predictability or large-scale risk management. This book 
is concerned with what Taleb argues is a human blindness to randomness and large 
deviations. In Taleb’s thinking, what is unknown becomes more important than what is 
known. It is a book about uncertainty, and Taleb argues that it is important to study rare 
and extreme events as a means to explain more common events—not the reverse. He 
argues that our current approach, which is to rule out less common events and focus on 
“normal” ones, neglects so called “outliers” as aberrations. But, when he considers the 
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disproportionate impact of outlier events, the problem deepens. Taleb argues eloquently 
for the futility of predictive analysis of markets—and almost everything else. 
Taleb’s views are not universally shared. Swiss risk expert Didier Sornette has 
proposed a countervailing theory, reframing Taleb’s notion of “gray swans” (significant 
incidents which, unlike black swans may be predictable) as Dragon Kings.89 As Sornette 
contends, crises are potentially predictable, if extremely complex, through the application 
of models for power laws (the functional relationships in probability between lower and 
higher impact incidents). Sornette has attempted to lay the groundwork for predicting 
catastrophes including earthquakes and market crashes. The as yet unverified hope for 
Sornette’s work is the prediction of crisis, and a better calibration of response to crisis, 
along with the ability to avoid it. Black Swans and Dragon Kings represent two 
contemporary views of the same issue—the limitations of certainty and the way in which 
security professionals should respond to it. 
Our current ways of thinking about uncertainty and risk have led to the 
dominance of what Cass Sunstein describes as the “precautionary principle.” This 
principle is broadly the idea that it is better to be safe than to be sorry—which can 
translate into a bias for or against taking action. Sunstein argues that precaution, if taken 
too strongly, can result in paralysis as the risk of taking action and not taking action each 
produce subsequent risks.90 Precaution as the dominant mode of regulation and security 
policy, according to Sunstein, imprisons decision makers between impossible risks on all 
sides of pressing social issues.91 Sunstein makes a distinction between risk and 
uncertainty, examining the precautionary principle against what he calls the “Maximin” 
principle. In this paradigm, when regulators are unable to assign probabilities to uncertain 
outcomes, they must instead choose the policy with the best worst-case outcome.92 
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Sunstein proposes balancing precaution against attention to probabilities. In 
situations of unknown probabilities and incalculable costs, we need to adopt an “anti-
catastrophe principle”—taking action to avoid the worst-case outcome even in the 
absence of confirming fact.93 The same principle may perhaps be applied to the 
development of regulatory policy, or tools of homeland security governance. Sunstein’s 
work serves a regulatory primer, outlining a set of principles that may serve as a guide for 
policy makers in navigating their responsibilities to both probability and precaution. In 
considering indefinite probabilities and measureless damages, we may need to modify 
our approach to scenario design, operational planning, policy and operational 
implementation to pursue the best worst case, rather than invest in preventing all possible 
cases. 
The literature of attempting to counter unbounded and extreme events is equally 
rich. Charles Perrow has argued that one solution to the “normal accidents” of tightly 
coupled complex systems and the humans that interact with them is to pursue 
“modularity.”94 This idea of modularity means a reduction in the concentration of 
vulnerability, such as the grouping of populations in high-risk areas, or the reliance on 
concentrated infrastructure arrangements such as the prevalence of extra-high voltage 
transformers in the electrical grid. Distribution of risk is a common theme in resilience 
literature, often referred to as “semi-autonomy” and has been augmented by Nassim 
Taleb’s notion of what he calls “antifragile” systems.95 Fragile things, according to 
Taleb, like teacups or poorly designed buildings, do not like volatility. Robust things, like 
diamonds or hardened structures do not particularly care—up to a defined tolerance. 
Antifragile systems are responsive to trial and error, flexible, adaptable, decentralized, 
and may even require volatility to flourish. In antifragile systems, all mistakes are good 
mistakes, because they spread and decentralize error, and therefore impacts. The principle 
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response to uncertainty here is decentralization and resisting the tendency to concentrate 
dependencies. 
For the responder who must react to uncertain and uncontrollable incidents, the 
literature also provides some unusual refinements to current thinking. In 1957, Omar 
Khayam Moore published “Divination—A New Perspective” in The American 
Anthropologist.96 His paper forwards the startling argument that magical practices in 
some cultures—traditionally dismissed by anthropologists as non-effectual—may 
actually produce their desired effect. Not, he argues, through actual magic, but by serving 
to randomize human behavior in relation to prey (such as the caribou) that responds to 
and tries to anticipate the actions of hunters, and by providing a sense of certainty in 
unpredictable situations. In view here is the possibility that developing systems of 
randomization may help responders address unpredictable enemies and threats. 
A close corollary to this notion Patrick Lagadec’s insistence on responder 
sensitivity to absurd rather than weak signals.97 Arguing that catastrophe and crisis push 
responders into unfamiliar territory, the modern responder must develop and adopt a 
comfort with recognizing and exploring the unknown without the expectation of being 
able to revert to familiar practices or rote solutions. 
Patrick Lagadec advocates and trains crisis professionals in the use of a rapid 
reflection force (RRF).98 Responders to modern crisis, argues Lagadec, must develop 
expect that it will not conform to procedures, plans, or even the domains constructed for 
managing disaster. The RRF is a notional interdisciplinary body not tied to the direct 
function of response, but tasked with anticipating the weak, even absurd signals that 
characterize modern crisis. Incorporating an RRF as part of a response organization is 
meant to provide a level of reflection and anticipation beyond the execution of immediate 
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tasks. As Nassim Taleb has argued that what we do not know is far more dangerous than 
what we do know, Lagadec’s exploratory frame of thinking is intended as tool for 
navigating a universe of increasing and omnipresent uncertainty.99 For Lagadec, this 
means being comfortable with deviating from procedure. As situations refuse to conform 
to rote procedure, responders should be comfortable exploring and experimenting within 
response to crisis. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Studying the borderland where homeland security reach exceeds grasp, this 
research seeks to understand and reform the way we conceptualize and manage 
unmapped security problems at the edge of our understanding. Such problems include the 
unpredictable possibilities of cataclysmic terrorism or catastrophes of staggering 
complexity or unique surprise. 
1. Selection 
Within the homeland security enterprise, I have circumscribed this study by 
focusing on the concept of national preparedness. Borrowing from the evolving concept 
of a national preparedness system initiated in HSPD-8, and revised under PPD-8, I have 
narrowed this research and argument to the way in which homeland security theory and 
practice manages contingency events across multiple missions and disciplines.100 This 
has meant excluding a consideration of more persistent issues such as immigration, 
economic or environmental policy, and fixing on operational concepts and practices. 
The concept for this thesis began with studying a renaissance map, and marveling 
at the depiction of dragons as informed conjecture about unknown places.101 The process 
I used to initially scope and select the research object required understanding risk, 
                                                 
99 Taleb, The Black Swan. 
100 White House, Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: March 
30, 2011). 




uncertainty and maps (conceptualizations) in homeland security applications. The 
overlaps and a basic view of this initial literature review are reflected in Figure 1. 
2. Limits 
This research is an observation and analysis of how unbounded risks influence 
security theory—including philosophical and epistemological beliefs and assumptions 
about security. And, when problems defy existing concepts of control, this research 
considers how current theory and corresponding doctrine and practice fares, and whether 
refinements may be in order. Second, this research will principally address strategies and 
doctrinal approaches for governing uncertainty, rather than directly assess crisis decision-
making, or social and organizational psychology. Finally, as mentioned above, this study 
is bounded by an emphasis on national preparedness, to the exclusion of persistent 
security issues such as immigration or economic policy. Rather, this study relies in part 
on the concept of national preparedness provided in PPD-8 as a means of building and 
marshaling capabilities to manage security risks. 
3. Data Sources 
The data used in this study includes a literature review and primary source 
documentation in the form of publicly available plans, strategic national risk assessments, 
doctrinal statements and homeland security laws, regulations and presidential directives. 
Additionally, I will consider small-scale case studies that are illustrative of the 
limitations of procedure, and the advantages and strengths of unconventional, exploratory 
methods for managing uncertainties.  
4. Type and Mode of Analysis  
This research follows a qualitative approach, producing a prescriptive set of 




a. Qualitative Approach  
Research will be qualitative, indicating that words, ideas, expressions and 
concepts of governance are the data under consideration, rather than numbers. 
b. Prescriptive Paradigm  
In exploring successful possibilities for managing uncharted security landscapes, I 
hope to provide a set of rules, recommendations or methods. 
c. Hermeneutic Method  
Hermeneutics is the art and science of interpretation.102 This thesis is more 
concerned with what the homeland security enterprise has made of quantitative fact than 
it is about the facts themselves. As a method, hermeneutics proposes to pierce the divide 
between art and science, and between science and philosophy.103 Such an approach is 
essential for the theoretical territory of this thesis. To study the imaginative and 
interpretive approaches in place for dealing with elusive security problems requires a 
means of examining the interstitial space between object (threat and catastrophe) and 
interpretation (policy, doctrine, conceptual maps and operational plans). This research 
will follow an inductive method to generate a theory and conceptual framework grounded 
in systematic analysis and comparison of three main bodies of security literature and 
cultural criticism: maps, risk and uncertainty. 
As a methodology, hermeneutics requires a cyclical, recursive approach to 
assessment of existing literature, interpretation and conjecture, theory, and argument. The 
process is designed to ensure logical rigor and broad consideration of existing interpretive 
frames of policy and practice. Figure 1 provides a further view of the way the speculative 
hermeneutics provides an analytic approach to comparing and evaluating a plurality of 
interpretations. As an enterprise made up of diverse disciplines, stakeholders, agencies, 
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legal authorities, etc., homeland security is not lacking for varied interpretations and 
views of identical information. For this reason, hermeneutics is an especially apt 
approach for assessing the uncommon ways in which interpretation of uncertainties has 
generated explicit and implicit theories in homeland security practice.  
Finally, hermeneutics is interpretive in contrast to an inventive approach. The 
prescriptive paradigm of this thesis will rely on interpretation as a means of providing 
rigor to theory development, rather than proposing a wholly new or inventive theory.  
However, in offering prescriptions, induction does imply a measure of creativity 
in producing a theory. “The man,” says J. Bronowski, “who proposes a theory makes a 
choice—an imaginative choice which outstrips the facts...every induction is a 
speculation, and it guesses at a unity which the facts present, but do not strictly 
imply.”104 
Figure 1.  Conceptual Model for Hermeneutic Approach 
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The output of this thesis is a proposed homeland security theory highlighting the 
problems of unbounded risk, and proposing approaches that refocus the homeland 
security enterprise away from fantasies of control, and toward disciplined irregularity, 




II. RISK UNBOUND 
The last few decades have witnessed an extraordinary development in the 
sciences and techniques of risk control and crisis management. However, 
there is a gnawing doubt: what if our points of reference, our capabilities, 
are no longer good enough? 
—Patrick Lagadec105 
 Ai! Ai! 
The elements obey me not. I sink 
Dizzily down, ever, for ever, down. 
And, like a cloud, mine enemy above 
Darkens my fall with victory! Ai, Ai! 
—Jupiter106 
 
In this chapter I will argue that the dangers homeland security agencies confront 
are increasingly beyond the reach of measures for control. In the first place this is 
because the character of the risks we face is changing. Secondly, it is because worst 
cases, not merely probable accidents and disasters, are particularly relevant to domestic 
security agencies and organizations. Because homeland security organizations lack the 
ability to select or decline risks the way, for instance, insurance companies might, 
catastrophe, threat, and concentrated uncertainty dominate their concerns. This presents a 
challenge to the idea that homeland security programs must be risk-based, because the 
uncertainty and possibility of such risks strain available risk management tools. 
Citing an older maritime edict, 6th century Roman law established, “that if 
merchandise is thrown overboard to lighten the ship, the loss occasioned for the benefit 
of all must be made good by the contribution of all.”107 Given uncertainty, this was a 
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means of distributing the loss of cargo between the merchant and the captain. In the 
intervening centuries, probabilistic and observational science have combined to offer 
improved means of taking calculated risks. The idea of risk offers something new to this 
early insurance scheme: control.  
Risk, says Ulrich Beck, “inherently contains the concept of control. Pre-modern 
dangers were attributed to nature, gods and demons. Risk is a modern concept. It 
presumes decision-making.”108 For a people who have a spent hundreds of years living 
by the future and organizing so many of our actions based on an ability to rationally 
anticipate the horizon, there is something traumatic in events that violate our schemes of 
management. Tragedy, surprise, attack, threat and catastrophe all describe the rupture of a 
reliable relationship with the future. They are the bubbling up of insecurity.  
Presenting this will require a brief explanation of what makes it possible to 
transform uncertainty into risk and what it means to manage risks that we know enough 
about to inform rational decisions. But more importantly, I will examine the ways in 
which contemporary risks violate our ability to manage them. Ulrich Beck argued that 
“The speeding up of modernization has produced a gulf between the world of 
quantifiable risk in which we think and act, and the world of non-quantifiable insecurities 
that we are creating.”109 Homeland security agencies inherit these non-quantifiable 
insecurities. And the result of this process is a set of modern risks that are, according to 
Beck, “de-bounded” along spatial, temporal and social dimensions.110 This in turn causes 
such risks to defy efforts at risk calculation and control. To Beck’s tripartite frame, I 
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make a case for a fourth dimension, that of rationality—arguing that the burgeoning 
hyper-complexity of crises particularly defies our ability to make sense of them.111  
For homeland security agencies tasked with responsibly adjudicating limited 
resources to provide against an expanding menu of threats and hazards, this is 
problematic. Unbounded risk undermines the concept of risk-based security, but it does 
not undermine the concept of risk or risk management generally. Rather, it describes the 
relationship that homeland security must develop with risks that are particularly difficult 
to manage, either because they are highly uncertain or catastrophic. It is precisely the 
uncertain element, and the catastrophic possibility that is of particular importance to 
homeland security agencies. 
Ultimately, I conclude the homeland security risks are becoming unbound, and 
the result is a security wilderness, increasingly unresponsive to the measures in place for 
control. 
A. RISK-BASED SECURITY 
9/11 was extremely unlikely. The mode of attack was unexpected, and its impact 
was likely worse than even the attackers intended.112 The world, and Americans in 
particular, will confess that its improbability offers no comfort. Terrorism in America 
remains highly improbable, but disquieting. Averages and aggregates are diminished in 
the face of cataclysm, just the way that a kidnapped child is an extraordinarily unlikely 
event, but an unmitigated tragedy for that particular family. Neither the rare earthquake 
nor the outlier tsunami is tolerated through the comfort of improbability. Rather, they 
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dominate our thinking with their horror—perhaps because they are distinct and seem to 
us unusual. And yet, conscious that security agencies must confront the unthinkable with 
limited resources, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff insisted as early as 2005 that, “DHS 
must base its work on priorities driven by risk.”113 What can he have meant? 
Chertoff’s admonition contains two ideas. First, managing individual threats and 
hazards requires the discipline of risk analysis. Second, that we must face a multitude of 
dynamic threats with limited resources. A risk basis for security actions is both a method 
for the control and management of individual risks, and a means of being judicious in 
addressing a multiplicity of risks. 
And DHS doctrine provides a framework for how the department is to go about 
this task, and develop a, “common organizational understanding of and approach to,” 
managing risk.114 The DHS Risk Lexicon defines risk as, “potential for an unwanted 
outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood 
and the associated consequences,” and risk management as the, “process of identifying, 
analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring or 
controlling it to an acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any 
actions taken.”115 Carrying through on this approach to risk requires homeland security 
to demonstrate both knowledge and control of risk. 
Not surprisingly the DHS annual Financial Report to its oversight and 
appropriation bodies in Congress for fiscal year 2014 contains more than one hundred 
references to risk, its management and reduction, and the development of risk-based 
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security measures.116 Risk management, the taming of chance, is a central figure in the 
doctrine and program development across a homeland security enterprise increasingly 
driven to efficiency by oversight and appropriation. From border security programs to 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screening measures, homeland security 
must, it seems, be risk-based. 
Undergirding such insistences on risk is a sophisticated and complex body of 
analytic science. A common framework for understanding this analysis is to determine 
the probability of something bad happening (threat), the extent of its damages 
(consequence), and the measures in place to reduce the impact (vulnerability). Expressed 
as a formula: Risk = threat x vulnerability x consequence. 
This formula has reached totemic proportions, and become a kind of explanatory 
phenomenon. In it, we find a means for understanding what we want to protect, and how 
much we are willing spend to protect it.117 John Mueller has argued that such calculation 
offers a means of critiquing homeland security spending. Homeland security agencies 
should, in his view, demonstrate that the cost of security measures do not outweigh the 
benefits.118 Mueller summarizes the method this way: 
Thus, for a successful attack in which the enhanced security cost is $75 
billion, losses sustained are a very high $100 million, and the reduction in 
risk is .45, the probability of a successful attack would need to be at least 
(probability of a successful attack) > $75 billion/[$100 million x .45] = 
1,667 attacks per year119 
Elsewhere, Mueller points out that in order to break even on counterterrorism 
spending, from a cost/benefit standpoint the United States would need to be experiencing 
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attacks on the scale of 9/11 at least once a year, or 18 Oklahoma City bombings every 
year.120 
Properly understood, this formula allows homeland security to responsibly 
allocate funding while making America safer. In such methodology risk becomes the 
province of experts: those able to know, assess, and determine the how likely and how 
bad something might be. Risk, then, is how such expertise makes it possible to rationalize 
and take action, even in uncertainty. 
The appeal of risk-based security is clear to the policy maker and to the security 
professional. It supposes a level of rationality to both uncertainty and operational 
response. On its surface it provides a rule for understanding and regulating security 
expenditures, which should properly be scalable to the level of risk for any given threat or 
hazard. Understanding probability distributions of given events, and being able to analyze 
in detail the potential consequences, even of extreme events, allows security professional 
to understand where their investments should focus, not simply in terms of the capability 
to be built, but in terms of whether a risk is better accepted, managed through response, 
reduced through mitigation, or dealt with through a cost effective combination of 
measures. 
The concept of a tornado safe room provides an elegant example of this kind of 
analysis; demonstrating multiple risk management measures at one location. The cost of 
designing a home to withstand a tornado is prohibitive when calculated by the square 
foot. What this means is that it is financially a better alternative to invest in insurance, 
disaster recovery, and hardening only a small portion of the home to be a tornado safe 
room.121 If supported by enough knowledge, risk analysis should guide security 
professionals in knowing how much they have reduced risk through mitigation, and how 
much to invest in what kinds of incident management capabilities, from fire suppression 
capabilities to emergency procedures.  
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1. Risk Informed Security 
Risk’s emphasis on decision-making illustrates that risk is a thing to be mastered 
not avoided—tamed not eliminated. Enterprise Risk Management is one method, or 
approach that views risk as an essential component to generating value. Organizations 
must take calculated risks in order to be successful. As expressed by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, “risk is integral to the pursuit of 
value,” and, “strategic-minded enterprises do not strive to eliminate risk or even to 
minimize it, a perspective that represents a critical change from the traditional view of 
risk as something to avoid.”122 Recent DHS approaches to risk have echoed this 
proactive sensibility.  
The DHS chaired Interagency Security Committee (ISC) maintains federal 
guidelines for determining the level of risk and corresponding required level of security 
for federal facilities.123 This risk management approach assigns a level of required 
security (I-IV) based on assessing the characteristics of the facility and its likelihood as a 
target.124 The ISC process allows for an “intangible adjustment,” an interesting 
acknowledgment of the concept that formal risk management may not be sufficient to 
account for either anxiety or possibility. The process also allows for a Level V 
designation, although what security measures are required with a Level V designation are 
left somewhat vague.125 In short, the ISC process allows for something other than 
calculation—from expert opinion to hunches—to inform security designations. 
In selecting a facility, the ISC process allows for the determination that a risk is 
unacceptable, but in the absence of a suitable alternate facility, a Federal entity can 
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choose to accept that risk. Risk acceptance is an important option in this decision-
making. What it acknowledges is that a certain activity or facility might be important 
enough to warrant taking additional risks. It is an expression of the value of the 
activity.126 
Similarly, Argonne national laboratory maintains three indices that allow for DHS 
Protective Security Advisors to assess, “high-risk critical infrastructure assets.”127 
Protective Security Advisors conduct enhanced assessments of facilities to collect and 
score information about that facility. The methodologies prescribed by Argonne provide a 
Protective Measures Index (PMI), a Consequence Measurement Index (CMI), and a 
Resilience Measurement Index (RMI. In keeping with the DHS approach to 
understanding risk, these indices consider risk as a combination of threat, vulnerability 
and consequence, and the indices as a combined means of measuring and assessing these 
three factors in relationship to a particular site or facility. The methodology is designed to 
provide an all hazards approach to measured risk. The PMI methodology, for instance 
measures five categories of protective activity, each with second and third level 
subcomponents. Physical security measures include a sub component of fences, gates, 
and closed circuit televisions that in turn have multiple characteristics which the PMI 
methodology assesses and scores.128 The utility of these indices is somewhat limited. 
They can provide an assessment of how individual parts of a facility perform and are 
resourced, but it does not necessarily highlight the overall criticality of individual 
components, or describe the way that they interact. Combined, however the value of this 
detailed triumvirate of method (PMI, CMI, and RMI) is to provide risk awareness at the 
facility level. Collecting information to support these indices then allows facility owners 
and operators to compare the performance of the facility in different scenarios using a 
web-based tool. In this sense, the purpose of detailed facility knowledge is a springboard 
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to understanding and modeling system performance in different scenarios. This should 
guide decision-making, and provide security professionals with access to the assessment 
information a detailed sense of facility level risks nationwide.  
2. A Noble Mirage 
Thus, far, risk sounds appealing, even inspiring. It is a liberating concept, as well 
as a means for homeland security to advance and exert a structured control over dangers 
while ensuring efficient operations and spending. It is the source of sufficient confidence 
to guide decisions and permit value to exist as a function of risk and return. What, then, is 
disaster? What could 9/11, or tornados in Joplin Missouri mean in the language of risk? Is 
catastrophe just chance we could not tame? Are ambiguous threats the leftover 
uncertainty security organizations were unable to render into risk? If security were purely 
a matter of risk, then such losses might be considered acceptable in the grand scheme—
the necessary endurance of uncertainty. 
Risk has always been fickle.  
Early on in the story of risk, the transition out of pure causality presented a 
problem of fatalism. Again, Hacking observes, “if it were a law that each year so many 
people must kill themselves in a given region, then apparently the population is not free 
to refrain from suicide.”129 Of a sudden, probability presented the same challenges to 
human agency that causality had before the invention of risk. This serves as a reminder 
that risk contains a constant element of uncertainty. It is over this question of uncertainty 
that the idea of risk-based security begins to suffer.  
a. Risk-Based Screening 
Recognizing a downward trend in security budgets and upward trends in mission 
requirements, the TSA has sought ways to maximize value for the public derived from 
transportation security. This problem gave birth to the concept of risk-based screening 
                                                 




procedures.130 There is a security proposition in this approach: If Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab, the infamous “underwear bomber” of December, 2009 would have been 
detected by a pat down, but the solution of patting down every traveller is unacceptable, 
then we need a smarter method for deciding who to pat down. 
The TSA approach is built on the recognition that DHS is not as organizationally 
agile as an adversary. Terrorists can rapidly adapt to security procedures that take months 
and years to put in place. And they can keep adapting. Keeping up is, perhaps, not 
possible for governments. And so TSA’s approach proposes that we stop chasing 
“devices” when faced with an infinitely adaptable enemy. Rather, TSA aggregates people 
(passengers) based on risk indicators. If they cannot screen everyone for the infinitely 
small possibility that someone is a terrorist, then they can address a challenging security 
tradeoff. 
Innovations that allow smaller and smaller amounts of explosive to disable a 
plane means that TSA must better focus technology on a smaller population, and be able 
to absorb a lower detection rate. 
TSA identifies higher risk groups of passengers, and subjects that higher risk 
group to a higher level of scrutiny. This allows TSA to focus resources on highest risk 
populations, and realize the greatest value per inspection dollar. The benefit is easy to 
argue. This would improve the efficiency of process, and focus resources on risks. 
But here is where we might object. 
If pre-check programs and other screening factors put travellers into low-risk 
pools, then the infinitely adaptable enemy will simply seek to place bad actors in low risk 
pools, while TSA excessively screens passengers who pose higher risk, but potentially no 
threat. This possibility was realized recently, as two men were arrested in a gun 
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smuggling operation that relied on one of them having a security clearance, and airport 
access.131 Adaptable adversaries can even adapt to risk-based screening. 
As a matter of public accountability, the risk-based screening approach is a 
mixture of good and bad. The risk-based screening approach at TSA is designed to 
maximize the airline industry performance measures and passenger convenience. 
Unfortunately, while trying to maximize this value, it is simply attempting to minimize 
inconvenience. The essential problem with this approach is that it reduces security to a 
question of how much we can afford to degrade system performance. It is important to 
demonstrate the security return on dollars spent, however, we must also make the case 
that measuring the performance of security measures include measuring more than how 
much they degrade system performance. Security needs to be a measurable value, and 
acceptable risk needs to become a more common concept. How can TSA demonstrate 
value in the absence of thwarted attacks? If enterprise risk is meant to show value as a 
function of risk and return, then what is the value?  
b. Risk-Based Limits 
Risk-based security diminishes as an idea in the face of high uncertainty and 
catastrophe. Homeland security is necessarily preoccupied with the unlikely. As Lee 
Clarke examined in Worst Cases, it is the statistically unlikely plane crash, the 
improbable catastrophe, and the previously unimagined terror that moves security 
organizations to action. And plane crashes, argues Clarke, must be investigated not 
because of their probability, but despite it.132 This places homeland security in a 
challenging position. Homeland security risk, it seems, is often not fully risk at all. It 
remains as uncertainty and danger. And this is at the heart of the challenge to risk-based 
security practices. If homeland security is predominantly in the business of the unlikely, 
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then it is problematic to think of ordering its capabilities against likely outcomes—even a 
suite of likely outcomes. There is a fondness for describing events that violate 
predictability as “rare” events. In some case, admitting to the increasing, perhaps 
disproportionate, impact of these outliers, we refer to them as “forcing events” or “low 
probability, high consequence” events.133 Active shooters and asteroid strikes. Terrorism 
and tsunamis. Such outliers are not made more acceptable by their rarity. 
This seems problem enough. However, understanding the likelihood and impact 
of risks is also increasingly difficult. The fundamental dimensions of risk as described by 
DHS doctrine—likelihood and consequence—are uniquely unavailable in the case of 
some of the most important homeland security risks. Terrorism risk is especially 
uncertain, and its potential losses highly concentrated. Pandemics and cyber threats may 
be highly volatile and decentralized. Environmental disaster may present invisible 
dimensions and long latency. In other cases, even the scope of the impact defies 
calculation. 
Curiously, the more we know about possible futures often means the less we 
know what to do. 100 years ago there was, literally, nothing to be done about asteroids. 
Today, we might be able to break them up in outer space, see them coming a few days 
away and order evacuations etc. But asteroids must line up alongside hurricanes and 
drought and climate change and terrorist attacks and mutating germs. They must compete 
for our attention and resources Sometimes, the more we know, the less we know what to 
choose. We can be equally paralyzed by knowledge and uncertainty. 
Modern risks present previously unknown challenges to taming chance. Tools 
designed for managing calculable dangers may be unsuitable for managing highly 
uncertain, catastrophic, volatile or diverse threats. In homeland security, risk, it seems, is 
becoming unbound.  
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B. UNBOUNDED RISKS 
The cockpit door locking system and entry keypad on the Airbus a320 (involved 
in the Germanwings 9525 crash) aircraft has built in safety features for emergencies: 
In case of emergency (suspected flight crew incapacitation, for example), 
a three-digit code followed by ‘‘#’’ can be dialled on the digital keypad. 
The acoustic signal then sounds continuously in the cockpit for 15 seconds 
and the green LED on the keypad starts to flash. If the flight crew does not 
respond during these 15 seconds, the door unlocks for 5 seconds. The 
green LED lights up continuously to indicate the door has been unlocked 
and the acoustic signal stops. The door only needs to be pushed in order to 
open it. After these five seconds have elapsed, the door locks again. If the 
flight crew toggles the switch during those 15 seconds, the acoustic signal 
stops and the system reacts according to the command 
(UNLOCK/LOCK).134 
In short, the system is designed to allow flight crew outside the cockpit to enter if 
the door is locked, unless the flight crew in the cockpit prevents them. U.S. regulation 
and industry rules require two crewmembers in the cockpit at all times, but at the time, 
European regulations did not.135 Shortly after the Germanwings accident, the European 
Aviation Safety Agency issued emergency guidance recommending two crew members 
be in the cockpit at all times.136 The review of such safety procedures in hindsight belies 
a darker concern: procedures must consider more fully how to protect against the pilot. 
This is a staggering thing to consider. The professional most directly responsible for the 
safety of the plane must be thought of as a liability.  
Of course the idea of a traitor is nothing new. Nor are negligence, operator error, 
fatigue or forgetfulness.137 Nevertheless, the idea of protecting an airplane from its pilot 
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demonstrates a problem. Who guards the guards? Delivering the keynote address at the 
2015 RSA conference, Amit Yoran acknowledged that one of the central errors in 
information system security is the amount of trust given to the trusted. What he is 
observing is the increased risk that occurs with localizing power, access, and capability 
with individuals without providing mechanisms for controlling them.138 His observation 
that that the current approach to such threats places security in the “dark ages” illustrates 
the challenge of worst-case thinking. Fortifications are medieval. In unbounded risks 
insecurity is normative. In a world of worst cases, this is not a peripheral concern. For the 
regulator, the policy maker, the designer of procedures, or the security specialist, the 
importance of worst-case scenarios is a central occupation. 
Fortress thinking still permeates the American approach to security. After 9/11, 
security measures in the cockpit of airplanes were designed like medieval castles—to 
provide the decision and tactical advantage to the defender within the cockpit.139 The 
crash of Germanwings 9525 offers a troubling critique of this model, tied to the changing 
nature of modern risk. In the worst-case world of Germanwings 9525 the defender was 
the threat. The passengers on Germanwings 9525, and indeed every flight, are uniquely 
separated from the means controlling the risks they face. They inherit a risk that 
originated elsewhere, including the mental state of the pilot, and the failure of existing 
procedures to recognize his state, and the comparatively normal dangers posed by an 
airplane crash. Unbounded risk is a way of describing such risk.  
1. The Insufficient Fortress 
Fortifications must adapt with the threats they face. Writing in the late 19th 
century, French architect and engineer Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc considered the 
problem and challenge of securing a single geographic location over generations. In his 
book Annals of a Fortress, he imagines a fictional hilltop town in France, and evaluates 
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twenty-two centuries of evolving defenses necessary to secure it from attack.140 As a 
primer in the principles of fortification, the book provides a useful chart to the necessary 
adaptations that follow advances in technology, and evolutions in threat. As societies rise 
out of primitive times and into siege weapons and eventually artillery, the fortress 
evolves from a druidic settlement to simple Roman Oppidum, and then toward 
increasingly sophisticated and complicated battlements designed to counter siege 
weaponry. Scattered watchmen outside the campfires give way to guards and gates. 
Concluding the book, Viollet-le-Duc examines the essentials of fortress thinking. 
In its simplest abstract form, a circular enclosure presents a defensive problem. The 
defender of a fortress is at a disadvantage. Facing an attacker with projectile arms, “the 
defenders will be able to oppose only an inferior number of engines to the convergent 
fire.”141 Annals of a Fortress illustrates this point by demonstrating the necessary 
changes from simple defenses to complicated defenses. 
Figure 2.  From Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc, Annals of a Fortress. 
 
With this series of figures, Viollet-Le-Duc demonstrates the way that the application of 
the principles of fortification leads to progressively more complicated defenses. 
Translated by Benjamin Bucknall, Annals of a Fortress (Boston, J. R. Osgood and 
Company, 1876), Figures 77, 78, and 79. 
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“This principle,” says Le Duc, “regulates and will always regulate attack and 
defence; distances alone modify its applications.”142 In other words, the variation of 
defensive measures increases the safe distance of the attacker. Increases in the effective 
distance of projectile arms, from siege warfare through the development in artillery 
necessitate corresponding evolutions in defenses. The fortress evolves from simple to 
complicated as technology and tactics alter the paradigm of defense. 
Completing his examination at the close of the 19th century, Le Duc concludes 
that the struggle between attacker and defender—and the necessity of fortifying a 
location against evolving threats—will result in the betterment of nations. Such conflict 
cultivates innovation, and the evolution of society will, he reckons, progress toward ever 
more complicated measures and means of defense and security. Since the publication of 
Annals of a Fortress, however, the nature of threats and risks has changed, and may 
require something more than complicated defenses. The 20th and 21st century have 
witnessed evolutions beyond technical advancements in the range and lethality of 
weaponry, and generated risks where the central concern is no longer robustness or 
complication of defenses, but the unforeseen possibilities that come with complex 
systems, concentrated vulnerabilities, and uncertain risks. The principle of attacker and 
defender is potentially eroded by complex risks, exhibited in the concentrated, 
unaccountable example of Germanwings, where the pilot was able to create astonishing 






                                                 




Figure 3.  From BEA, Preliminary Report on the Germanwings Flight 9525 
Crash. 
 
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile (BEA), Rapport 
préliminaire Accident survenu le 24 mars 2015 à Prads-Haute-Bléone (04) à l’Airbus 
A320-211 immatriculé D-AIPX exploité par Germanwings (Paris, FR: BEA, May, 2015), 
Figure 3. Cockpit Door Locking System. 
One lesson of the Germanwings tragedy is that even complicated fortification is 
newly insufficient. A security arrangement that made the cockpit more robust also 
allowed the unthinkable. The character of modern dangers exhibits the incompleteness of 
complication and robustness as a defensive response. Complexity, unseen connections, 
and ambiguous dangers, are increasing in their security prominence. Adaptive defenses 
seem to require a new set of tools beyond the challenge of reconfiguring our fortresses.  
In 2015, the Secret Service Protective Mission Panel released the executive 
summary to a report.143 The panel was commissioned to address recent security lapses 
(including a particularly successful fence jumper) and provide some insight into hiring a 
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new agency director. As an opportunity to review what might be the most complex 
physical security problem in the modern world (maintaining perfect security at a 
presidential residence that welcomes well over a million visitors a year), the report 
offered only a few interesting observations. The recommendations summarized fall into 
three unremarkable categories: 
• Training and Personnel 
• Technology, Perimeter Security, and Operations 
• Leadership144 
Such recommendations could probably have been discerned without a formal 
panel report. The recommendations for leadership prescribe a mission-based budget 
redesign, and suggest that the next director come from outside the agency. What follows 
sounds suspiciously like a call to tighten procedures. But procedures may have been the 
problem on September 19th, 2014. Perhaps what allowed Gonzalez to reach the White 
House was not a failure to implement procedure, but responders adhering too rigidly to 
procedure, and being uncertain in the face of an event that violated procedure. Perhaps 
they were surprised. The reaction directly after the event (and in the Panel report) from 
physical security specialists was in part to widen the perimeter. The flaw in this thinking 
is immediately visible. The White House cannot be infinitely hardened. Deployed against 
a specific threat defensible space and other hardening measures reduce risk, and make 
theoretical sense. Deployed as a general tactic and security philosophy, they approach 
absurdity as threats evolve. In reviewing the incident, the Secret Service Protective 
Mission Panel acknowledged the limitations of a singular focus, concluding that, “For 
sure, the fence must be taller…But the problems exposed by recent events go deeper than 
a new fence can fix.”145 There is Aegean stables efficiency to wholly rethinking 
missions. But there is a change in risk that remains unacknowledged in a report summary 
that calls for new ideas, but largely recommends a new boss, better training, and a higher 
fence.  
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The now viral video of a Buckingham Palace royal guard subtly, subversively 
dancing within the rigid regularity of his age-old ornamental security beat may offer 
some insights for refining fortresses.146 While the guard was removed from his post for 
the breach in decorum, his performance illustrated a level of comfort and improvisational 
skill that may in fact be required by risks that do not conform to the rules of fortress 
thinking. 
2. Risk Society 
It was the same year as the Chernobyl disaster that Ulrich Beck published the 
German manuscript of his Risk Society.147 In it, Beck considered the societal and 
governmental implications of living with persistent and omnipresent risks. Two decades 
later, Beck considered a U.S. congressional committee tasked with investigating how the 
U.S. might communicate to civilizations 10,000 years in the future the hazards associated 
with our nuclear waste, wondering, “what concepts can we form, and what symbols can 
we invent to convey a message to people living 10,000 years from now?”148 Considering 
the dimensions of such a problem Beck offers a summation of the problem of modern 
risks: 
What is remarkable about this commission is not only its research 
question, that is, how to communicate across 10,000 years, but the 
scientific precision with which it answered it: it is not possible…Past 
decisions about nuclear energy and present decisions about the use of gene 
technology, human genetics, nanotechnology, etc., are unleashing 
unpredictable, uncontrollable and ultimately incommunicable 
consequences that might ultimately endanger all life on earth.149 
                                                 
146 Alastair Macaulay, “At Buckingham Palace, a Dancing Guard Throws Decorum to the Wind,” The 
New York Times, September 16, 2014. 
147 See Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne [risk society: towards a 
new modernity] (Frankfurt, DE: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986). For the first English edition see also Ulrich 
Beck, Risk Society. 
148 Ulrich Beck, “The Terrorist Threat World Risk Society Revisited,” Theory, Culture & Society 19, 





Modern risk as defined by Ulrich Beck was, “a systematic way of dealing with 
hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself.”150 Here risk is 
not a general method for making sense of the world, but a necessary construction around 
the dangers which human society introduces as it advances. And Beck was struck by the 
profound social implications of society dealing with risks it has created. One of his most 
striking observations notes the way that in modern risks, the cause and effect of risks 
become separated. The Bhopal chemical disaster, argues Beck, demonstrates the way that 
a globalized economy can transition the production of dangerous chemicals to third world 
countries, where the catastrophic impact of a factory accident then poisons an unwitting 
population living near the plant.151 Managing such scattered risks becomes problematic.  
a. Risk Society and Unbounded Risk 
Risk Society was revolutionary in its scope, but it also reflected a growing trend in 
observations of the time concerning the nature of extreme risks posed by increasingly 
complicated technological hazards.152 The heightened possibilities associated with 
technological accidents put in high relief the idea that mankind was able to create dangers 
more powerful and complex than the measures for control he might be able to design. 
Technological risk had transitioned in some way from mere complication to complexity, 
which implied that aspects of risk were invisible. The safety procedures surrounding 
modern technology—from nuclear power to chemical production—presented a challenge 
to risk because they made it difficult to assess the probability and consequences of an 
incident. But it was not simply a Frankenstein terror, or fear of a machine run amok. 
Rather Beck was interested in the idea of what a society that was no longer feudal or 
industrial would do with the idea of risk. How might risk transform social arrangements 
or governmental structures? Risk presented itself in this thesis as something more than a 
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problem to be capitalized on, instead a new social phenomenon that governments, 
organizations and individuals must organize their lives by. 
Beck contends that, “calculating risks is part of the master narrative of first 
modernity.”153 But risk society represents what Beck refers to as “second modernity,” a 
period defined by the societal self-awareness of coping with the risks it has created. And 
here Beck considers the ways in which modern risks appear to defy the established 
methods of calculation and control. Observing that risks are increasingly de-localized, 
incalculable, and non-compensable, Beck viewed them as “de-bounded” along multiple 
dimensions: spatial, temporal, and social.154 
Spatially, risks do not conform to political boundaries, or the doctrinal and 
operational distinctions between professional disciplines and infrastructures. The Ebola 
virus, once consigned to burn out in remote villages, now moves at the speed of 
transportation, evolving rapidly into a problem of logistics, border security, intelligence 
and interdisciplinary coordination.155 Climate change, along with toxic pollution and 
even the transport of hazardous materials illustrate the ease with which risks move, and 
shift across spatial boundaries.156 Temporally, the long-term impacts of nuclear and 
biological attacks and accidents produce long-term effects that further complicate 
attempts to understand their impact. The social dimension of risks serves both to make it 
difficult to locate the precise source of risks, and easy for risks to be amplified by 
complex social dimensions. 
American sociologist Kai Erikson considers the ways in which chemical and 
radiological disasters, “violate all the rules of the plot,” of risk: 
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Some of them have clearly defined beginnings, such as the explosion that 
signaled the emergency at Chernobyl or the sudden moment of realization 
that opened the drama of Bhopal; others begin long years before anyone 
senses that something is wrong...But they never end. Invisible 
contaminants remain part of the surrounding, absorbed into the grain of 
the landscape, the tissues of the body, and, worst of all, the genetic 
material of the survivors. An all clear is never sounded. The book of 
accounts is never closed.157 
These curious modern risks appear to violate the very dimensions which 
homeland security organizations are positioned to measure. The Argonne methodologies 
of PMI, CMI and RMI depend on an ability to measure threat, vulnerability and 
consequence with sufficient accuracy to guide decisions. But in Beck’s risk society, 
threats are highly uncertain, consequences are incalculable, and vulnerabilities are 
occluded. As Kai Erikson observes, the consequence of risks may never be counted as 
complete, their onset may be of indeterminate latency. In a risk society, calculations will 
often be incomplete. 
The phenomena of such risk is exemplified by chemical and radiological events, 
but it is not restricted to them. As recently as September of 2014, FEMA and the State of 
Louisiana still retained $812 million in unexpended hazard mitigation grant program 
funds, nearly a decade after Hurricane Katrina.158 The impact of modern disasters 
extends beyond the initial assessments, calculations, and the operational conduct of 
emergency response. From chemical disaster to Katrina and 9/11, the book of accounts 
remains open. 
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b. Risk Society and Double Government 
In the attacks of 9/11 Ulrich Beck saw the implication that, “a state can 
neoliberalize itself to death.”159 The thesis of Risk Society meant that the state would 
increasingly need to assert itself. Government institutions would supersede private or 
economic concerns in order to provide security. With the creation of DHS, new agencies 
like the TSA, and other reactions to 9/11, this seems demonstrably true. Government has 
reordered itself around an assertion of domestic security. However, because government 
institutions like DHS are established to provide security, in a risk society, “every accident 
violates the basis of the unshakeable right to security which appears to be promised.”160 
That is, departments and agencies designed expressly to promise security to citizens find 
themselves unable to deliver on their promises in increasingly prominent ways. 
Because unbounded risks create such immense challenges in the realm of 
calculation and response, they have the curious quality of increasing the distance between 
the citizen and the government entities designated to provide security. Considering the 
question of why security policy has not appreciably changed between two presidential 
administrations, Michael J. Glennon reaches a disturbing conclusion: it is not the 
president, nor the judiciary, nor even the congress, who exert the most sway over national 
security policy.161 
The American experiment, describes Glennon, designated a three-part separation 
of governmental power between the “dignified” “Madisonian” institutions of Executive, 
Judicial and Legislative branches. Security, since the days of Harry Truman and the 
national security act of 1947, has become the emphatic province of the expert—the 
“efficient” “Trumanite” institutions of government that exist in executive branch security 
agencies. Invoking the 19th century observations of Walter Bagehot, Glennon concludes 
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that America is under the grip of a “double government.” While the “dignified” 
institutions of the “Madisonian” scheme continue to function, their purpose is largely 
symbolic. Meanwhile, the actual decisions and calculations about risks are managed by 
the network of government experts in the “Trumanite” government. Americans are being 
governed twice. And the means of oversight for these institutions—ultimately 
culminating in the right and duty of American citizens to vote—is undermined by the 
inability to directly access this second veil of government. Representatives in the 
legislature are, according to Glennon, less and less equipped to intrude upon the 
“Trumanite” network. 
One challenge to Glennon’s concern is the apparent necessity of “Trumanite” 
efficiency in the face of unbounded risks. Arguably, unbounded risk is complicated and 
uncertain in such a dramatic sense, that it has become solely the province of experts, and 
far beyond the legislative skill set of Congress, or the well-intentioned decision making 
of the President. Cass Sunstein has recently expounded on this very idea, arguing that the 
executive branch has by necessity grown to be the “most knowledgeable branch.”162 
Increasingly uncertain risks—from technological complexity to decentralized 
non-state threats and violent extremism—particularly challenge the way that government 
response to them. “Unlike specific dangers,” says Mikkel Rasmussen, “which can be 
countered by specific means, threats are elusive, compelling risks that must be 
managed.”163 The impact of such risk elusiveness is, according to Beck, a profound 
social change in what risk means. Citizens and elected officials alike are so unable to be 
fully expert in risks—from technological systems and biologically engineered germs to 
sectarian rivalries and cyber vulnerabilities—that they relinquish to the experts. The more 
startling conclusion, as Beck points out, is that even experts are unable to perfectly 
predict terrorist threats or technological disaster, and, “when there is no one to give the 
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authoritative answers then society begins to work in new ways, it ceases to be modern 
and becomes reflexive about its own modernity.”164  
Unbounded risks create a separation between the instruments of security and 
those secured by it. Citizens in a risk society are separated from the government that 
provides security. Information that must be classified is remanded to the specialists who 
have been investigated and vetted. It is not so much hidden from the citizen, as it is 
hidden from the adversary who would misuse it, but in the process, the citizen is 
separated from the specialized world of security management trained and equipped to 
handle such vagaries. In the realm of national security, as the equipment necessary to 
combat risks becomes increasingly arcane, the arrangements increasingly byzantine, and 
the risks more abstruse and uncertain, so too does the distance between the governed and 
the government tasked with providing security widen. 
In Beck’s view unbounded risk undermines the concept of liberal government. 
Says Beck: 
It is easy to misconstrue the theory of world risk society as Neo-
Spenglerism, a new theory about the decline of the western world, or as an 
expression of typically German Angst. Instead I want to emphasize that 
world risk society does not arise from the fact that everyday life has 
generally become more dangerous. It is not a matter of the increase, but 
rather of the de-bounding of uncontrollable risks.165  
Beck is not predicting the decline of the West, but rather concludes that 
unbounded risk that did not respect political boundaries required governance that did not 
respect political boundaries. The globalization of risks demands a corresponding 
globalization of governance. The problem of climate change is not geographically 
constrained, its causes and effects not political. Likewise, the spread of Ebola in 2014 
illustrated the permeability of doctrinal and organizational distinctions. Security agencies 
have responded largely along the lines that Beck argues may be necessary. Despite its 
resurgence, Beck saw here the end of the idea of the national state, as government 






institutions become, “more powerful, and supranational institutions like NATO [become] 
less powerful.”166 
Beck imagined a “cosmopolitan” form of government—one that corresponded not 
to national state boundaries, or parochial interests, but to the dimensions or risk and the 
complexities of an increasingly connected society. The nationalization of the NIMS and 
the ICS are indicators of a similar impulse to create a form of governance for risk that 
does not correspond to jurisdiction. The creation of national systems and increasingly 
trans-political security measures and approaches indicate a trend toward adjusting 
security governance measures to match the scale of risks. 
The impulse is incomplete. NIMS, ICS, and other increasingly globalized, or 
systematized security management approaches are not multilateralism or 
cosmopolitanism, but merely a competing form of unilateralism. Such systems fail to 
address other essential characteristics of unbounded risks—characteristics that demand 
variability, and adaptability.  
Ultimately, a re-invigorated sense of federalism—a jumpstarting of the 
“dignified” “Madisonian” institutions—may be the only answer to enduring uncertainty. 
It may also provide the kind of cosmopolitanism Beck aspired to, redistributing the 
centralizations that have been carried along by the resurgence of the state in the wake of 
9/11. Decades before Beck, John Maynard Keynes considered the importance of 
uncertainty which cannot be eliminated, despite probabilism and analysis: 
By ‘uncertain knowledge’, let me explain, I do not mean merely to 
distinguish what is known from what is merely probable. The sense in 
which I am using the term is that in which the price of copper and the rate 
of interest twenty years hence, all the obsolescence of a new invention are 
uncertain. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.167 
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Homeland security theory must consider more directly this margin of enduring 
uncertainty. Current approaches tend to view it as residual—best managed through 
accelerated and rapid versions of standard risk management and crisis response tools. 
Other influential theories may provide a more refined engagement with uncertainty. 
“Crises,” says Patrick Lagadec, “seem to be in total opposition to the very foundations of 
modern social science.”168 This is because the persistence of complexity and the 
endurance of uncertainty continue to undermine the evolving measures to centralize 
means of controlling interconnected and mercurial risks.  
3. Worst Cases 
Contemplating the possible destruction of the earth, Cambridge physicist Adrian 
Kent notes drily that in addition to the loss of all life on the planet, “there is the 
opportunity costs arising from the absence of future generations.”169 This is a cost 
beyond accounting. Kent considers two opposing views of such world ending 
possibilities: 
Proposed catastrophe mechanisms generally rely on speculation about 
hypothetical phenomena for which there is no evidence, but which at first 
sight do not contradict the known laws of physics. Sometimes, such 
pessimistic hypotheses can be countered by arguments which show that 
the existence of the catastrophe mechanism is highly improbable, either 
because closer analysis shows that the proposed mechanism does in fact 
contradict well established physical principles, or because its existence 
would imply effects which we should almost certainly have observed but 
have not.170 
The question Kent wrestles with is how to reconcile the possible with the 
probable. On the one hand, there are hypotheticals, on the other hand the challenge of 
proving, disproving and dealing with them. Kent laments that little has been done to 
resolve the conflict between these two views, mathematically or in terms of policy.  
                                                 
168 Patrick Lagadec, “Risks and Crises in Terra Incognita,” Paris Tech Review (October 10, 2010). 
169 Adrian Kent, “A Critical Look at Risk Assessments for Global Catastrophes,” Risk Analysis 24, no. 





One such scenario that Kent considers is the possibility of a particle accelerator 
disaster. In 1999, scientists at the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider (RHIC) commissioned 
by Brookhaven National Laboratory responded to concerns that heavy ion collisions 
could result in the end of the world.171 Sir Martin Rees, the United Kingdom’s 
astronomer Royal, has further explained that the RHIC could produce a, “shower of 
quarks” leading to a hypothetical “strangelet disaster” that could reduce the earth into, 
“an inert, hyperdense sphere about one hundred meters across.”172 Rees and other 
scientists have concluded that the possibility of a strangelet disaster is remote, but 
calculating this remoteness presents analytic challenges. Adrian Kent, in acknowledging 
that the possibility of a strangelet disaster is, within current theoretical models, “precisely 
zero,” admits that, “When the destruction of the Earth is in question, though, it would be 
preferable not to have to rely on theoretical expectations alone.”173 Put simply, the 
outcome of a strangelet disaster is so potentially bad, even infinitesimal improbability 
may not be sufficient comfort. 
Considering this scenario of earth’s destruction, Richard Posner concludes that 
while such dangers appear lower, they are ultimately incalculable.174 Incalculable 
dangers may be easier to ignore, but that does not mean that they are best ignored.  
Neglecting such possibilities in favor of probabilities can be dangerous. In Worst 
Cases, Lee Clark argues that, “probabilistic thinking is not the only way to be 
reasonable.”175 Worst cases, argues Clarke, may be unlikely, but they are not aberrant. 
They are rare, but normal. And worst cases matter especially for security agencies and 
organizations. This presents immense challenges. While the temptation in confronting 
worst cases is to build organization of such robustness that they permit a form of 
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organization hubris, Lee Clarke warns that the lesson or worst cases is almost the 
opposite. Worst cases should make us humble176  
4. The Fourth Dimension: Rationality 
The first preseason outlook produced by National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration for the 2012 Atlantic hurricane season predicted 9–15 Named Storms, 4–
8 Hurricanes, and 1–3 Major Hurricanes.177 The season actually produced 19 tropical 
cyclones. One of them was Hurricane Sandy. Sandy made landfall on October 29, 2012 
as a post-tropical cyclone, and it impacted densely populated and complicated 
jurisdictional, infrastructural, and residential communities in New York and New 
Jersey.178  
Because of the complex of storm damages, jurisdictional arrangements, and multi-
state impacts of the storm, FEMA faced corresponding challenges in organizational 
arrangement. FEMA doctrine allows for three basic operational paradigms: functional 
organization, geographic organization, and a hybrid approach to each. For Sandy, FEMA 
opted for a hybrid approach, but applied it inconsistently and faced enormous challenges 
in allocating and maintaining visibility for resources across geographic and functional 
branches and divisions.179 
FEMA faced an emergent property that is increasingly common to catastrophe 
and threat: hypercomplexity. Unconventional dangers degrade traditional, “crisis 
planning and management, and [make] them instantly obsolete.”180 
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Hypercomplexity makes it difficult to establish a rational understanding of threat 
and catastrophe. It is difficult to develop and frame operational objectives when the 
problem itself is variable, and more complex than our means of understanding it.  
C. CASE STUDY: CRUDE OIL UNBOUND 
Each of us is all the sums he has not counted...the seed of our destruction 
will blossom in the desert, the alexin of our cure grows by a mountain 
rock 
—Thomas Wolfe181 
Early on the morning of July 6th, 2013, crude oil from North Dakota resulted in 
47 fatalities in Quebec Canada. Unbounded risk is like this, drawing invisible lines of 
chance that suddenly become clear in the aftermath of tragedy. Cause, effect, assessment, 
and response are separated, creating national and international challenges to tracing out 
such lines of dependency before they result in damage and death. American novelist 
Thomas Wolfe wrote of the, “dark miracle of chance,” in which, “every moment is a 
window on all time.”182 Moments of catastrophe are like this, forcing events that cause 
homeland security to try and trace the outline of causation to its root. Unbounded risks 
make it difficult to do so. 
The evening prior, a 4700-foot oil transport train left unattended overnight began 
to roll. It travelled more than seven miles, ultimately reaching a speed of 65mph when it 
derailed in the center of the town of Lac-Mégantic, Quebec.183 Its derailment set off a 
series of fires and explosions in which, “47 people died, and about 2000 people were 
evacuated. Forty buildings and 53 vehicles were destroyed.”184 The accident also resulted 
in contamination of a nearby lake and river. 
                                                 
181 Thomas Wolfe, Look Homeward, Angel (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1929; New 
York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 5. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Railways Investigation Report R13D0054 Runaway and 
Main-Track Derailment of Montreal, Maine, & Atlantic Railways Freight Train MMA-002 MILE 0.23, 
Sherbrooke Subdivision Lac-Mégantic, Quebec 06 July 2013 (Gatineau, QC: August, 2014). 




The accident analysis section of the investigation into Lac-Mégantic begins with a 
reflective acknowledgement. “Understanding what happened is only the first step;” say 
the authors, “it is important to determine why such accidents happen. This analysis will 
therefore focus on the underlying factors that played a role in this accident.”185 The scope 
of the Transportation Safety Board of Canada investigation report follows this approach, 
and it reveals the unbounding of risk along multiple dimensions. A startling array of 
factors contributed to the accident and defined its impact. It is difficult to pinpoint a 
single cause. Examined in hindsight the accident appears as an inevitable unfolding of a 
complex of interactions. But the workings of these constituent parts were, in many crucial 
ways, invisible to the individuals and groups involved in the accident.  
On the evening prior to the accident, the train was discharging an unusual amount 
of smoke, the result of a nonstandard engine repair that left superheated oil building up in 
the body of the turbocharger.186 The engineer noted this, and planned to deal with it in 
the morning. The train was secured for the night using a combination of air brakes, 
handbrakes, and independent brakes to prevent it from beginning to roll. The engineer 
tested the hand brakes by removing the air brakes, but neglected to remove the 
independent brakes. The train did not move, and the engineer, “deemed the test 
successful.”187 The engine, per procedure, was left running, maintaining compression for 
the air brakes. Just before midnight, firefighters responded to a 911 call and extinguished 
a fire on the locomotive, caused by the oil buildup in the turbocharger. Following 
procedure, the firefighters shut the locomotive’s fuel supply and electrical breakers off. In 
consulting with the rail line representative dispatched to the scene (a track foreman, not a 
locomotive engineer), the locomotive was left off for the night, and firefighters, along 
with the representative left the scene after notifying the rail traffic controller of the 
condition of the train. However, the air brakes relied on compressed air, which the engine 
was no longer producing. Additionally, a fail-safe mechanism that would engage other 
                                                 
185 Ibid. 





brake systems was wired incorrectly and did not engage when the firefighters pulled the 
breakers. As the air brakes lost compression, the remaining brakes were insufficient, and 
the train began to roll.188  
This was only the proximate cause of the accident. 
The train derailment occurred at a switch point that brought a main thoroughfare 
in the town alongside rail track turnouts and switch points. The 47 fatalities might be 
blamed on this aspect of municipal and industrial planning that concentrated people near 
technological risk. But just as easily one might blame the design of the 63 tank cars that 
derailed. The joint Department of Transportation (DOT) rule developed in the aftermath 
of this disaster prescribes retrofit and design changes to the standard DOT-117 tank cars 
(TC-117 in Canada).189 Or perhaps it is the volatility of Bakken Crude itself, or the rail 
safety or the fire response procedures. Perhaps even more broadly, the Lac-Mégantic 
disaster is not separable from the forces of global economics and geopolitics that generate 
the demand and permit the transport of crude oil across borders and countries. 
Perhaps it is all these things. The lesson appears to be the complexity and the 
invisibility of connections between these contributing aspects of risk.  
The unnamed repairman who performed nonstandard repairs on the engine of the 
MMA-002 train was likely not aware of standard procedures for responding firemen, or 
even the worn condition of the handbrakes on that train. Nor could he have been expected 
to understand the way that a more volatile form of crude oil could change the risk profile 
for a community the oil travelled through. Even the table of contents to this report serves 
as a reminder of the nature of the risk society thesis, as well as the ultimate “normal 
accident” and an archetypical “worst case.” The design of rail cars, the physical layout of 
rail lines, the grade and geography of the region, safety procedures, brake designs, 
regulations in place, rail traffic, community planning, emergency response planning, and 
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the corporate culture of the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway are all factors which 
influenced the accident. 
As an exemplar of the risk society, the Lac-Mégantic disaster demonstrates the 
challenge of addressing the enormous complexity of risks that are the product of 
modernity. The difficulty of managing a risk that originates in North Dakota, and exhibits 
itself in Quebec takes on uncertain proportions. As expressed by Ulrich Beck, “thanks to 
the complexity of the problems and the length of chains of effect, assignment of causes 
and consequences is no longer possible with any degree of reliability.”190 The fuel 
coming from the Bakken range is potentially more volatile than other crude oil, but it has 
been shipped over systems—from rail lines to tankers to human procedures and 
emergency response plans—that remained unchanged. The trains carrying Bakken oil 
transect multiple jurisdictions, each with differing capabilities to respond to crude oil 
fires, and with uncertain and variable training budgets and private and public resources 
for crisis management. The citizens of Lac-Mégantic found themselves the inheritors of 
those risks, suffering the effects of a disparate sea of complex causes. This is not to argue 
that the failure of risk management in the case of Lac-Mégantic undermines the idea of 
risk management. The accident investigation report highlights failures of risk assessment 
in multiple stages and places. But the complexity of procedure, responsibility, 
jurisdiction, political boundaries, law, regulation, and response, all demonstrate the many 
ways in which risk can become unbound from the tools available to comprehensively 
approach it.  
As a normal accident, it is interesting to note the criticality of small decisions in 
the disaster. The track foreman who was not aware of the interrelationships between 
braking systems on the train, demonstrates the normal accident notion of tight coupling 
and socio-technical systems. It is startling to consider the many risks within a rail system 
that depend so greatly on other actions within the system. There is nothing remarkable 
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about any individual decision or mistake in the story of the accident, however the 
arrangement of the rail system magnified the results of those decisions. 
And finally as a worst-case this accident challenges the imagination and 
organizational hubris that accompany such risks. By mid-2015 the total compensation 
fund established for the Lac-Mégantic disaster was $435 million.191 Probabilistic 
thinking, says Lee Clarke, needs the augmentation of possibilistic thinking.192 The 
difficulty with the interlocking network of rail safety regulation, emergency response, 
public governance and private industry is that it makes it very challenging for 
organizations to exercise such imagination. It is difficult to think of regulating to 
possibility. And risk management designed to thread the needle between safety and 
efficiency is not always well suited to the contemplation of worst cases. 
In 2014, the U.S. DOT issued a series of emergency orders and safety advisories 
concerning crude oil coming from the Bakken oil fields in North Dakota, culminating in 
final rule on May 1, 2015 designed to strengthen the safety standards governing the 
transportation of flammable liquids over rail lines.193 The rule is impressively 
comprehensive, addressing a range of issues from the design and retrofit of oil transport 
tankers to crude oil testing and reporting requirements and new responsibilities for oil 
companies to liaise with emergency management agencies and information sharing 
centers in potentially impacted jurisdictions.  
The rule further illustrates a vital lesson in managing unbounded risk. Put simply, 
such risks may not be managed in isolation. The problems of unbounded risk require 
unprecedented intimacy between uncommon disciplines, and across political boundaries. 
But the inability to foresee such necessary connections until after accidents occur means 
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that identifying and creating this necessary intimacy ahead of time—in planning, 
operations, and response—is often impossible. In approaching such risks, unknown 
complexities and unseen connections ought to dominate our security considerations. In 
responding to such accidents, skill in working with strangers and uncommon disciplines 
is paramount. 
D. CASE STUDY: INSURANCE UNBOUND 
An Act to provide for the payment out of money provided by Parliament or 
into the Consolidated Fund of sums referable to reinsurance liabilities 
entered into by the Secretary of State in respect of loss or damage to 
property resulting from or consequential upon acts of terrorism and losses 
consequential on such loss or damage. 
—[27th May 1993]194 
An Act…to ensure the continued financial capacity of insurers to provide 
coverage for risks from terrorism. Be it enacted by the Senate and House 
of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. 
—H.R.3210 —107th Congress195 
The insured losses resulting from the attacks of 9/11 approached $44 billion.196 In 
the midst of great national tragedy, this provided a stark and sudden lesson about the 
potential economic instability that catastrophic terrorism can provoke. Prior to 9/11, 
commercial insurance generally covered terrorism losses.197 In the wake of devastating 
and concentrated industry losses, insurance and reinsurance markets began excluding 
terrorism from their coverage, presenting a problem for builders and developers who 
required that insurance to secure loans. The World Trade Center Bombing and the 
Oklahoma City Bombing did not generate such a response. The insurance lesson of 9/11 
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was new for America. In the United Kingdom (UK), the retreat of insurance companies 
from providing coverage for terrorism losses was an old problem by the time 9/11 
occurred, with a solution well underway. 
On the morning of April 24th, 1993, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
detonated a truck bomb on Bishopsgate, a central part of London’s financial district. One 
person was killed, another 44 injured. At the time, loss estimators imagined the damage 
to be slightly worse than the Baltic Gate bombing, which had targeted financial 
infrastructure a year prior.198 The ultimate cost of the Bishopsgate bombing was 
estimated between £350 and £500 million pounds, elsewhere cited as more than $1.5 
billion.199 But for the insurance industry, these costs were also signals of a deeper 
problem. Paying claims on such attacks nearly initiated the collapse of the world’s 
leading insurance market, Lloyds of London.200 As a result, insurance companies in the 
UK began to remove terrorism from their list of covered losses. 
This meant that if future attacks occurred, the financial exposure would go 
uninsured, leaving the government with the decision to reimburse or not. In a sense, the 
tactics of the IRA were made explicit, and the impact was felt immediately. The UK 
responded by establishing a government backed insurance scheme, and entering what is 
now a complex global response to a difficult threat. 
On the 27th of May, scarcely a month after Bishopsgate, it was enacted, “by the 
Queen’s most excellent majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords 
Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the 
authority of the same…” that the UK government was in the business of insuring against 
terrorism.201 The insurance industry, in cooperation with her majesty’s government, 
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established Pool Re, a reinsurance firm designed to establish an insurance market for 
controlling terrorism risk. Facing a sustained IRA campaign against the financial sector, 
the insurance industry in the UK was presented with a unique challenge. The risks 
associated with terrorism losses were particularly hard to insure against.  
The essential difficulty was twofold. Terrorism was difficult to estimate in terms 
of impact and probability. And secondly, losses are spatially concentrated.202 This meant 
that high value, commercial, city properties were the most likely to be attacked—the only 
companies asking for the insurance would be most likely to need it, a problem known as 
“adverse selection.” Commercial terrorism insurance suddenly shared the problem of 
high-risk coastal areas, without sufficient probabilistic data from which to derive the cost 
or likelihood of the impact. Insurers and reinsurers were open to substantial losses, 
without a reliable means of rate setting that would make insurance affordable for the 
consumer or viable for the insurer.  
The solution in the UK was to establish a separate company, Pool Re, which 
would manage a government backed reinsurance program against terrorism. This made 
the UK government the “insurer or last resort” for terrorism.203 Under the system created 
in 1993, insurance companies applied to and became members of the Pool Re scheme. 
The premiums collected from that insurance would go towards covering losses in the 
event of an attack. Costs exceeding the collected premiums would be carried by the 
insurance companies who bought into the Pool Re scheme up to a 110% of the total funds 
in the risk pool. Costs in excess of that value would, in turn, be borne by the UK 
government.  
In contrast, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) made the offer of 
terrorism coverage mandatory in the U.S. The United States established the TRIA, which, 
similar to the UK model, shares the costs of insured terrorism losses between the 
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government and private sector, as a means of making sure that terrorism coverage is 
available. The TRIA was a temporary authorization passed in 2002 and extended in 2005, 
2007 and most recently 2015.204 Part of the goal of the TRIA is to encourage a viable 
private sector insurance/reinsurance market. Both the UK model and the U.S. model 
include mechanisms for sharing the risk and impact of terrorist attacks between the 
private and public sectors, and both face similar challenges in attempting to grow their 
respective programs toward a lesser burden on the taxpayer to fund the protection against 
the terrorism risk. 
And yet in the U.S., the TRIA is very different from the UK model. As a 
temporary program it did not establish a permanent company, or risk pool. The TRIA 
created a mandatory requirement—requiring all U.S. primary insurance companies to 
offer insurance against terrorism.205  
1. Reinsurance Revolution 
In March of 2015, Pool Reinsurance Company Ltd. (Pool Re) announced the 
purchase of terrorism reinsurance on the commercial market for the first time since its 
inception in 1993.206 It is difficult to speculate just what this newly minted availability of 
private reinsurance within the UK means. While the industry ability to model terrorism 
losses has improved, this does not seem to be the reason behind the sudden availability of 
commercial reinsurance. The insurance industry still views terrorism risks as a, “constant, 
evolving and potentially expanding threat for the foreseeable future.”207 The answer may 
in part have to do with Edward Snowden. 
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A provocative assertion went quietly unnoticed in 2014 outside of narrow risk 
management circles. In its published white paper report entitled, “Quantifying U.S. 
Terrorism Risk” the firm Risk Management Solutions included the following assessment: 
[models of terrorism risk] tend to presume a lack of Western counter-
terrorism capability to control terrorist action against the U.S. homeland. 
This presumption may be attributable to a dearth of public information 
about counter-terrorism activities. Counter-terrorism officials are duty-
bound to “serve in silence.” The whistle-blowing revelations of Edward 
Snowden have broken this code of silence, and by so doing have alerted 
the general public to the widespread and intensive surveillance undertaken 
to protect them from terrorist attack. Widespread public concern over this 
surveillance has provoked the NSA to publicly declare the importance of 
such surveillance in terrorist plot interdiction.208 
For companies that build terrorism risk models, this was something of a sea 
change. The radical transparency of Edward Snowden’s unlawful revelations may have 
provided sufficient information for the insurance industry to better understand the 
mitigation in place against the terrorist risk. But the shift is even more provocative. 
According to Risk Management Solutions, terrorism risk can now be effectively 
modeled as a man-made catastrophe because, “Carriers writing terrorism cover are 
insuring against the failure of a government’s counter terrorism operations.” In short, the 
insurance industry is not ready to insure against terrorism. But perhaps they are ready to 
insure against the government failing to be successful.  
This is a strange reorientation, and it highlights the various means available for 
dealing with the uncertainty associated with terrorist attacks. In the case of the UK 
reinsurance market it may indicate an important point of growth for the industry. Perhaps 
an improved ability for the insurance industry to work with security agencies within the 
UK will assist them in continuing to spread the risks of terrorism related losses and create 
viable markets, ultimately lowering the financial impact of terrorism, and perhaps even 
lowering the incentives of terrorism.  
                                                 





Reinsurance, according to the Insurance Information Institute is “insurance for 
insurance companies.” Elsewhere it is more carefully defined as, “the insurance by an 
insurer of the liability of another insurer arising under contracts of insurance which the 
latter has entered into.”209 Reinsurance functions as a global mechanism for transferring, 
sharing and profiting from the management of risks. Terrorism has proven to be an 
intractable risk—difficult to estimate both in terms of impact and probability, and thus 
difficult to establish viable rate setting measures, deductibles, and the other necessary 
apparatus of insurance schemes. From its inception, the UK government backed 
reinsurance program for terrorism risk was criticized as counterproductive. Critics argued 
that creating a government backstop for terrorism risk removed market incentives for 
private insurers to innovate ways to bear the cost of insurance, and felt that the scheme 
put in place was too onerous and costly to cultivate the growth of a viable market.210 
However, this most recent move towards private insurance (if only a single layer) may 
indicate a step in growth towards a viable private market for insuring against terrorism. 
Granted, it has taken more than two decades.  
Little is publicly available about the precise decision making that led to 
commercial reinsurance for the Pool Re scheme. However, the purchase was brokered by 
Guy Carpenter, and provided by Munich Re.211 Considering the enduring challenges 
inherent to modeling and insuring terrorism risk, the purchase of this reinsurance remains 
something of an enigma.212 However, the connection between threat and intelligence 
analysis conducted by insurance firms and central to this brokered insurance sale may 
support the idea that the concept of reinsurance has changed somewhat in the UK, tying 
financial structures more closely to the work of counter terrorism and security agencies. 
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Since its creation, the Pool Re scheme has paid for terrorism losses totaling £600 
million across thirteen separate incidents.213 In that time period UK insurance and 
government have had to respond to important changes in the insurance market and in the 
threats facing them. The availability of reinsurance on the commercial market has led 
some to question whether government programs are necessary as financial backstops to 
protect national economies from the impact of insurance companies withdrawing 
coverage and retreating from the market in the wake of attacks. Perhaps the reinsurance 
market at a state of maturity that it can effectively replace government programs to 
underwrite risk pools. The consensus appears to be that even with significant advances in 
modeling terrorism risk, the government must continue to provide some form of 
backstop.214 The private industry, even with innovations in single layers of private 
reinsurance, is not robust enough to stand on its own. 
2. Lessons for Unbounded Risk Management 
The Pool Re scheme had to address the question of whether terrorism campaigns 
were to be a temporary disruption (e.g., an above average hurricane season or Northridge 
earthquake), or permanent change in conditions. This meant establishing a means of 
responding to changes in the threat paradigm, and evolutions in the insurance market. 
Evolutions in insurance provide useful lessons for how homeland security 
agencies might approach unbounded risks. In its essence, insurance is fundamentally 
about the management of uncertainty. However, there are evidently risks which are either 
too uncertain or with losses too concentrated or catastrophic for insurance to devise a 
profitable actuarial model for them. The necessary components for transforming raw 
uncertainty into rational risk are insufficiently available for private sector insurance to 
effectively manage them alone. In such cases, the risks are often shared with the 
government, or managed through risk pools. The insurance of flood risk, nuclear reactor 
risk, and insurance against terrorism each illustrate the way that the private sector and the 
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government have worked together to provide insurance against particularly challenging 
uncertainties. In particular, governing terrorism risk through insurance has evolved and is 
beginning to show signs of developing out of temporary programs and towards a private 
market capacity to take on a larger share of the risk. However, it seems unlikely that 
terrorism risk will ever be fully taken back by the private sector. And this may offer some 
lessons about the enduring character of the uncertainty in play. 
Insurance does not prevent loss. It is not, by itself a counterterrorism or counter 
catastrophe strategy, but a mitigation measure. It ensures that losses can, in some way, be 
compensated. Reducing the cost and consequence of catastrophe does not undo the loss 
of life, or prevent the terrorist attack from happening, but it does promise a measure of 
control. It may even reduce the incentive for terrorism by demonstrating to the terrorist 
that their actions may result in loss, but not devastation.215 It may reduce the element of 
terror that the terrorist pursues. Considering the dimensions of risk, insurance does not 
alter the threat (probability), but mediates the consequence by reducing vulnerability. 
The profitability of insurance or the extension of credit depends on selecting risks, 
and establishing corresponding actuarial rates, deductibles, etc., in order to both 
compensate the loss, and run at a profit. Critiquing Beck’s Risk Society thesis, insurance 
analysts have argued that, “insurers have always been selective about the risks they 
assume...some risks that have proven too difficult to insure in the private market – for 
example, the risk of unemployment or of flooding in specific regions – are addressed by 
government insurance schemes. Other such risks are not insured at all.”216  
Homeland security agencies do not have such free market luxuries. Laws that 
require homeland security agencies to manage risks that the private sector has abandoned 
due to their uncertainty or concentration present a problem of inherently unbounded risk. 
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Evaluating the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) after Hurricane Katrina, the 
American Institutes of Research noted that, “Because flooding is unpredictable and 
catastrophic in nature, only those most at risk would be likely to purchase the insurance, 
precluding the accumulation of funds sufficient to cover claims that would have to be 
paid. This phenomenon is known as ‘adverse selection’ and is inconsistent with a sound 
private insurance program.”217 The problem of adverse selection was part of the genesis 
of the NFIP. As construction near water expanded the profile of flood risk in the nation, 
the NFIP was established as a means of reducing dependence on federal disaster relief 
and decreasing the consequences of flood through a national risk management and 
insurance program. Likewise, since 1957, claims resulting from nuclear reactor accidents 
have fallen under the Price-Anderson Act. Nuclear reactor risk is addressed through a 
primary tier of industry insurance for each reactor site, and a second tier industry-wide 
pool that contains more than $12 billion in funds.218 Congressional disaster relief would 
address losses exceeding $12 billion.219 
The result, according to Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle is a symbiotic 
relationship between government security entities and private sector insurance to provide 
against unbounded risks: 
This is a story of how, in conditions of extreme uncertainty, insurers have 
difficulty forming a market, and seek the help of governments as the 
insurers of last resort. Governments, meanwhile, seek both the capital and 
preventive security capabilities of the insurance industry to spread at least 
some of the risk.220 
This theme has been picked up by others as a critique of Beck’s view of 
unbounded risk. Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster contend similarly that 
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unbounded risk has engendered new and creative responses that combine the capabilities 
of government institutions charged with the provision of security and private sector 
institutions capable of capitalizing on risk: 
The argument that catastrophic terrorism is incalculable and uninsurable 
appears therefore inattentive to the institutional measures and actions that 
surround the tragic events of 9/11. Against the backdrop of radical 
contingency and incalculability, institutions have attempted to devise 
means to minimize or avoid the catastrophic promise of the future, seeking 
for alternative ways to predict and master it.221 
Like the prospect of risk-based security, this has an immediate appeal. The joint 
efforts of institutions of government and insurance may represent an ability to adapt to 
changing risks rather than signaling a new character to risk that defies insurability 
altogether. In this way of thinking, Beck is giving insufficient credit to the breadth and 
complexity of the insurance response to high uncertainty or catastrophic possibility. 
Governments can underwrite unbounded risks, and insurers can help spread them. 
Terrorism’s adaptive uncertainty makes it extremely difficult to tame and take 
chances. It is only possible to manage terrorism through the paradigm of insurance by 
creating a monetary fortress in the form of government underwriting. This joint 
arrangement between private and public sectors is as complex as Beck’s critics claim, but 
perhaps as tenuous as Beck feared. The solidity of the arrangement might be dissolved by 
a catastrophe beyond our current imagination. 
E. CONCLUSION: THE WILDERNESS OF RISK 
Normal accidents, worst cases and the risk society bring with them unseen 
connections, improbable consequences, and a landscape of insecurity and uncertainty. 
The growing awareness of risk possibilities that are less and less responsive to the 
measures we have in place presents a challenge for homeland security. Risk controls and 
procedures established for a rail transport system—from the design of rail cars to the 
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procedures for checking brakes—are still designed in isolation. A fireman cannot forecast 
the impact on braking measures of shutting off a locomotive engine. And yet, the worst 
case, the possibility resulting from this oversight is not a peripheral issue, but, when 
illuminated by catastrophe, the principal concern of homeland security agencies.  
In hindsight, the Lac-Mégantic rail accident does not look inexplicable. Indeed, in 
the clarity of hindsight it takes on the appearance of inevitability and calculated certainty 
as we observe the alignment of risks. 
The risks that homeland security agencies face remain especially resistant to risk 
management methods. And this may be the true utility of Ulrich Beck’s claims 
concerning risk society—not that risk analysis is never useful, but that risks in the 
modern era increasingly amplify uncertainties. This has profound implications for the 
way that organizations should respond to them.  
Even something as prosaic as a multi-jurisdictional watershed illustrates the how 
risks can be unbound, even when well understood. Increasingly dense communities and 
infrastructures that transect jurisdictional boundaries, professional disciplines, and social 
vulnerabilities combine in unforeseen and unperceivable ways. The cause and the effect 
of risks are separated, and occluded for the analyst.222 For those who would presume to 
design measures to control such risks, the possibility of exploiting chance is diminished 
because it is increasingly impossible to have the full picture of data necessary to calculate 
either the possibility of a bad thing happening, or the forms that bad thing might take. 
Social amplification, catastrophic possibility, and the elongation and permanence of 
losses defies the homeland security agency seeking to organize its effort around precisely 
the things it finds it cannot know. 
This chapter concludes with a troubling thought. If we can admit to the 
dimensions of contemporary risk, what arrangements ought we to have in place for 
                                                 
222 For example, while the FEMA Risk Mapping, Analysis and Planning program is increasingly 
including watershed level assessments of flood risk, regulatory products developed under the NFIP are still 
approved at the jurisdictional level. Non-regulatory products that take a broader view support more 
comprehensive planning, but the flood studies conducted to calculate discharge rates and establish 




confronting this deep and expanding uncertainty? As the future acquires new dimensions 
of inscrutability, what impact should this have on the plans of the present? Chapter 3 will 
argue that our doctrine, and organizational arrangements largely commit a surprising 
error: treating the uncertainty that dominates the responsibilities of homeland security 
with tools better suited to reliable, predictable, rational futures. 
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III. UNCONSCIONABLE MAPS
Unconscionable, a. (sb., adv.)... 
b. Unreasonably excessive.
—Oxford English Dictionary 
1. The map is not the territory.
2. The map represents not all the territory.
3. The map is self-reflexive.
—Alfred Korzybski223 
Unconscionable maps do not know they are maps. They are maps that have 
forgotten they are not the territory, which believe they represent all the territory. They are 
the thousand page operational plan that remains unread by the first responder, or the 
unattainable presumption to a national, “near real-time situational awareness capability” 
for threats and hazards.224 They are measured as unreasonable or excessive not by being 
false, but by being incomplete and unaware of themselves. 
In this chapter, I will consider the ways that homeland security has responded to 
unbounded risk. Largely, this response has been the creation of unconscionable maps. 
The security response to unbounded risk often displays two problematic tendencies: the 
pretense of applying risk management when the information necessary to support such 
calculation is not available, and boundless precaution. In the first case homeland security 
lives with a false assumption that it has exerted control over a risk, in the second, 
homeland security has little assurance or measure of success and surrenders decisions to 
threat politics. 
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Homeland security is promising and pursuing greater security than it can achieve. 
In the process, it is making unconscionable maps. Unbounded risk further makes it 
difficult for what have become standard homeland security practices to produce anything 
other than unconscionable maps.  
The doctrines, depictions, plans and tools in place for managing unbounded risks 
are arguably extensions of what curator Robert W. Karrow Jr. describes as a “mapping 
impulse”—the creative disposition to explain one’s place in the world.225 Defining just 
what a “map” is has become, according to Karrow, “a rather contentious issue in the 
field.”226 Karrow describes the way that, “Administrators and politicians ‘map strategy,’ 
teachers use an ‘english curriculum map,’ and diplomats follow a ‘roadmap toward 
peace.”227 Homeland security has its own maps too. In homeland security, the noun 
“map” and the verb “mapping” encompass visual representations and abstractions from 
regulatory maps displaying the various characteristics of special flood hazard areas, to 
catastrophic plans and concepts of operation. For this reason, Karrow proposes the 
broader concept of a “mapping impulse” that speaks to a desire to find one’s place in the 
world. Such wayfinding maps, says James R. Akerman, “do not just tell us where we are 
going, they also tell us who we are.”228 
All maps are abstractions. They are not the thing they represent, but are instead an 
explanation of it, an orientation or a statement of relationship to it. Maps are not just 
spatial navigational tools, they express a range of data, intended use, and even self-
conception and belief. Certain Japanese pilgrimage maps from the Edo period are not laid 
out by distance, but by devotional activities to be performed at key shrines. London 
underground maps from the 1920s are not geographically accurate, but represent an equal 
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distance between stations. Underground, the distance between stations is not the 
important thing, simply the station name.  
What should homeland security professionals make of the Nuclear/Radiological 
Incident Annex to the National Response Framework?229 This is a map. It is a practical 
tool designed to orient action and explain the purpose and function of security measures. 
Such maps are used in proverbial briefings and in accounting for action to appropriations 
and oversight committees in congress. They are practical culture. But they are also 
semantic, rhetorical culture. They explain homeland security to itself and others.  
In chapter two I argued that the homeland security risks America faces are 
progressively beyond our capacity to perceive, prevent, or control them. This puts 
considerable strain on the common concept that homeland security must be risk-based. 
Even in areas where we have sophisticated measures in place, the most prosaic and well 
understood of hazards still defy us. We cannot rule out even flood disaster, where 
decades worth of data and refined analysis allow us to develop detailed regulatory risk 
products around floodplains.230  
In this chapter I consider the way that homeland security lives with such 
possibilities. I will argue that homeland security theory and practice has insufficiently 
addressed uncertainty. Not through inaction, but through action ill-suited to the changing 
nature of risks. Domestic security efforts are pursuing certainty where they cannot have 
it, and disguising enduring uncertainty with boundless precaution. Where risk was 
designed as the exploitation of chance, many of the central arrangements in place for 
providing domestic security deny or seek to eliminate chance. Here risk management 
becomes a means of eliminating waste and increasing efficiency. Noble ends, but ends 
not aimed at the unthinkable, or the worst case. 
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“For more than six decades,” says sociologist Robert Wuthnow, “humankind has 
lived with knowledge that it could be the agent of its own annihilation.”231 He is 
referring, of course to the advent of nuclear technology. As Wuthnow assesses in his 
book Be Very Afraid, our response to such knowledge has not been the paralysis of fear, 
or the mad rush of panic, but a complex, and essentially human network of disciplined 
action. As we become acquainted with terrible possibility, from terror to pandemics, we 
have done a great deal to secure ourselves against a variety of doomsdays. We have not 
responded to unbounded risks with inaction, quite the contrary. The changing nature of 
risks has had a dramatic impact on our arrangements. 9/11 introduced the idea that 
catastrophic terrorism, even as an outlier, was a possibility. In the same way, our 
heightened awareness of abstruse and apocalyptic hazards has imprisoned security 
agencies between paralysis and precaution. Faced with an expanding menu of possibility, 
high uncertainty and catastrophic potential, the predominant mode of action has been an 
abundance of caution. Such precaution costs money. Expenditures on domestic security 
have increased over $1 trillion in the last decade.232 Treating Ebola in the United States 
cost over $1 million per patient, and in Africa alone could cost $15 billion over the next 
five years.233 Unbounded risk makes it very difficult to discern how much security is 
enough, or to measure the effectiveness of the measures we have. Unbounded security 
measures lack a limiting principle. And, paradoxically, such precaution may be making 
us less secure.  
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Unconscionable maps have a tendency to pave over uncertainty—to render 
organizations insensitive to it. Homeland security maps often presume control over things 
we cannot control. This presumption of control is manifested in our doctrines, our 
organizational arrangements, and the way that aspiration and practice confront threats and 
catastrophes through plans and operations. In Mission Improbable, Lee Clarke examined 
the way that organizations often respond to situations that defy, “operational 
rationality,”234 that is, situations where the organization lacks sufficient information to 
produce a plan that mirrors reality. In such situations, organizations often produce what 
Clarke calls “fantasy documents.” Such documents do not actually guide operations, but 
rather serve as reassurances that the organization has taken the problem seriously and 
stands ready to deliver. Such plans are symbolic, not real. 
In unbounded risk, however, homeland security is unable to know or estimate 
significant details of that risk. Methods designed for bounded problems may not be suited 
to unbounded problems. Organizational approaches designed to produce efficiency 
depend on a regular landscape, in the same way that a factory might optimize production 
based on known and maintained stasis in a production environment. But homeland 
security risks do not hold still, and models designed for efficiency permit an illusion of 
control in the face of changing environments. In this case an unconscionable map 
presumes or pursues that which it cannot have. In making such pursuit the central 
concern of much homeland security planning, doctrine and practice, security 
organizations are, in turn, poorly situated to confront uncertainty.  
In chapter two I contended that risks are outpacing the pursuit of control. In this 
chapter, I will consider the way that domestic security is arrayed against this reality in 
four categories of unconscionable maps: 
• Precaution 
• Plans, Atlases and Threat politics 
• National Incident Management Uniformity 
• Command and Control 
                                                 




A. HERE BE DRAGONS: PRECAUTIONARY MAPS 
Imagination is not a gift usually associated with bureaucracies...It is 
therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, even bureaucratizing, the 
exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more than finding an expert 
who can imagine that aircraft could be used as a weapon. 
—9/11 Commission Report235 
Zhuping man studied the art of butchering dragons under Crippled Yi. It 
cost him the thousand pieces of gold he had in his house, and after three 
years he had mastered the art, but there was no one who could use his 
services. 
—Zhuangzi236 
The bureaucratized imagination is surprisingly vivid. Of the fifteen National 
Planning Scenarios designed in 2005 to support the implementation of HSPD-8, twelve 
were terrorism related. They included blister agent chemical attacks and improvised 
nuclear devices, but excluded the threat of electromagnetic pulse weapons.237 In 2014, 
H.R 3410 set about to correct this oversight.  
The draft Critical Infrastructure Protection Act or CIPA, which passed the house 
in 2014, would, “require the Assistant Secretary of the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate to: (1) include in national planning scenarios the threat of electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) events.”238 Apparently unbeknownst to the authors of H.R 3410, the 
national planning scenarios were rescinded in 2011 with the institution of PPD-8, which 
replaced HSPD-8. This detail would make H.R 3410 either very easy, or very difficult to 
implement if it were to pass the senate. The authors of the bill might be forgiven for 
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missing such an arcane detail (though perhaps lawmakers should know better). But 
scenarios are a persistent fixture in homeland security’s pursuit of organizational, 
bureaucratic imagination. H.R 3410 presents a problematic reminder that it is possible to 
invest in a single uncertain risk at the exclusion of other risks. The bureaucratized 
imagination can, perhaps, hyperextend itself, or come to believe in itself too much. 
Homeland security organizations should be wary of the lesson of Zhuping man, who gave 
his fortune to prepare to fight a dragon, only to find himself in a world without dragons. 
The saying was proverbial as early as 1934, that generals are always ready to fight 
the last war.239 But the alternative offers no easy solutions. How should homeland 
security prepare to fight the next war, thwart the next attack, or respond to the next 
catastrophe? By now these questions are also proverbial. The 9/11 Commission Report 
admonished the Federal government’s insufficient imagination.240 According to The 9/11 
Commission Report, the intelligence, law enforcement, and domestic security and 
preparedness apparatus of the nation failed to credibly imagine the possibility of an 
aircraft used as a weapon. The mirror twins of failing to take action against a catastrophic 
possibility are to give credulity to every imagined possibility, or to suppose you are able 
to imagine every possibility. 
So it is challenging to parse out just what the failure of imagination consisted of, 
if indeed The 9/11 Commission Report’s charge of failure is to stand. The 9/11 
Commission Report is not merely arguing that agencies failed to think of an outlandish 
counterfactual, but that they failed to take it seriously. According to the report, they failed 
to take action against it. In 1945 B-25 bomber crashed into the Empire State Building. In 
the years before, Japanese Kamikaze attacks demonstrated the effectiveness of using 
aircraft as weapons.241 The 9/11 Commission Report identifies that security concerns and 
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exercises had already considered the counterfactual that an aircraft might be used as a 
weapon.242 For the exercise of imagination this is troubling. As the report argues, 
America needs something more than an expert capable of imagining such things. It wants 
for something more than planning scenarios. 
 “Generally speaking,” argues Erwan Lagadec, “in all countries and sectors, 
[leaders] have proved culturally incapable of taking the ‘unthinkable’ seriously, let alone 
react effectively when it actually occurred.”243 What, then, is the appropriate 
organizational response to the unthinkable? In evaluating the reaction to 9/11, it is likely 
that the purpose of bureaucratized imagination, and even the purpose of scenarios must 
be something more than simply preparing for that scenario. 
There is, it seems an intrinsic value in cultivating the exercise of imagination. In 
cultivating our ability as organizations to take the unthinkable seriously and to expect the 
impossible. In pondering such matters the American response has been the embrace of 
precaution. This may be an unsuitable form of imagination. 
1. The Precautionary Principle 
To avoid potential injury… 
—Safety signage from a shopping cart 
The precautionary principle is often expressed as an idiom: better safe than 
sorry.244 The principle, “counsels that we should avoid steps that will create a risk of 
harm; until safety is established through clear evidence, we should be cautious.”245 In a 
more detailed sense the precautionary principle proposes that in situations with limited 
information or confirming fact, “in the absence of scientific near-certainty about the 
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safety of the action, the burden of proof about absence of harm falls on those proposing 
the action.”246 From a regulatory standpoint this could mean prohibiting or limiting 
actions which have not been proven to be safe, but precaution can also reflect a bias for 
action, particularly when homeland security organizations take precautionary measures 
against threats and hazards that are uncertain. A precautionary stitch in time saves nine. 
Often, such precaution lacks a limiting principle. Avoiding injury is insufficient, it seems. 
We must also avoid the potential for injury. 
Cass Sunstein has examined some further problems with the precautionary 
approach. Taken seriously, says Sunstein, the precautionary principle would in fact be a 
“paralyzing principle”—as any action designed to address one risk would bring with it 
potential risks and uncertainties.247 But the precautionary principle has come to represent 
a dominant force in thinking about uncertain risks, particularly at the regulatory level, 
and particularly in the European Union.248 It is not difficult to see why. The motivation 
behind precaution is noble, an approach intended to oppose undesirable possibilities, 
without delaying unnecessarily.  
In contrast to precaution, John Rawls “maximin principle” argued that in 
conditions of uncertainty, we ought to rank alternatives by their worst possible outcomes, 
and select the outcome with the best worst case.249 Refining the thinking of Rawls, 
Sunstein proposes an “anti-catastrophe principle” as an antidote to the paralysis of 
precaution.250 Sunstein’s view is that the precautionary principle is, “literally 
incoherent,” preventing organizations from deciding whether the risk they are addressing 
is more problematic than the risk of taking action against it or neglecting one risk in favor 
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of another.251 For instance, Sunstein favors a “rule utilitarian” ban on torture over a 
moral heuristic, as he feels that a moral heuristic will predictably misfire. Selecting the 
rule utilitarian approach does not argue that torture could never be justified, but that 
unless it is wholly outlawed, governments will resort to torture in situations where it is 
not justified. Granting the permission to torture in extraordinary cases will, from this 
second order perspective do more harm than good.252 This may be taken as regulatory 
philosophy—that the government has a responsibility to the address and take action 
against the worst aspects of worst cases. Both Sunstein and Rawls present more 
conservative, targeted approaches to uncertainty that embrace the possibility of 
catastrophe, but do not surrender to boundless fear.  
Precaution, says Sunstein, results it a, “selectivity of fear.”253 This means fearing 
only those threats that are prominent or available. Such availability is subject to the 
influence of media coverage, etc. Precaution then puts risks in the hands of political will, 
not probability. Unbounded risk presents a hurdle to this problem. As we have seen, 
unbounded risk is problematic because it prevents the assignment of probabilities in some 
cases. In such situations, Sunstein argues that the anti-catastrophe principle is a more 
useful tool than the precautionary principle, limiting governmental action to the worst of 
the worst cases and constraining the tendency toward boundless imagination or political 
advocacy for specific threat prominence.254 
2. Precautionary Mappaemundi 
Medieval mappaemundi were typically tripartite or T-O maps, so called because 
they depict the Mediterranean, the Nile and the Tanais as dividing Europe, Asia and 
Africa (the T), all surrounded by a circumfluent ocean (the O).255 These were maps of the 
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world in its entirety, enclosing all that mattered within a ring of ocean. The mapping 
impulse evident in these mappaemundi reflects a pursuit of bounded certainty, circling 
that which is important and pursuing greater knowledge within.  
Worst-cases and unbounded risk invite a tendency toward precaution, and 
precaution invites a tendency to pursue omniscience. “Terrorism,” says Claudia Aradau 
and Rens Van Munster, “is to some extent a ‘risk beyond risk’, of which we do not have, 
nor cannot have, the knowledge or the measure.”256 Unbounded risk presents difficulties 
to such conceptions of the world for homeland security. Says Claudia Aradau, “although 
Beck presents risk society as riddled with risks of which we can have neither knowledge 
nor measure, the ‘war on terror’ displays an insatiable quest for knowledge: profiling 
population, surveillance, intelligence, knowledge about catastrophe management, 
prevention etc.”257 
The governmental appetite for precautionary information is the result of 
confronting such challenges. Bulk data collection conducted through the National 
Security Agency reflects an understandable extension of both precautionary philosophy 
and the challenges of unbounded risk and pervasive uncertainty. In a security 
environment characterized by uncertainty, where what agencies and organizations do not 
know becomes more important than what they do know, the collection of all information, 
even irrelevant information, appears a necessity. In such uncertainty, “the traditional 
technologies of risk management become more extensive, as profiling and surveillance 
attempt to encompass the whole population.”258 
In precautionary data collection and analysis, the management of uncertain risks 
like terrorism becomes less about confronting specific threats that currently exist, and 
increasingly about the anticipation and prevention of an infinite array of possible futures. 
In this case, “the rationality of catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek 
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to prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the 
future.”259 The ongoing debate and legal determination about the government’s ability to 
collect, for instance, phone data about American citizens that it does not currently need, 
but might eventually need to support intelligence analysis and counterterrorism is the 
formalization of government precaution.260 It is difficult to understate the shift contained 
in this approach to security. Where risk arose out of a desire to tame chance and take 
calculated risks, precautionary security is more fundamentally fearful. 
In an occasional paper written for the Central Intelligence Agency’s Sherman 
Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Jack Davis considered a troubling question. If 
surprise is inevitable, what could be the role for intelligence analysis? He frames his 
argument with an axiom: “If surprise can succeed despite robust tactical warning, then 
defense must utilize effective strategic warning to prepare to succeed despite surprise.”261 
Davis acknowledges that the catastrophic surprise of 9/11 colors the thinking in his paper, 
and informs his recommendations. As argued by Davis, the United States must, 
“reconstitute strategic warning analysis as a collaborative governmental responsibility,” 
as opposed to a function consigned to intelligence alone. This conclusion mirrors the 
conclusion of the 9/11 Commission Report that called for renewed strategic analysis 
capacity.262 But Davis examines further the nature of strategic intelligence as opposed to 
tactical intelligence and the connection between analysts and policymakers who make use 
                                                 
259 Ibid. The case made in this paper is the need to acknowledge that the way in which modernity has 
responded to risk society has been to aggressively deploy many different means of exerting control over 
catastrophic possibility. This has meant dramatic expansion in capability, and attempts to debound security 
to match unbounded threat. This hardly undermines the idea of risk society, but it recognizes and 
aggressive posture in confronting the reality of risk society. 
260 Savage, Charlie, “Surveillance Court Rules That N.S.A. Can Resume Bulk Data Collection,” The 
New York Times, June 30, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/fisa-surveillance-court-
rules-nsa-can-resume-bulk-data-collection.html. 
261 Jack Davis, “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” The Sherman 
Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers: Volume 2, Number 1 (Washington, DC: January 
2003). 
262 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York, NY: 




of analysis. It is a paper fitting for the Sherman Kent center, reminiscent of Kent’s own 
quip that the purpose of intelligence analysis was to, “elevate the quality of discussion in 
this town.”263 
Davis is not optimistic about relying too much on tactical—credible and 
immediate—warning. He is confident that we will be surprised. But, while Davis is 
concerned that, “these and related analytic skills for disciplined assessments of seemingly 
unlikely dangers are key to distinguishing strategic warning analysis from exercises in 
worst-case speculation,” it remains unclear whether such, “disciplined assessment,” can 
really provide any antidote to precautionary information collection and analysis.264  
Precautionary data collection is part of a broader security mapping impulse 
toward perfect knowledge. Fundamentally uncertain risk understandably results in the 
sustained impulse and pursuit of more knowledge about threats and hazards in order to 
close the gap. But it is difficult to know when enough information has been collected, or 
to assess how much that information reduces the risk or allows for control over danger.  
Presidential Policy Directive 21: Protecting Critical Infrastructure, put forward a 
national goal of “near real-time situational awareness” of threats and hazards to critical 
infrastructure.265 On the face of it this may seem a remarkable assertion and goal. Such 
knowledge is unattainable even at the facility level in many locations and industries. The 
pursuit of such absolute knowledge of threat, hazard and system has built an entire 
industry of dashboards and viewers, geospatial platforms and catalogues of risk 
assessments. Homeland security organizations and agencies have, in large part, cohered 
around methods for accumulating and sorting through such information. 
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Claims to national “near real time” knowledge are in this sense unremarkable. 
They are supported by the large-scale organizational pursuit of those ends. Data 
collection and domain awareness do not necessarily suppose that all information can be 
known, but they have as their animating principle the idea that the more unlimited 
information collection capabilities and pursuits are, the better security will be. 
Unbounded risk challenges this assumption with the idea that the information necessary 
to avert catastrophe will, by definition, only be revealed in catastrophe. 
Even in our current environment of relatively boundless precaution, the principle 
of unbounded risk argues that we cannot rule out catastrophe. In such a universe, it is 
difficult to argue that precautionary collection has delivered security. 
3. Precautionary Amplification of Risk 
The Professor, Joseph Conrad’s nihilistic, bomb making villain in The Secret 
Agent, walks the streets of London with a flask filled with high explosives that he can 
detonate within 20 seconds. As a result, the authorities give him a wide berth. Explains 
the professor: 
I have the means to make myself deadly, but that by itself, you understand, 
is absolutely nothing in the way of protection. What is effective is the 
belief those people have in my will to use the means. That’s their 
impression. It is absolute. Therefore, I am deadly.266 
Political writer Paul Berman complains that Conrad’s terrorists are, “marginal 
screwballs.” To his thinking, Conrad wasn’t taking anarchists and nihilist “death cults” 
seriously enough.267 Jack London’s 1907 fictional terrorist Emil Gluck is probably more 
to Berman’s liking, as a “nihilist, or annihilist” who first murders those close to him, then 
expands to terrorism against military, police, royal, and ultimately random targets before 
inventing a machine that allows him to exterminate tens of thousands.268 But Berman 
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seems to miss that The Secret Agent is a satire about England’s counterterrorism efforts. 
For Conrad, the government response to terrorism posed a greater danger to liberal 
society than a bunch of screwball anarchists who wanted to blow up the Greenwich 
Observatory. So he satirizes the external threat to highlight the danger of a self-inflicted 
threat. Believing in the danger posed by the Professor caused a corresponding restriction 
of liberty. The source of the Professor’s power lies with the way he is perceived, not the 
means at his disposal. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the Government did not take 
its imagination seriously enough. Conrad warns against the dangers of taking it too 
seriously. 
It is difficult to balance such concerns. What threats and catastrophes must 
homeland security take seriously, and what actions must security organizations take 
against them? How can the perception of danger impact, amplify and legitimate the 
danger itself? 
In Conrad’s Professor, we can see the roots of Barry Buzan’s “securitization”—
framing issues as security problems.269 Buzan ably captures the dimensions of efforts to 
problematize in the context of security, but what does this process mean for the security 
imagination? Securitization contains a transformative power, able to transform both 
bridge and carnival equally into the language of vulnerability, susceptibility, target 
selection and impact assessment.  
German photographer Simon Menner captured this transformative power in a 
recent photograph exhibit entitled “Camouflage.” Working with the German Army, 
Menner photographed woodland landscapes where snipers had concealed themselves.270 
The resulting images are unsettling. The effect of knowledge on the viewer (knowing that 
a threat is concealed in the nature scene) invites a sense of foreboding. Menner’s 
photographs either transform nature to a wilderness, or serve as a reminder that it was 
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always wild. They are reminders of lurking danger, but also lessons in the way that 
securitization can amplify fear, and alter perception. 
The way that organizations perceive and respond to a risk can present its own 
risk—if, for instance surveillance programs infringe upon privacy rights. Such 
organizationally amplified risks provide several important observations about the way 
that homeland security organizations ought to process and respond to fear. Sociologist 
Robert Wuthnow has assessed that rather than reacting to fear with paralysis, humans 
have a, “bias for action” in the face of fear.271 But this tendency, says Wuthnow, to do 
something about fear is not a mindless or reflexive response, but a mentally engaged one 
as well. In Wuthnow’s observations there lies the crucial consideration of just how 
readily fears reflect reality. The psychological heuristics, or methods of thinking that 
Daniel Kahneman considered in Thinking, Fast and Slow illustrate powerfully the way 
that particular patterns and tendencies influence the way that humans respond to facts, 
often making poor decisions based on an autonomic tendency to substitute simpler 
problems for more complex ones, favoring reaction over contemplation in many cases.272  
Such heuristics, and the possibility for the social amplification of risk indicate a 
grave responsibility on the part of homeland security organizations to respond to risk 
effectively. This is a more complicated business than simply elevating or decreasing the 
volume of official fear around a given subject, but requires an approach tailored to the 
reception of the information. Smokers, for instance, tend to overestimate the health risks 
of smoking...but smoke anyway. In such cases the appropriate response in terms of risk 
communication would not be to focus on communicating how bad the risk of smoking 
is—since smokers have already demonstrated a form of immunity to such information.273  
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Organizations must make similar decisions in considering which risks to take 
action against, and what action to take. If the degree of dread, political visibility, or 
media saturation around a certain risk drives such decisions, organizations are in a 
position of surrendering the analysis of risk to the perception of risk. All risks then 
present dual dangers. They are both the dangers they pose, and the dangers of our 
reactions to such information. Here the failure of imagination returns with equal duality. 
The way that security organizations respond to possibility presents the potential to 
amplify risks. The bureaucratized imagination can be dangerous. 
The United States spends more than $16 billion annually on counterterrorism 
efforts within the U.S. intelligence community alone.274 This does not account for the 
amount spent on other counterterrorism efforts within DHS and elsewhere. Such 
spending is almost certainly too much, too little, or just the right amount. Uncertainty and 
volatility make it difficult to make sense of a number such as this.  
Our spending on counterterrorism is largely precautionary spending, meaning it 
cannot be accounted for through actuarial means or cost-benefit analysis. The homeland 
security enterprise will always be in danger of veering one way or the other; surrendering 
hazard specific priorities to horrific possibilities, or ignoring the possible and focusing 
only on probabilities and controllability. 
B. PLANS AND ATLASES 
Plans are expressions of how to achieve a stated end. If the plans that homeland 
security produces are unconscionable maps, then it is due in part to planning 
methodology. Planning in conditions of uncertainty means that at least part of the 
challenge of the plan is how to make sense of organizing people and things to achieve an 
end, when operating conditions and even desired ends may change without warning. 
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The dominant methods of security planning have grown up around such 
uncertainties. Planning methodologies are, in some important ways, means of reducing 
uncertainty while still taking action. Two planning methods in particular have come to 
characterize national preparedness planning efforts: scenario planning, and capabilities-
based planning. Each method proposes a different approach to address and ostensibly 
reduce the problem of uncertainty. 
However, in this section, I will argue that these methods have served a more 
uncertain purpose. In many cases, the level of specificity to the plans developed from 
these methods commit to certain assumptions about future states that run the risk of 
paving over uncertainties. 
Often, argues Lee Clarke, the kinds of plans that organizations develop for 
uncertain and catastrophic possibilities do not actually serve to guide operations, but 
rather communicate confidence and accountability to the public and even organizations 
themselves. Clarke refers to such plans as “fantasy documents.” Fantasy documents taken 
too seriously by an organization easily become unconscionable maps, not just symbolic 
but dangerous fantasies. And the way that security organizations have understood and 
practiced planning methods has contributed to a growth industry of unconscionable plans. 
1. Scenario Planning 
Scenario planning allows organizations to live in multiple futures rather than 
committing to and overinvesting in a single future.275 As a method employed by Royal 
Dutch Shell in the 1960s scenario planning was a conscious departure from reliance 
purely on computational models to assess the likelihood of certain outcomes. Scenario 
planning asked organizations to engage in a creative conversation with possible futures, 
adapting and structuring their current posture based on multiple, different, plausible 
futures. This move towards considering plausible, not merely probable future conditions 
recognized the volatility of future conditions and served two purposes: challenging the 
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bias towards probability that existed in organizational culture at Royal Dutch Shell, and 
developing preparedness for more than one possible outcome. 
In this, both the value and liability of scenario planning is visible. Scenario 
planning as an organizational exercise in self-knowledge and imagination prepares 
organizations for volatile futures. But scenario planning as a search for commonalities 
across different scenarios only reduces uncertainty for the scenarios considered. It does 
not reduce uncertainty for the scenario you were not able to consider. 
Scenario planning for security applications owes its existence largely to the work 
of Herman Kahn, who pioneered the approach while at RAND Corporation in the 1940’s 
and 1950s.276 Given uncertainty in the actions of opponents (in Kahn’s case, chiefly a 
Russian foe) scenarios offered a way to construct multiple plausible futures and consider 
them in detail. Rather than preparing for a single future, and committing too much to that 
possibility, scenarios were a structured way of hedging organizational bets against 
possibility. They also helped organizations to explore the possibilities of what might 
happen under different circumstances. 
In this way, scenarios allowed American national security planners to understand 
the capabilities necessary to respond to multiple futures, and build a diverse set of 
capabilities rather than a single approach. It is a means of organizationally learning 
lessons. André Maginot is remembered for the strategic failure of the Maginot line: the 
meticulously planned and sophisticated fortifications meant to protect France from 
another German invasion in the wake of World War One. Scarred by the German 
invasion of the First World War, France invested heavily in hardening their border to 
protect against that possible future. And the Maginot line fortifications display other scars 
and lessons learned from the horrors of trench warfare—reflecting a civilized approach to 
fortifications that included retractable turrets. During world war two, Germany simply 
went around the fortifications and invaded through Belgium. Here scenarios appear as an 
imaginative form of risk. They are the exercise of imagination in considering plausible 
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futures, considering and testing our responses to them. Like risk management, scenarios 
permit action in uncertainty. 
Scenarios are equally subject to limitations. How many scenarios—how many 
possible futures—are sufficient? The national planning scenarios selected fifteen, but 
neglected EMPs and asteroids—plausible futures that suggested capabilities not covered 
in the other scenarios. “It is difficult,” says Michael Barkun, “to create contingency plans 
for inconceivable contingencies.”277 
Faced with such apocalyptic possibility, it does seem important to plan for such 
eventualities. This presents a problem.  
2. Capabilities-Based Planning 
Scenario planning offers a means of living in multiple futures, but presented 
conceptual limits to uncertainty in the way that it bounded threats. Capabilities-based 
planning emerged as a means of decreasing the scope of uncertainty by developing a 
wider range of capabilities necessary to respond to a wider array of risks.278  
Writing for the RAND Corporation, Paul Davis examined a new analytic 
architecture for defense planning that was applicable to a broad range of other planning 
applications.279 His capabilities-based approach reversed the way that planners 
approached uncertainty by beginning with organizational self-awareness. The 
capabilities-based methodology was designed to reduce the margin of uncertainty by 
looking across multiple different scenarios or risks and developing exhaustive lists of the 
capabilities necessary to confront them. This allowed for a risk-based optimization of 
what capabilities organizations would need to develop, and in what quantity. 
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Capabilities-based and scenario planning are clearly not mutually exclusive. Both 
methods are designed for conditions of uncertainty, and both seek to reduce that 
uncertainty through the consideration of multiple potential outcomes. Where scenario 
planning is primarily an exercise in organizational imagination, capabilities-based 
planning is the accounting for scenarios through organizational capability development, 
and the search for commonality and structure to multiple plausible futures. 
3. National Preparedness Planning 
Since 2005, national preparedness planning conducted at the federal level has 
gradually shifted from scenario planning to capabilities-based planning. 
HSPD-8 proposed a full-scale national approach to the management of crisis.280 
This took the form of scenario planning. The White House homeland Security Council 
served as the chair of an interagency committee that reviewed and developed 15 national 
planning scenarios thought to represent the spectrum of plausible national preparedness 
threats and hazards.281 From these scenarios a universal task list was constructed, and 
these tasks were aggregated into greater capabilities. 
The National, capabilities-based approach national preparedness planning has 
evolved from the comparative analysis of these “national planning scenarios” from which 
were extrapolated a set of “target capabilities” required across multiple scenarios, to an 
approach based on a Strategic National Risk assessment (SNRA).282 From HSPD-8 to 
PPD-8 the shift was from scenario to risk, but the concept of capability development 
remained constant. The SNRA was designed as means to allow agencies to understand 
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risks, and it was intended to impose greater rigor on the identification of necessary 
capabilities than the imagination of scenario planning. 
Applied to national preparedness, the concept of scenario-based planning, or even 
deriving capabilities from scenarios suffers somewhat. The range of futures that must be 
considered is an expansive list. The National Planning Scenarios supposed fifteen 
plausible futures. The unconsidered possibilities of a catastrophic solar storm or climate 
disaster illustrate just how insufficient this number might be. The state of Ohio, for 
instance, considers thirty-five separate hazards in its State emergency operations plan.283 
The National Preparedness System is the closest thing that the United States has 
to a comprehensive homeland security doctrine. The system itself is in its youth, born on 
paper in 2008 when PPD-8 replaced HSPD-8. However, the system has a much older 
lineage, dating at least back to the White House offices that initiated early civil defense 
programs and plans for rearmament in the wake of a Soviet attack.284 Around the same 
time however, the large-scale flood control projects of the 1930s were taking shape under 
the Army Corps of engineers. The responsibility for managing flood and natural disasters 
remained spread out across multiple agencies not explicitly concerned with threats from 
attack. For this reason, the evolution of national preparedness has been a convergence of 
cultures: one focused on loss reduction and risk management, the other focused on threat 
management and civil defense. Along with these combined planning cultures came the 
imperative to address all hazards through national preparedness planning. 
Both HSPD-8 and its successor PPD-8 claimed allegiance to an all hazards 
approach, meaning simply that every crisis contains common relationships and tasks, and 
the homeland security enterprise should focus on building up this generic capability to 
better respond to a broad range of threats and hazards. And they also both claim to be 
“capabilities-based.” But their approaches are almost inverted. 
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Table 1.   Comparing Planning Approaches HSPD-8 and PPD-8. After 




2. National Planning 
Scenarios 
3. Universal Task List 
4. Target Capabilities 
List 
1. National Preparedness Goal 
2. National Preparedness 
System 
3. Strategic National Risk 
Assessment (SNRA) 
4. National Planning 
Frameworks (across five 
mission areas) 
5. Federal Interagency 
Operational Plans (FIOPs) 
6. Incident Annexes 
White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8, National 
Preparedness (Washington, DC: White House, December 2003), and White House, 
Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (Washington, DC: March 30, 
2011). The planning approaches contained in support of HSPD-8 and PPD-8 employ two 
different methods, but each consider a broad range of perils as the means to assess and 
calibrate capability development. Where HSPD-8 engendered reliance on scenarios, 
PPD-8 proposed a reliance on risks. 
As concepts, HSPD-8 and PPD-8 are mirror twins. HSPD-8 arrives at capabilities 
from scenarios. PPD-8 arrives at incident annexes (akin to scenarios) from capabilities 
and concepts of interagency coordination. The SNRA, designed as a compendium and 
index of existing models of risks, informs both the FIOPs and the incident annexes. There 
are apparent affinities between the target capabilities of HSPD-8 and the core capabilities 
of PPD-8, but the process that undergirds them, and thus what they mean, is essentially 
inverted. 
Though it is not acknowledged fully in the existing planning doctrine, PPD-8 
changed national preparedness from a scenario-based approach for deriving national 
capabilities, to a risk-based one. 
PPD-8 directed the development of a national preparedness goal that would, 
“appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist attacks, major 




recover from them.”285 The National Preparedness Goal, published in 2011 contained the 
succinct summary statement that, “we define success as: A secure and resilient Nation 
with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, 
mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest 
risk.”286 Risk, ideally, would then govern which capabilities the nation required. But 
facing catastrophic or highly uncertain dangers, using risk as a measure of capability 
development becomes somewhat illusory. If we can’t predict the threat (probability) or 
the consequence (cost), it remains difficult to discern the best path for guiding capability 
decisions. 
4. Threat Politics 
Scenarios do not greatly reduce uncertainty. Dire, catastrophic scenarios contain 
another flaw: influence. Especially bad, uncertain, or fearful dangers are subject to public 
influence, social and organizational amplification, lobbying, and many forms of worry 
that is, it seems, disproportionate to the likelihood of the threat or hazard. This is the 
politics of threats. 
The rarity, horror, and uncontrollability of a hazard impacts the way that 
Americans view that risk, and risk perception may even present its own risk. Given 
uncertainty, scenario planning as the basis for organizational action is particularly 
susceptible to “threat politics.” 
Returning to H.R 3410, security analysts may ask a forcing question: what 
conditions are necessary for a given hazard to warrant its own legislation? 
There is ample reason to worry about EMPs. There is also ample reason to worry 
about catastrophic asteroid strikes, catastrophic climate change, and unbounded 
technological risks posed by nuclear power. Which of these require legislation? Which 
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require scenarios? Perhaps most importantly, how should homeland security 
professionals adjudicate scarce resources to address them? Our increased ability to 
predict and to do something about a wide range of threats often means an increased 
anxiety about what to do with limited resources. And conditions of uncertainty and 
volatility mean that hazards compete for attention. 
The essential problem with scenarios, in this light, is that they can surrender risks 
to politics. The threat posed by a particular set of hazards, or a particular scenario is 
raised in prominence through advocacy, and one possibility can take resources from 
another equally likely (or equally uncertain) possibility. And this highlights the strange 
case of H.R 3410, a bill which sought to mandate a scenario onto the imaginations of 
planners.  
But the overemphasis of single hazards and single scenarios has a damaging side 
effect. One of the central values of scenario planning was for organizations to engage in 
imagination. The scenario itself faded properly into the background, while the limits and 
strengths of the organization itself became the purpose and forefront of the exercise. 
Scenarios were mere tools for organizations to come to grips with how they might 
confront uncertainty. They were not designed as blunt instruments to rid the world of 
preparedness of the monster of uncertainty.  
5. Not The Scenarios We’re Looking For 
Hilaire Belloc wrote The Bad Child’s Book of Beasts in 1896 as a satire on the 
long tradition of moralistic children’s tales.287 Books like the 18th century The History of 
Little Goody Two Shoes, which followed the adventures of Margery Meanwell, were 
popular forms of using narrative and imagination to illustrate a principle or value.288 
Belloc’s book pokes fun at this didactic literature. His book was written to bad (rude and 
wild) children, with the promise of making them, “unnaturally good” and the comic verse 
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that follows tends to highlight the absurdities of human culture against a quiet nobility in 
the beasts themselves. Because it has the power to be compelling where mere facts may 
not succeed, narrative is often a vehicle for ideas. 
How often are the scenarios that form the basis of homeland security plans simply 
didactic narratives? Have they ever attained Belloc’s self-awareness? Inevitably, 
scenarios seem to reflect biases. While possibilistic thinking is necessary in the face of 
unbounded risk, scenario thinking can be particularly prone to threat-political 
interpretations. Here, scenarios can become cloying attempts at instruction, or mechanical 
process, blunting the value of a narrative with the plodding deliberation of a factory tour. 
The failure of imagination, if such a failure exists, is not corrected simply by imagining a 
sufficient number of scenarios. If scenarios are to be useful tools for imagination then 
they must encourage imagination as its own skill, not descend into guided tours through 
designed possibilities. 
Robert Moore, vice president of Hewlett Packard’s Global Security Services 
describes the boundless volatility of outcomes faced in a single year this way:  
Just touching on the headlines…We dealt with the fallout from civil unrest 
in Tunisia and Egypt at the beginning of the year, followed by the 
Christchurch earthquake in February, the Japan disaster and a state of 
emergency in Bahrain in March. In May, the capture of Osama bin Laden 
raised the possibility of retaliation. In June, there was an E-coli outbreak 
in Germany and unrest in Greece and Spain. In July, there were attacks in 
India and Norway followed by successive typhoons in the Philippines and 
flooding in Thailand.289 
In situations where it is difficult to know what the future holds, scenario planning 
is supposed to allow the planner to consider multiple futures. This may improve 
preparedness through sheer numbers of potential outcomes considered, but it will not 
necessarily prepare organizations or individuals for the one scenario that was not 
considered but then occurs. The number of possible and probable and plausible futures 
outstrips our scenarios. If scenarios do not first serve to prepare planners and responders 
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to manage surprise and rupture, they are, it seems, little better than selecting one future 
and betting on it. 
6. Scenarios Rightly Understood 
As it has increasingly inherited a multiplicity of hazards, FEMA has adopted an 
all-hazards approach to planning, based largely on the capabilities-based approach. 
Capabilities-based planning, built on the assumptions of the SNRA has formed the 
backbone and baseline of a national approach to capabilities-based plans. However, the 
use of scenarios has also served as a powerful antidote to allowing national preparedness 
plans to descend into unconscionable territory. The source of this renovation of scenarios 
has come from Administrator Fugate’s “Maximum of Maximums” approach to planning. 
Says Fugate: 
In emergency management we have only planned for what our capabilities 
can handle or only looked at what we can do to respond as 
government...But what we really need to be doing is planning for disasters 
that go beyond our capabilities. That’s why we have to look beyond our 
government-centric approach and see what outside resources we can bring 
to the table.290 
The maximum of maximum approach is effectively a “non-scenario.” It is about 
coming to understand an organization at its limits, and learning to reach beyond them. It 
is not about the specific features of a given plausible future. The Response Federal 
Interagency Operational Plan developed as part of the National Preparedness System 
reflects this ethos.291 As a document designed to guide the development of other plans, it 
orients the way that Federal resources are coordinated during disaster, and as such is, 
“[not] a contingency or implementation plan based on a specific threat or a scenario.”292 
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Scenarios are properly exercises in self-knowledge—increasing our understanding 
of our organizations and relationships. They acquaint us with our limitations and our 
strengths. As operational thought experiments, we should never mistake these maps for 
the territory, or the scenario for the future. And we base foundational plans on them at 
our peril. Rather, scenarios are simply tools for testing and expanding our ability to adapt 
to variable futures. In this sense, they are not really about the scenario at all.  
This is why FEMA currently favors the “maximum of maximum” approach to 
planning and exercise design. The purpose of such an exercise is not simply to exercise a 
capability, but to understand means of responding when that capability is exhausted. It is 
a deliberate rupture of control, in order to map out limitations and discuss difficult 
tradeoffs and atypical options. In short: this kind of planning and exercising provides a 
model for the kinds of decisions that inevitably face emergency managers during crisis. 
In contrast, scenario-based planning efforts have large scale trickle down effects within 
the homeland security enterprise, notably in the way jurisdictions structure their grant 
requests. Scenarios can highlight a deficit in capability, but can equally be a mirage. 
Draft legislation such as H.R. 3410 remind practitioners that the debate over scenario-
based strategy is not closed. 
The next catastrophe or attack will be plausible. But only in hindsight. The value 
of scenarios is their ability to encourage organizations to exercise their imagination. The 
liability of scenarios is that organizations may be tempted to think that by considering 










C. MAPS OF NATIONAL UNIFORMITY 
Upon an island hard to reach,  
The East Beast sits upon his beach.  
Upon the west beach sits the West Beast.  
Each beach beast thinks he’s the best beast.  
Which beast is best?…Well, I thought at first  
That the East was best and the West was worst.  
Then I looked again from the west to the east  
And I liked the beast on the east beach least. 
—Theodor Seuss Geisel293 
Maritime historian Marcus Rediker describes how eighteenth century naval ships 
were mobile organizations that also relied on tightly hierarchical labor arrangements. 
Walled off from the world by the ocean, organization onboard ships followed the strict 
hierarchies and stratifications of a closed society.294 Maintaining the order necessary for 
the machinelike function of naval vessels reinforced a hierarchical model—from the 
captain, down through officers, noncommissioned officers and crew. Arguably, the 
exigencies of naval warfare required such strict command and control. Says Rediker, “the 
omnipotence of the elements and the fragility of human life marked the consciousness of 
every early-eighteenth century seaman.”295 Part of Rediker’s insight, however, is to 
understand how thoroughly command and control aboard a ship depended on the 
isolation of the system. Command and control may have been necessary, but in order for 
it to exist, the conditions perhaps required a closed system. Sailing ships required 
isolation in order to preserve the conditions of command and control. The United States 
Military retains its own internal justice system, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
largely for the same reasons.296 In order to preserve the internal orderliness of command 
and control structures necessary to provide for the common defense, a certain amount of 
overall separation of that system is necessary.  
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The modern fire company is similar. Company captains, lieutenants, drivers and 
firefighters exist, train, deploy and operate in tightly controlled, hierarchical units. There 
are barriers to entry, and tightly structured means of advancing through experience, 
training and time in service. Fire trucks, when dispatched, illustrate mobile versions of 
that hierarchy. It is no surprise, then, that the lineage of ICS owes so much to fire service 
organizational models. If fire service organizations require command and control in order 
to function, they may also depend, as eighteenth century ships did, on conditions that 
permit command and control. ICS is such a system. 
When hierarchical organizations came together during joint firefighting 
operations, lack of common organizational structure presented a command and control 
liability. The absence of a common organizational system prevented the integration of 
existing mechanisms for planning, resource allocation, and coordinated execution. But 
equally, restoring such a system required the invention of a common system. Preserving a 
common system, similar to Rediker’s observation, required protecting it from the chaos 
of competing models. 
The central idea that underlies NIMS and ICS is to approach the uncertainty and 
complexity of incidents with regularity and order—to impose order upon chaos. As an 
answer to the turbulence and ubiquity of unbounded risk, NIMS and ICS suppose that 
singularity, comprehensiveness, and the unification of all approaches under a common 
scheme are the answer to such risks. Standardization will permit seamless integration 
across disciplines and organizations. Uniformity will conquer chaos. 
The stated purpose of NIMS is the provision of a, “consistent nationwide 
template” for the management of all incidents—from house fires to catastrophic 
hurricanes and terrorist attacks.297 The scope of the NIMS guidance is national in the 
classical sense; it is meant to apply equally to government and the private sector, to 
federal, tribal, state, municipal governments and citizens. NIMS encompasses a national 
doctrine, an accepted practice that expresses a platonic concept of incident management. 
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It is a document that asserts a bold national truth claim: this is the way that America 
organizes to manage incidents. 
The structure of the 2008 version of NIMS is prefigured by two “concepts and 
principles”: flexibility and standardization.298 With somewhat circular reasoning, the 
2008 NIMS doctrine explains that, “NIMS is flexible because the system components can 
be utilized to develop plans, processes, procedures, agreements, and roles for all types of 
incidents; it is applicable to any incident regardless of cause, size, location, or 
complexity.”299 In other words, NIMS is flexible because all incidents require a 
standardized system. NIMS flexes by expansion or contraction of a universal form. 
But at heart, these framing principles recognize that a standard system will find its 
application in many different situations. The purpose of a standardized NIMS then is to 
provide a common tongue for different organizations to work together. 
NIMS proposes five components to its national system: Preparedness, 
Communications and Information Management, Resource Management, Command and 
Management, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance. The doctrine provides the 
concepts and principles that explain and guide each of these components. Not 
surprisingly, the concepts informing each of the five components stress uniformity, 
standardization, consistency etc. Command and management requires a, “fundamental 
form of management established in a standard format.”300 Resource management 
requires consistency and a standard method for managing resources. This underlying 
purpose and intent for NIMS is to provide a lingua franca for incident management. 
Problematically, NIMS asserts that this language already fundamentally exists. 
1. The Persistence of Scientific Management 
In 1916, French Engineer Henri Fayol proposed an enduring idea that there are 
five essential functions to management: Planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating 
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and controlling.301 Three years prior, one time president of the American society of 
mechanical engineers Frederick Winslow Taylor published The Principles of Scientific 
Management, in which he turned to engineering science as a tool to achieving national 
efficiency and maximum prosperity.302 Greater efficiency in complicated manufacture 
and operations would, in Taylor’s view, improve both the speed and quality of 
management systems. Scientific management was a means to optimize, get ahead and get 
better at it. 
Bearing the mark of these influential schools of management, ICS was designed 
in the 1970s as a joint organizational model, “built to accomplish the five basic functions 
of any successful organization, Command, Planning, Operations, Logistics, and 
Finance.”303  
While NIMS does not provide much clarity around its four different kinds of 
management, the more important comparison with Fayol’s characteristics is that both 
systems view organizations as machines. Like Taylor’s model, ICS and NIMS are 
designed to produce ad hoc organizations that are able to rapidly combine and become 
efficiently engineered organizations. 
The map, says Korzybski, is not all of the territory. The error and shortcoming of 
the NIMS component approach is that it creates an unconscionable map of organizational 
function. 
2. The Appeal of Uniformity 
Uniformity permits efficiency. The perceived value of the NIMS and ICS systems 
originated with the U.S. Forest Service Large Fire Organization model. This model was 
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designed to bring disparate firefighting resources together and allow them to perform in a 
synchronized fashion.304 
Wildfires exhibit complex behavior. They are susceptible to changing weather 
conditions and topography, their impacts variable depending on the impact area. Fighting 
fire requires the individual capabilities and organizational discipline of what would 
eventually become ICS because it permitted the expansion and contraction of the 
organization as the conditions of the fire changed and resources were brought in from 
multiple jurisdictions. 
A uniform, national organizational model for incident management is appealing 
because it confronts incident complexity with organizational regularity; replacing 
unknowns with a known quantity. The responsibility of the ICS organization is to 
transform chaotic and complex incidents into complicated, but orderly objectives, 
dividing tasks across operational periods and systematically working to achieve 
objectives.305 Not surprisingly, this has created a tendency for ICS to focus excessively 
on the intricacies of organizational models and approaches. The growth of ICS 
terminology and training is a reflection of the impulse to engineer incident response into 
an efficient organizational machine. 
Complex incidents have a way of pushing back on orderly organizations. And it is 
a strange observable side effect of ICS organizations that they are uncomfortable with the 
inherent complexity of incidents. From its origins in Firefighting Resources of California 
Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE), ICS offered a regular set of tools 
for fighting the complexity and mutability of wildfire. But early minutes from the 
FIRESCOPE meetings are telling: “Dave Nelson. USFS, also gave a presentation on the 
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Incident Complexity Proposal. Radley stated he felt the presentation was overwhelming 
for the group.”306 
If, as some critics have suggested, ICS is designed to impose order on certain 
chaotic conditions in an incident, then the enduring complexity of an incident threatens to 
undermine one purpose of ICS.307 Perhaps incident management is not the place for 
efficiency or the superimposition of coherence. The history of NIMS and ICS in 
particular suggests a discomfort on the part of responders with the endurance of 
uncertainty. And tools designed for efficiency may not be well suited to encouraging 
adaptation to complex risk. 
The scientific management approach of NIMS and ICS tend to resist rather than 
acknowledge the inherent complexity of incidents. And when NIMS fails, homeland 
security organizations often learn the wrong lesson from such failure. Crises are 
inefficient problems. Decentralized, variable, uncertain threats that come with the 
problem of unbounded risk are not well suited to the centralized perception and decision 
model of command centric organizations. 
3. Fighting Federalism 
Decentralized risks have only accelerated the quest for uniformity. The way that 
unbounded risks cross-political boundaries and artificial sectors and geographic limits, 
combined with our precautionary approach in the wake of 9/11 has led homeland security 
to chafe against federalism in the name of security.  
Reduced to a national preparedness axiom, the principle of federalism in 
American government is a reminder that mayors do not work for governors do not work 
for the President. And citizens work for none of these. American government was 
designed with a high degree of intentional inefficiency. The principle of enumerated and 
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balanced powers originates with an idea about the nature of man—that he was endowed 
by his creator with certain inalienable rights. A government with enough power to 
preserve those rights might be able to abridge them, and so needed to have built in 
limitations and controls. The design of the Constitution was a decentralized national 
approach to government that recognized state and local sovereignties, as well as distinct 
federal government authority to exert certain limited national powers. Further 
complicating matters, the American system of separating powers among executive, 
legislative and judicial branches of government ensured that the process of editing and 
refining government powers was arduous. 
This is the operating environment for incident management. 
In the context of national preparedness, this presents stark difficulties. In disaster, 
the efficiency of NIMS and ICS runs into a carefully designed network of government 
that thwarts the establishment of a uniform, centrally controlled machine organization 
with control over intentions, resources and operations. Prevented from imposing a system 
of command and control that draws a red line from the President down to the citizen, 
NIMS pursues a model of “unified command.” 
Unified Command, as expressed in the NIMS doctrine is a concept that, when the 
impact and operations of incidents span multiple jurisdictions political boundaries, 
“allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and 
responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency 
authority, responsibility, or accountability.”308 And yet this voluntary concept of 
jurisdictional cooperation contains a caveat. As a footnote to the concept of, “chain of 
command,” NIMS acknowledges that: 
Concepts of ‘command’ and ‘unity of command’ have distinct legal 
meanings for military forces and operations. For military forces, command 
runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of 
the combatant command to the commander of the forces. The ‘Unified 
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Command’ concept utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the 
military chain of command.309 
As a doctrinal “get out of jail free” card this quotation highlights an oddity with 
the idea of unified command, admitting to the way that large incidents chafe against the 
complexity of federalism. Unified command appears to be a consensual myth: voluntary 
and cancelable. 
The military, as exemplified in the quotation, has discrete legal authorities and 
limitations that make it clear that it does not simply integrate into a unified command 
structure. More accurately, the footnote would acknowledge that civil authorities likewise 
do not divest their chains of command. They remain differently, but equally as 
independent as the military chains of command during large-scale incidents. 
Incidents such as the Deepwater Horizon oil spill have highlighted the way that 
doctrines can collide against federalism. The “Shared Power” doctrine of unified 
command also collides with other federal doctrine that supposes a greater degree of 
control at the federal level—resulting in what has been called “doctrinal confusion.”310 
The Hurricane Sandy FEMA After Action Report highlighted similar uncertainties about 
how to establish and cultivate a “unified coordination group,” which doctrinally serves as 
the principal organizing construct for working across jurisdictional entities.311 
The observation may be simple enough to seem absurd, but the chief reason that 
national incident management has not achieved uniformity after a decade of sustained 
national effort is likely the reality that such uniformity does not exist. The shape and 
responsibility of governments across the United States were not engineered from a central 
planning department, but grew up around the needs and shapes of the communities within 
those states. The idea of NIMS, imposed through grant requirement, is designed to, in the 
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realm of incident management, begin to move towards a common, engineered approach. 
But the entities involved in emergency management are not restricted to incident 
management organizations, and operate on a day-to-day basis within the shape and 
function of their own sphere. 
Considering “NIMS implementation behaviour” Jessica Jensen observed that 
states and localities adopting NIMS as required for grant funding, are heavily modifying 
it.312 NIMS doctrine as written allows for a certain degree of local adaptation. However, 
the forms of adaptation taken at the implementation level nationwide are significant 
enough that Jensen argues it may undermine the use of NIMS as the basis for national 
incident management. Perhaps more starkly than Jensen concludes, the extreme 
variability of approaches across jurisdictions may undermine the usefulness of any 
national incident management model. 
National uniformity may be an unconscionable map. It may also be fundamentally 
unachievable. Perhaps worse, were NIMS to succeed in producing a nationally uniform 
scheme of operations, such efficiency might in fact present security liabilities. 
4. The Liability of Uniformity 
The prevailing narrative of crisis and catastrophe response is not the disciplined 
deployment and coordination of known quantities, but rather the incorporation of 
unknown capabilities, and the rapid adaptation of uncommon partners to new 
circumstances.  
When NIMS fails, the assumption is often that this failure has to do with lack of 
operational discipline or incomplete training and awareness. But the uniformity of NIMS 
can also degrade organizational adaptability. FEMA doctrine provides for three models of 
organization post disaster: Geographic, functional, and a hybrid approach.313 This is 
based in part on the persistence of principles of scientific management—tools for 
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maximizing the efficiency of an organization. Such arrangements are designed for 
efficiency, not maneuverability. When a NIMS organization has to change and adapt to 
evolving impacts and requirements, it confronts similar challenges to a factory owner 
deciding to reconfigure or re-tool an assembly line.  
Implementing incident management structures was presented as an area for 
improvement in the Hurricane Sandy FEMA After Action Report. Responding to 
Hurricane Sandy required FEMA to address an overarching operational challenge—
coordinating a federal response across multiple states each with differing political 
boundaries, geographic features, infrastructure sectors, impacts and populations. The 
approach taken was designed to, “facilitate centralized program decision-making, while 
ensuring appropriate geographic coverage.”314 
The intent of FEMA’s selection of an operational model, as with NIMS and ICS 
approaches in general, was to centralize decision making as a means of ensuring 
efficiency, productivity, and meeting the needs of those impacted. As the relief effort 
progressed, some operational components devolved responsibilities in some areas 
increasingly to geographic divisions, while others resisted decentralization of authority. 
To complicate matters, as multiple federal agencies addressed impacts: 
Sandy response efforts revealed that several [emergency support function] 
coordinating agencies have adopted a more department centric approach to 
response operations, rather than the integrated functional approach 
prescribed by the [national response framework]. In these instances, ESF 
coordinating agencies did not fully draw upon the capabilities of 
supporting departments and agencies.315 
This observation suggests that individual departments and agencies failed to 
integrate properly into the coordinated incident management structure. They did not 
effectively work within the efficient NIMS machine. 






Sandy, however, may offer a similar lesson to Deepwater Horizon and other 
complex disasters. On the one hand, responding agencies and departments failed to 
integrate. On the other hand, organizational models failed to adapt to the reality of 
impacts and requirements. This may demonstrate more than a breakdown in 
organizational discipline, though that may well be true, emphasizing a limitation to the 
use of organizational models that require such disciplined integration in the first place. 
It is the perennial duty of after action reports to prescribe more training. If 
individuals and groups responding to Sandy had been more expert in the organizational 
imperatives of the system, then perhaps they would have been able to integrate more 
readily in a seamless fashion. 
Conversely, engineered organizational models of incident management may need 
to more readily acknowledge the complexity of disaster impacts and the corresponding 
complexity of agencies and capabilities. ICS and NIMS are orderly. But if incident 
command and management is not sufficient to get all the players to align and integrate, 
the alternative may not be chaos. Perhaps there is a better way. 
Post disaster organizational structures that respond to and reflect the operational 
environment would require a radical rethinking of the engineered organization. 
Organizational structures would have to allow national teams to cross political 
boundaries when necessary, to address geographical concerns as needed, and to address 
cross cutting subject specific issues as needed. This would mean admitting to the multiple 
overlapping nature of authorities and capabilities at play in an operation, the border 
crisscrossing impacts to infrastructure systems, and the need for a form of community 
engagement that takes the shape of a community, rather than superimposing an incident 
structure over the top of it. 
This does not mean institutionalizing chaos, but rather means acknowledging the 
truth of complexity. ICS contends that common internal organization is necessary to 




5. Two Competing Doctrines 
Emergency management doctrine promotes the concept that everyone is an 
emergency manager, and the “whole community” of the nation is central to disaster 
response. As expressed by FEMA administrator Craig Fugate, “Individuals and 
communities are key assets, not liabilities. They offer specialized knowledge and skills, 
provide neighbor-to-neighbor assistance, and allow emergency responders to focus their 
resources where they are most needed.”316 For the future of NIMS, and the impulse to 
nationalize it as a system, this presents a troubling dual doctrine. If everyone in the nation 
is a part of crisis response, then everyone must be trained on NIMS in order to fully 
participate in response. 
We must first ask whether such a thing is possible. We must then wonder whether 
it is desirable. Each case seems doubtful. Just as the risk society thesis argues the 
unbounded complexities of risk create a gulf between individuals institutions responsible 
for managing those risks, the exponential complexity of incident management structures, 
rules and training act as impediments to the doctrine of “whole community” emergency 
management. This is not to argue that incident management is simple, and requires a 
simpler discipline. Quite the opposite. It is to argue that incidents are inherently complex, 
and defy any single system. And despite its abstruse rules for functional structure and 
hierarchy, the concept of incident command in fact proposes to simplify the solutions to 
incident complexity. This presents a barrier to innovation during operations. 
6. NIMS Unbound 
Writing in 2013, Cynthia Renaud argued that the structures of incident command 
outlined in the National Incident Management System are incomplete.317 The relevance 
and usefulness of command and control architectures, especially the ICS that is part of 
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NIMS may, according to Renaud, have a lower bound. In the initial moments following 
incidents, or at a highly localized level, the prefabrication of the ICS system may not lend 
itself well to the undiscovered and ill-defined parameters of an incident. In this space, 
incident commanders must cultivate something Renaud identifies as an almost intangible 
quality of sense making and leadership. 
The lower bound of NIMS and ICS is a question of sensing and decision-making. 
The efficient, scientific organization of NIMS and ICS does not describe the 
unstructured, often improvisational efforts that characterize much crisis decision-making. 
If NIMS and ICS are organizational systems subject to a lower bound, they may 
also have an upper bound. In unbounded risk, incidents can achieve a scope, scale or 
complexity that diminishes the usefulness of command and control structures. 
7. The Myth of the Typed Resource 
It might have been the beginning of a joke, were it not a serious problem: how 
many utility trucks can you fit on a C-5? Prior to Hurricane Sandy, the Defense Logistics 
Agency, the Department of Energy, FEMA and private sector utility companies had not 
developed load plans for airlifting utility trucks into disaster areas to effect power 
restoration. And yet, in 2012, that became a central logistical problem to solve, as the 
DOD helped move Southern California Edison Utility Company equipment and 
personnel to support the relief effort.318 Due to the change in air pressure during flight, 
utility trucks need to have the air let out of tires not designed for such pressures. This was 
not written in any operational plan prior to the incident. 
In response to disaster, professionals solve such problems as a matter of course. 
Adapting to these uncertainties is arguably the central prevailing narrative of large-scale 
emergency management. But airlifting unfamiliar equipment encourages another impulse 
as well; it seems to support the case for “typed” resources. For almost a decade, FEMA 
has pursued the construction of a catalogue of national resource type definitions—
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covering everything from people to equipment, from advanced emergency medical 
technicians to Wheel Dozers. The hope for the Resource Typing Library Tool (RTLT) is 
a complete compendium of disaster resources, with nationally standardized 
definitions.319 But there is no current resource type for utility trucks. 
The concept behind nationally typing resources makes sense. If the qualifications, 
training, shape, size, weight and other pertinent dimensions of every resource are known 
and catalogued as a national standard, then developing, maintaining, deploying and 
managing those resources becomes a scientific matter of national resource awareness. 
This may be unachievable for many resources, but it also may represent the ultimate 
unconscionable map. The list will never be exhaustive, the nature of resources will 
change more rapidly than the list and the plans built from an incomplete and perpetually 
out of date list will be incomplete and perpetually out of date. Such plans will, invariably, 
forget that they are maps. 
The development of national resource types has been plagued with difficulties. 
The list of typed resources is incomplete, and out of date. There is no national standard 
adhered to for virtually any typed team or asset. And the next necessary resource that will 
become needful during catastrophe is probably not even on any list. There doesn’t seem 
to be agreement, nationally, one what certain resources consist of. This raises the 
possibility that resource types may actually differ from state to state, or from discipline to 
discipline. Why is it so difficult to type resources? 
The limitations of resource typing may be the same limitations of scenario and 
capability-based planning. While scenario planning is useful as a means of exercising 
organizational imagination it is limited as a tool for preparing for different potential 
outcomes. Resource typing suffers a similar fate. In such cases, Lewis Carroll 
whimsically argued, the country may serve better as its own map, without the imposition 
of an unconscionable one. 
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D. PORTOLAN CHARTS: COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Any system comprising multiple, interacting elements, from societies to 
sports teams to any living organism, needs some form of command and 
control. Simply put, command and control in some form or another is 
essential to survival and success in any competitive or cooperative 
enterprise. Command and control is a fundamental requirement for life 
and growth, survival, and success for any system. 
—Marine Corps Doctrine320 
Thus, seated, [King Canute] shouted to the flowing sea, ‘Thou, too, art 
subject to my command, as the land on which I am seated is mine; and no 
one has ever resisted my commands with impunity. I command you, then, 
not to flow over my land, nor presume to wet the feet and the robe of your 
lord.’ The tide, however, continuing to rise as usual, dashed over his feet 
and legs without respect to his royal person. 
—Henry of Huntingdon321 
Martin Waldseemüller’s 1507 world map depicts two sea monsters that signal the 
dangers of the unknown ocean. His 1516 Carta Marina, in contrast, depicts king Manuel 
of Portugal astride a sea monster, indicating political and technical mastery of oceans 
previously seen as unknown and dangerous.322 The dynamic illustrated is that with 
knowledge comes control.  
This section addresses the question of whether command and control are 
compatible with unbounded risk. Unbounded risk places a particular burden and 
challenge to the concept of command and control. National preparedness doctrine, by 
contrast, places great emphasis on command and control. This presents a problem. 
The emphasis that Marine Corps doctrine places on command and control is frank 
and universal. Command and control in the Marine understanding is not a military 
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doctrine but a fundamental statement about the world. With this understanding, command 
and control is to be examined, fostered, cultivated and optimized for the functioning of 
organizations and endeavors. Elsewhere, military command and control has 
complementary and competing definitions: 
Command and control [is] the means by which a commander recognizes 
what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.323 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 
the mission.324 
Each definition is tailored to its purpose. The DOD definition, built for the 
context of joint or interagency operations, is careful to include the concepts of designated 
authority and assigned responsibility. The Marine Corps definition is more essentially 
philosophical. It is about command, control, and the commander. But both share a 
common idea. In situations that require action, there is a commander, and appropriate 
action. And the commander’s obligation is to recognize and ensure that action. 
It is an appealing concept. Faced with ambiguity, external threat or difficulty, the 
commander must exercise discipline and initiative to accomplish a group objective. The 
commander is the central figure in this story—the means for getting something done. 
It is perhaps not surprising then that NIMS and ICS place such emphasis on 
command and control. It is largely accepted in incident management doctrine that 
command and control is necessary. It is “established” post-incident, and incidents and 
disasters are often viewed as events that create a rupture with the existing command and 
control, requiring ICS structures in order to re-assert command and control on situations. 
In incidents then, society turns to incident management organizations as experts in 
asserting this fundamental concept back onto chaos and destruction. In this sense, 
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command and control are more than simply schemes to organize response organizations. 
It is a fact of society to be cultivated and maintained. 
In early December, 2014, the National Infragard Electromagnetic Pulse Special 
Interest Group convened a workshop and tabletop exercise to consider high impact 
threats to the electric grid. The group considered three scenarios, developed by a panel of 
experts in their respective fields. 
Four weeks into a blackout, says the scenario, “law enforcement has been 
replaced by Marshall [sic] Law” along with the “first signs of breakdown of social 
order.”325 Sooner than that, “barter will predominate for commerce,” meanwhile, “gangs 
roam the streets,” looting. The impacts are far worse in cities where, says the scenario, 
individuals are less self-reliant. The disaster overwhelms, despite the heroic efforts of the 
military to restore command and control, and protect fuel convoys from the ravages of 
gangs. One of the central questions of the scenario was whether the participant’s 
jurisdiction has a, “command and control structure that can deal with such a catastrophe.” 
Despite the emphasis on command and control, it may not be a model well suited 
to unbounded risk. 
Unified command is, as we have seen, an organizational half-truth. Footnote and 
law exempt the military from it, and civil authorities participate in it only as a consensual 
arrangement, cancelable when the needs of unified coordination groups no longer speak 
to the needs of a municipality or infrastructure sector. As in the case of the Lac- Mégantic 
rail accident, the entities responsible for managing such risks cannot have a common 
command and control structure. 
National incident management doctrine refers to, “establishing command and 
control.”326 Here we encounter the truth claims, the philosophy of command and control. 
The rupture caused by incidents requires group action, and disparate parts must work 
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together for a common end. As such, they require commanders to establish command and 
control. Returning to the Marine Corps definition, disasters cry out for a commander with 
the means to recognize and see to appropriate actions. 
But in domestic crisis, commanders often do not have command or control. 
Recognizing that individuals and organizations outside of the official and designated 
response personnel may play a critical role in weird or uncommon dangers means one of 
two things. Every citizen and group must have a working knowledge of the common 
operational system in order to respond effectively, or a national incident management 
system requires some limits. As discussed, the idea that every American citizen will be, 
or should be trained on NIMS is an uncertain concept.  
It should not surprise us to discover that organizations designed to superimpose 
order upon chaos are not well adapted to managing enduring uncertainty. While 
command and control is successful and essential doctrine within the sphere of military 
missions and coordinating disciplined resources assigned to a centralized command 
structures, it is unsuitable as a foundational philosophy for national incident management. 
Isaac Newton’s second law of motion stated that, “the alteration of motion is ever 
proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction of the right line 
in which that force is impressed.”327 Newtonian physics, in order to establish such laws, 
presupposes a closed system, in which the conditions within the system are static and not 
subject to the influence of “outside forces.” Domestic crisis and disaster management are 
inherently open systems—impacting multiple jurisdictions and drawing resources from 
local, state, and Federal organizations, as well as national organizations and companies. 
For this reason, incident command and control is vital in a limited application, but 
inappropriate as a national system for incident management. 
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Homeland security often implicitly promises perfection. This has meant that 
security organizations are highly susceptible to dramatic redefinition in the face of 
catastrophe. The thesis here is that we need an explicit doctrine of uncertainty. 
The problem goes beyond structural deficiencies in NIMS, or problems with the 
application of ICS, although the deficiencies are great, and the limitations in application 
are serious. As I have assessed in this chapter, National Preparedness may be better 
served by the abolition of NIMS along with the aspiration to national uniformity. What is 
wanting is not a common tongue, but a common skill: adaptability. In the next and final 
chapter I will argue that national adaptability is more desirable than national uniformity. 
This means a variegated landscape, and it means a different set of skills for responders. 
Our response to unbounded risk in much of our doctrine and organizational 
arrangements is to pretend that we can manage and control more than we are able. 
Command and control models for crisis management hinder rather than support adaptive 
organizations. We pretend with catastrophic planning that still catalogues actions and 
execution schedules. And we presume to unattainable knowledge with bulk data 
collection and boundless precaution (guns gates and guards). Such responses are reactive 
to enduring uncertainty—uncertainty that remains despite risk assessment—so our 
security agencies find themselves doing everything to avoid anything. However, it is not 
entirely possible to know how successful such precaution has been, and our current 
approach lacks any limiting principle. Homeland security is not able to say how much of 
what is enough. 
FEMA advises that emergency kits equip individuals and families for at least 72 
hours.328 There is little literature to suggest an origin for this three day minimum, and 
less to bear out in practice its utility. Naturally, this thesis is not arguing for a lower time 
frame of preparedness. But it is worth considering that this 72-hour bar of preparedness is 
not based on either the character of hazards or the character of governmental response. 
                                                 





There is no average disruption of 72 hours, and no average catastrophic response or 
rescue time of 72 hours. It is, in short, largely arbitrary. It is a good idea, but no better 
than 100 or 200 hours of planned survival. It is a time frame invoked, rather than advised. 
The purpose of challenging this accepted number is not to discredit preparedness, but to 
highlight a tendency that security and planning practices have towards arbitrariness and 
presumptions of control. For this number surely communicates more than simply a lower 
bound of disaster. You will find the 72-hour number not just in guidance for individual 
readiness but also in guidance for incident responders. 72 hours is a benchmark for 
establishing incident command.329 72 hours is a time frame for initial planning 
assumptions, and the transition of operational control to field personnel.330 It is a figure 
often invoked for these purposes, and it openly frames an important question. What are 
we to make of catastrophe that extends beyond this 72 hour mark? 
National uniformity in a lot of the NIMS effort is paving over inherent 
adaptability set up by federalism. Fortunately, in many cases, it is skills already in 
development, constrained by aspirations to uniformity. Homeland security needs to 
unleash such adaptability.  
                                                 





IV. UNSEEN DOCTRINE 
Fish don’t try to turn sharks into vegetarians. Living immersed in a world 
of constant risk forces the fish to develop multiple ways to live with risk, 
rather than trying to eliminate it. 
—Raphael Sagarin331 
Great and terrible flesh-eating beasts have always shared landscape with 
humans. They were part of the ecological matrix within which Homo 
sapiens evolved. They were part of the psychological context in which our 
sense of identity as a species arose. They were part of the spiritual systems 
that we invented for coping. The teeth of big predators, their claws, their 
ferocity and their hunger, were grim realities that could be eluded but not 
forgotten. Every once in a while a monstrous carnivore emerged like doom 
from a forest or a river to kill someone and feed on the body. It was a 
familiar sort of disaster–like auto fatalities today–that must have seemed 
freshly, shockingly gruesome each time, despite the familiarity. And it 
conveyed a certain message. Among the earliest forms of human self-
awareness was awareness of being meat. 
—David Quammen332 
 
Sledding on Capitol Hill has been banned since the attacks of 9/11. In 2015, 
following a snowstorm in the Washington, DC area, citizens banded together in an act of 
civil disobedience and defied the capitol traffic regulations prohibiting such sledding. The 
chairman of the Capitol Police board reiterated a ban on sledding, “for security reasons,” 
but legislators listened to and responded to the organized “sled-ins” that resulted. Bearing 
signs of, “sled free or die,” citizens, literally, took the hill. In May of 2015, a legislative 
branch funding bill instructed Capitol Police specifically to, “forebear enforcement,” 
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when they encountered sledding.333 This offers a lesson in responsive government. It 
illustrates further that it is possible to roll back securitization, and temper precaution. 
It is a humorous, charming episode. But this belies a more serious point about 
security. Citizens on Capitol Hill prefer sledding to the margin of safety provided by the 
sledding ban. This means they prefer the danger. This is defiant, contrary to the 
precautionary principle. When facing unbounded risk, it may also be good policy. 
Early in this thesis, I posed a rhetorical question that remains unanswered: Is 
catastrophe just chance we could not tame? Are ambiguous threats the leftover 
uncertainty that security organizations were unable to render into risk? Part of the answer 
is that America must discover the best way to live with danger. Homeland security cannot 
provide perfect security. And yet, the broad emphasis on precautionary measures, 
planning paradigms, nationally uniform incident management structures and command 
and control philosophies implicitly pursues and promises a greater degree of control than 
is possible. 
Sledding on Capitol Hill present no greater or lesser danger of terrorism in 2015 
than it did in 2002. But in the uncertainty of unbounded risk, values matter more than 
methods. For greater or lesser security, the tradition of sledding can trump security 
concerns. 
If homeland security is to inhabit especially dangerous and uncertain waters, this 
must mean new doctrine. In this chapter, I will consider what this task requires of 
homeland security professionals and evaluate available tools for confronting the enduring 
uncertainty of the risks they face. 
Thus, far, I have presented a bleak assessment. Risks are extending beyond the 
ability to know or control them, and security professionals venture to secure a wilderness 
equipped with a series of deeply institutionalized myths. Organizations pretend to 
control, and attempt to impose order on increasingly non-responsive risks. Our 
                                                 





philosophies of command and control may even be making us less safe as they fail to 
acknowledge the volatility of risk or the chaotic dimensions of response. And the 
dominant mode of precaution may be strangling our ability to provide meaningful 
security measures. Homeland security arrangements are often ill suited to the reality of 
danger and catastrophe. 
And yet, if homeland security is to earnestly turn its attention to the problem of 
insecurity and uncertainty, there is significant literature and thinking which can renovate 
our practices and our doctrines. Faced with unbounded risks, the concept of national 
preparedness may be able to reform itself around a new set of theory and practice. 
There is great danger and great utility in believing our own fantasies. Trusting in 
the unconscionable maps made for cataclysms, organizations may become too 
comfortable, too complacent and wedded to conjecture. However, they might equally 
make the opposite mistake, allowing us to become the madman described in A 
Midsummer Night’s Dream—who sees more devils than hell can hold.334 To understand 
unbounded risks aright requires a tempered catastrophism. Security organizations must 
admit to risks they cannot control and balance precaution against exploration and 
readiness for surprise. 
A. REASONABLE SECURITY 
Joint Intelligence Briefing products developed through the Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence often remind the reader that many suspicious activities are 
constitutionally protected behaviors. Another way of expressing this reality is that 
democratic society is not designed to be unreasonably safe. 
John Witherspoon, long time president of what would become Princeton 
University, signer of the Declaration of Independence, and teacher to many of the 
American founding fathers considered theoretically what it meant for a nation to provide 
                                                 





“reasonable security.” Says Witherspoon, “perhaps it may be asked what is reasonable 
security against future injury.”335 
Witherspoon recognized that absolute security might be totalitarian and was 
impossible anyway. It is perhaps a considerable irony that 18th century governmental 
theory should display such cold realism, while current national preparedness doctrine 
reflects an almost utopian confidence: 
A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the 
whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.336 
It may be semantic scolding to observe that a nation in possession of the 
capabilities to prevent all threats and hazards need not worry about responding to them. 
But it may also indicate that homeland security has lost the ability to understand itself in 
terms of the provision of reasonable security. Homeland security may be in pursuit of 
unreasonable security. 
In Federalist Paper No. 24, Alexander Hamilton warned that, “Though a wide 
ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet there are various considerations that 
warn us against an excess of confidence or security.”337 Considering the provision for the 
common defense, Hamilton argued that an excess of confidence or security must be 
tempered by realistic assessment of possible threats—this, in Hamilton’s view, justified 
the provision for a standing military. But this not an unlimited principle. Just as an 
excessive confidence in safety must be tempered by provision for security, a nation can 
excessively pursue security. The growth of unbounded risk, as we have seen, makes it 
difficult to know what reasonable or excessive security looks like. For this reason, a 
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doctrine of reasonable security must begin with the acknowledgement that we accept and 
live with a certain amount of danger. 
Here the concept of risk is reborn as a proposition of value. Risks are not things 
that happen to us, risks are instead taken. It may be counted a small thing, but sledding on 
Capitol Hill represents an important step in America taking and accepting risks. 
Reasonable security means living bravely. 
There is potentially deep absurdity to the precautionary principle. For one, it has 
no evident limiting principle. To be cautious about everything requires equal caution 
about taking action against anything, lest intervention bring with it unseen risks. If 
something is possible, must we do and expend everything against it? How do we address 
competing claims? Does precaution require us to simply surrender to our fears of what is 
possible? How do we choose between apocalypses, and which possible danger deserves 
our attention?  
Much of the effort to respond to volatile and devastating risks has exhibited itself 
as an effort to impose control over the uncontrollable. We can see the outworking of this 
thought in our national counterterrorism strategies, and in some of the progressive steps 
taken by European governments in addressing the catastrophic possibilities of climate 
change. The principle has an immediate appeal. If we cannot quite discern how likely 
something is to happen, and cannot cleanly project the scope of its impact, then it makes 
sense to pursue some action rather than no action. We are a precautionary people. 
Cass Sunstein’s “anti-catastrophe” principle provides an organizing doctrine for 
confronting and tempering excessive precaution. Assessing competing worst-case 
scenarios may serve as a means to prevent neglect of dire possibilities such as 
catastrophic climate change, and politicization of one hazard over another. The anti-
catastrophe principle does not promise perfect security, but it provides a disciplined 
approach to thinking about our plans and atlases that need not plan for every eventuality, 




Unbounded risk demands new doctrine. Crisis management expert Patrick 
Lagadec argues, “it would be a historic blunder to prepare the new generation of leaders 
for the risks and crises of the last century.”338 As risks and crises change, doctrine needs 
to evolve and adapt. 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF MULTIVALENCE 
multivalent (adj.) 
1874, from multi- + -valent, from Latin valentem, present participle of 
valere “be worth” (see valiant). 
—Online Etymology Dictionary 
A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, 
butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance 
accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give 
orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, 
pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die 
gallantly. Specialization is for insects. 
—Robert Anson Heinlein339 
A doctrine of unbounded risk precludes the imposition of a national incident 
management structure. It precludes the imposition of excessive control mechanisms, and 
makes a mockery of overly scripted plans for uncertain futures. Security doctrine for 
unbounded risk must instead be multivalent. Multivalence means possessing and 
incorporating the competing values of different systems. Military command and control 
must live symbiotically with unstructured community organizations. Decentralized 
volunteer groups must coexist productively with teams of forensic engineers. 
NIMS claims to be this system, eliminating differences in approach by creating a 
common national one. But if the central narrative of catastrophe, crisis, and threat is not 
the efficient deployment of known quantities, but the adaptive capacity of previously 
unknown partners, then NIMS will always be out of reach. Security doctrine must 
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conform to a new task. Here I propose four characteristics of multivalence for security 
doctrine. 
• Adaptability: The ability to sense and quickly respond to changes in the 
risk environment. 
• Pathfinding: The capacity for confident exploration of uncertainty. 
• Mapmaking: The ability to produce maps for uncharted landscapes. 
• Reconciling: The disciplined organizational humility regarding of the 
limits of safety. 
1. Adaptability 
We are a wild species, as Darwin pointed out. Nobody ever tamed or 
domesticated or scientifically bred us. But for at least three millennia we 
have been engaged in a cumulative and ambitious race to modify and gain 
control of our environment, and in the process we have come close to 
domesticating ourselves. 
—Wallace Stegner340 
Adaptability is a buzzword—a concept more often invoked than understood. 
We’re often told that our organizations need to acquire and develop it. Why? It is easy for 
disciplined and experienced responders to view the idea of adaptation as undisciplined, 
chaotic, irregular, or more often just amateur. In this view, adaptability looks like free 
jazz—its rebelliousness is its purpose. Convention and procedure are the fruit of 
experience, and we owe them greater respect than the loose affiliations that seem to drive 
so much adaptability talk. And, we think, in high risk or exigent circumstances, 
improvisation is the last thing we need. Whether parachuting or planning a complex 
emergency response operation, lives hang in the balance. Surgery is no time for a 
brainstorm. But this is not what it means to be adaptable. 
In his book Learning from the Octopus, Rafe Sagarin explores the ways that the 
DOD and DHS have created bureaucratic structures unable to respond rapidly to their 
threat environment. Part of his critique rests on comparing the predictive pursuits of 
security organizations to the adaptability of evolutionary systems within nature. 
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Evolution, says Sagarin, “proceeds by solving survival problems as they arise. Many 
systems in society, by contrast, are littered with meticulously planned designed—the 
Maginot Line comes to mind—that were entirely unable to solve emerging threats from 
the environment.”341 Organisms in nature survive without predictive knowledge because 
they have developed means of sensing and responding to changes in their environment. 
Many of the structures we put in place for the provision of security blunt our ability to 
respond to volatility in our environment. This is the danger of fortress thinking, and 
focusing on solidity over adaptability, or prediction over agility. 
Unbounded risk makes such survival skills paramount. Assigned the unthinkable 
and the impossible, we are, in crucial and large-scale ways, we are responding with 
sclerotic, hardened tools designed for regularity. 
The measure of success for a security policy, capability, or approach should not 
be its solidity, but its mutability, not its robustness, but it’s agility. “The problem is no 
longer about knowing the tools that help us to avoid surprises, but to train ourselves to be 
surprised.”342 Adaptable security organization will look almost nothing like what we 
know, but will rely, thankfully, on skills we already possess. 
Responders adapt. The rapid adaptation of utility trucks in hurricane Sandy to the 
requirements of airlift logistics illustrates the capacity of individuals to adapt when 
properly empowered and resourced to make and execute creative solutions. The question 
is whether the organizational systems we have in place augment or impede this 
adaptability. 
The emphasis on adaptability is not mere iconoclasm, or barefoot philosophy. It 
requires active engagement with the changing nature of threats. The principle of 
adaptability relies on the nature of the risks that organizations confront. The emphasis 
and interest in adaptability is born from dangers of inertia—organizational arrangements 
incapable of sensing and responding to variable threat landscapes and methods that do 
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not have the means to recognize that they are no longer effective. Organizational 
adaptability may mean that an entire organization will need to mobilize capabilities in 
response to an event nothing like their operational plan, and shift priorities based on its 
experience in that disaster. ICS and NIMS make this sort of movement difficult. 
In the past several years, FEMA has focused on the development of rapidly 
deployable emergency response teams called Incident Management Assistance Teams 
(IMAT). IMATs are, “interagency, regionally based response teams that provide a 
forward Federal presence to improve coordination and response to serious incidents.”343 
They train and deploy as small units to support emergency response efforts and 
coordinate the initial Federal role in support of disasters that may result in a Federal 
declaration. In effect, IMATs act as organizational sensors, establishing initial 
connections with impacted communities, and providing a means of rapidly assessing 
organizational requirements and operational impacts. The concept of IMATs, and the 
central role that they have played in recent FEMA response efforts illustrates a positive 
organizational trend towards developing smaller, more maneuverable teams that can act 
as adaptive drivers. The shift at FEMA towards the development and deployment of 
IMATs indicates a trend towards the kind of adaptive team environments that will allow 
for crisis management organizations to respond to the environments they operate in.  
2. Pathfinding 
Nowadays navigators rely so closely on technical aids that they find it 
much harder than the Western explorers of a couple of centuries ago to 
believe in primitive navigation. It is the very technical advancement in 
scientific navigation which has made the scientific navigators of today 
only too prone to build a wall of mystery, fable and myth around the 
natural navigators of the past. 
—Harold Gatty344 
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Of course, when the Naskapi do have information about the location of 
game, they tend to act upon it. Ordinarily, it is when they are uncertain 
and food supplies get low that they turn to their oracle for guidance. 
—Omar Khayam Moore345 
Charles Lindbergh called Harold Gatty the “prince of navigators.” Gatty’s unique 
interest was in the ability of “primitive” cultures to navigate successfully across 
uncharted landscapes; from the open ocean to the featureless expanses of the desert. In 
Greenland, Eskimo hunters carried carved wooden relief maps of the shoreline inside 
their mittens. Paddling in the dark, these maps allowed them to feel their way along a 
coastline rendered unfamiliar by the lack of light.346As an air force navigator, Gatty was 
familiar with and accustomed to the power of western navigational tools from compasses 
to charts, but he was equally interested in the dangers of over reliance upon technical 
aids. Too much reliance on technologies for navigation, reasoned Gatty, often resulted in 
navigators who quickly lost touch with navigational signals from their environments. 
When technical aids failed, this meant that navigators would be unable to navigate. 
Pathfinding, or natural navigation, meant the cultivation of navigational skills 
based on observation and understanding of the environment—understanding that trees 
tend to extend their large limbs to the south, and paying attention to the flight of seabirds 
and the indications of seasonal changes.  
In security, unbounded risk often places responders off of their existing maps. 
Catastrophe violates the rules of operational plans. The pre-established objectives and 
concepts of operation must adapt, and the individuals who respond must exhibit new 
skills for a changed environment. In such situations, pathfinding is a form of planning 
skill. For homeland security professionals this means cultivating skills for understanding 
threat environments that do not rely on the possession of perfect threat knowledge, or the 
capacity to relate catastrophic impacts to established plans. 
                                                 
345 Omar Khayam Moore, “Divination-A New Perspective,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 
59, no. 1 (February 1, 1957): 69–74. 




Henry the Navigator, the princely Portuguese explorer, “made his nation take a 
real interest in geographical discovery, broke down their superstitious fear of ocean 
sailing, and made a beginning in the circumnavigation of Africa.”347 Henry’s leadership 
institutionalized exploration as a cultural value. At a time when, “sailors of the fifteenth 
century still feared the great perils which the passage of that Cape offered to their 
imagination,” and the traditional belief of Arabic geographers in a “sea of darkness” 
permeated the thinking of most sailors, Henry approached the vast unknowns of the 
ocean with a very different ethic of exploration.348 
Pathfinding is both an orientation to threats and hazards, and a better way of 
thinking about “coordination.” As buzzwords go, “coordination” is among the more 
abused—used often enough to render homeland security almost senseless to its meaning. 
Pathfinding may serve as an ethic for organizations in security contexts to understand 
themselves and relate to others more effectively. 
In response to the surge of unaccompanied minors on the southern border in 2014, 
the Secretary of DHS, at the direction of the President, initiated coordinated Federal 
action. In 2013, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had “encountered over 
24,000 unaccompanied children crossing the border. By May of [2014], the number has 
already doubled to just over 47,000.” The surge of unaccompanied minors represented 
some uncharted organizational territory for homeland security. Recognizing that the 
capabilities of CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) required assistance 
from other federal agencies, but lacking an existing operational construct for how such 
coordinated action should occur without a Stafford Act Declaration, DHS constructively 
resorted to pathfinding. CBP, ICE, DOD, Health and Human Services, and other agencies 
and departments were forced to address an uncommon response, and invent a paradigm 
for coordination. Command and control diminished in importance, as FEMA played the 
role of host, creating a forum for coordinating capabilities rather than an efficient 
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organization for executing centralized intent. FEMA’s National Response Coordination 
Center provided neutral territory, and the response occurred without unified command 
and control structures. Discovering solutions while operating off of maps and plans 
meant a different set of skills and expectations. 
Crisis management expert Patrick Lagadec argues that increasingly, this kind of 
exploration is the norm for security organizations, and homeland security may require 
new capacity for understanding and making sense of “absurd” rather than “weak signals.” 
Lagadec describes this shift this way: 
We were trained to monitor “weak signals.” Now we must give priority to 
signals that cannot be noticed within the usual framework. It is not enough 
to magnify them in order to perceive and understand them. We need to 
openly question dormant variables, improbable combinations and 
contaminations, statistically insignificant events, and the convergence of 
intuitions. This means having additional sensibilities, new tolerance of 
ambiguities, different perceptions, and other tools.349 
He is describing the predicament of the responder who must make sense of 
unfamiliar challenges and requirements. The need for this brand of pathfinding has not 
abated. The 2014–2015 Ebola outbreak illustrated that a public health emergency can 
rapidly acquire unforeseen characteristics. It was not simply a problem of public health 
monitoring, or the usual tools of pandemic; it was rapidly a problem of transportation 
infrastructure, border security, logistics and interagency coordination. 
3. Mapmaking 
Maps for unbounded risk will look drastically different than unconscionable 
maps. Planning for conditions of such uncertainty requires new skills, and a new form of 
map. 
                                                 




a. The Shoulder Blade Path 
“It should be remembered,” says Omar Khayam Moore, “that it is difficult for 
human beings to avoid patterning their behavior in a regular way.”350 For the Naskapi 
tribes in Canada, breaking their cycles of regularity was a matter of survival. The Naskapi 
followed the caribou, and depended on hunting skills. But the caribou were an adaptive 
adversary, capable of responding to the movements of the Naskapi, and forcing the 
Naskapi to find means of being unpredictable. They turned to scapulimancy, a form of 
divination that relied on heating the shoulder blade of a caribou over a fire, and 
interpreting the cracks in its surface as auguries. Khayam Moore contends that this 
magical practice effectively randomized Naskai behavior, and served them as a tool for 
operating in conditions of uncertainty, outwitting their prey. As a response to a volatile 
risk, the Naskapi present some challenges to our current approach to security. 
“Would it not be sounder practice,” asks Moore, “for them simply to decide 
where, in their best judgment, game may be found and hunt there? Of course, when the 
Naskapi do have information about the location of game, they tend to act upon it. 
Ordinarily, it is when they are uncertain and food supplies get low that they turn to their 
oracle for guidance.”351 This is an important comparison with the way that homeland 
security manages risks. For risk management in situations where we possess sufficient 
knowledge to exert control, we do not need a new form of map making. But for 
unbounded risks, a different approach to knowledge and action may be warranted. “Like 
all people,” says Moore, “[the Naskapi] can be victimized by their own habits…”352 
The shoulder blade augury provided the Naskapi with a “chance like” instrument, 
a means of making themselves inscrutable to the adaptable caribou. “It seems safe to 
assume,” says Moore, “that human beings require a functional equivalent to a table of 
random numbers if they are to avoid unwitting regularities in their behavior which can be 
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utilized by adversaries.”353 Learning from the Naskapi means that planning for 
unbounded risks will require a different methodology. Plans for catastrophe and 
uncertainty may require less scripted knowledge, not more. 
b. Fake Book Plans 
In the world of jazz performance, “a fake-book is a bound collection of lead 
sheets...a musical score that shows only the melody of a work, usually written in treble 
clef, and its essential harmonic structure, usually indicated by alphanumeric symbols or 
tablature, or both, placed immediately above or below a single staff”354 Fake books were 
the minimum necessary information about a song. Armed with fake books, jazz 
musicians could easily play the standards, and play them together. But the ultimate form 
of the song and the solos would depend on the circumstance.355  
Fake books are form of melodic and harmonic crisis planning. Jazz performance 
relies on the interplay and communication between musicians as they improvise their way 
through a common theme. The results are unpredictable, and the essentials of the 
performance rely equally on the individual and technical proficiency of the musician, and 
his ability to keep time and communication with the rest of the band. The written music 
for such unpredictable environments necessarily takes a form quite different from 
classical symphonic notation. “Not only is jazz notation nearly impossible, but the very 
process would destroy the jazz spirit of spontaneous improvisation.”356 
It is axiomatic that plans do not survive first contact with the enemy. Equally, we 
are told that plans are nothing but planning is everything. This is the folk wisdom of 
planning, and it acknowledges that plans do not reflect the reality of operations, but rather 
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that the exercise of planning is its own form of preparedness. This brand of thinking 
should protect the practice of planning from the production of unconscionable maps—
maps that do not know they are maps. How well do such adages protect homeland 
security’s mapping impulses? 
The State of Nebraska Emergency Operations Plan 406 pages long.357 As a map 
of every action necessary for responding to an emergency, this is certainly far too short. 
As an operational guide for responders or community members involved in an emergency 
it is perhaps too long. Nor is the plan’s length unique. The State of Vermont’s Emergency 
Operations Plan consists of a base plan, 60 annexes (covering State support functions, 
State agencies, support topics, and incident types) and 5 appendices.358 This is common, 
and reflects a truth. Organization’s emergency operations are immensely complicated. It 
also reflects the unconscionable mapping impulse.  
The thinking, as it goes, is that the detailed operational plan will help build 
capability, test capability through exercises and then allow the organization to adapt and 
build the necessary structures indicated by the exercise in imagination that the plan 
represent. The limitation to this thinking is the over-commitment to a possible future. It is 
the proverbial problem of the Maginot line. Operational plans with this degree of 
specificity and task delineation have committed to a certain future. And such 
commitment represents a liability in a world of volatility. Operational planning for 
catastrophe and surprise requires some renovation then. The doctrine of multivalence 
may require “fake book planning” as an operational paradigm and discipline.  
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Why can’t our dreams be content with the terrible facts? 
The only animal cursed with responsible sleep, 
We trace disaster always to our own acts. 
 —William Meredith, from “The Wreck of the Thresher”359 
Multivalence requires homeland security organizations to adopt a new attitude 
about danger. Organizations that manage unbounded risks should reconcile themselves to 
uncertainty and accident. 
On April 10th, 1963 the USS Thresher, the Navy’s most advanced nuclear attack 
submarine, was lost at sea, taking with it all 129 crew members who perished in 8,400 
feet of water off the coast of Cape Cod. Fifty years later, the cause the accident remains 
uncertain. The official explanation of the accident was couched with phrases such as 
“most probable” and “most likely,” but settled on a faulty joint in a seawater pipe near 
the engine room.360 The circumstances and available information are complex. But, 
according to most recent accounts, evidence supports a very different theory of cascading 
failure in electric busses, coolant pumps and a suddenly scrammed reactor.361 
Testifying before Congress after the disaster, Vice Adm. H.G. Rickover, who was 
head of the Navy’s nuclear propulsion program at the time of the accident approached the 
problem of catastrophe in the face of scant facts and complex organizational and 
technological problems with surprising wisdom: 
Statements have been made that [classified] the ship lost propulsion. Such 
statements cannot, in my opinion, be substantiated and may cause us to 
lose sight of the basic technical and management inadequacies that must 
be faced and solved if we are to do all we can to prevent further Thresher 
disasters…It is not the purpose of my testimony here today to prove that 
the nuclear power plant did not contribute to this casualty. When fact, 
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supposition, and speculation which have been used interchangeably are 
properly separated, you will find that the known facts are so meager it is 
almost impossible to tell what was happening aboard the Thresher at the 
critical time.362 
We might glean from this a theory of forensic humility when faced with security 
problems where danger and management structures collide. With its cause still unknown, 
the wreck of the Thresher was the genesis for the Navy’s SUBSAFE program, a system 
of revised safety certification practices for submarine design and testing.363 
Meditating on the loss, former Naval aviator turned poet William Meredith 
concludes his account of the accident this way: 
Whether we give assent to this or rage 
Is a question of temperament and does not matter. 
Some will has been done past our understanding, 
Past our guilt surely, equal to our fears.364 
It is a bleak thought, heavy with a view of the world’s dangers as an ocean whose 
depths we cannot plumb. To Meredith’s grieved thinking it hardly matters whether we 
accept or fight such forces. This is too heavy-hearted for homeland security, but 
combined with the bold humility of Adm. Rickover’s disciplined uncertainty, it may 
provide a useful approach to complexity, uncertainty and danger. 
In an important sense, the complexity of the Thresher—the design and fabrication 
of its systems, the management and quality control structures governing its construction, 
and the operational arrangements surrounding its deployment and testing–were beyond 
the ability to foresee its failure. And yet, as Meredith says, we always trace disaster to our 
own acts. 
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Uncertainty, and failures beyond our capacity should help us rethink our 
organizational arrangements with a kind of suspicion. This should encourage us to tinker 
and shift and fix. It should make us humble as we work to provide security. The enduring 
uncertainty that surrounds the Thresher accident is illustrative. Even imagining a future 
when we can confirm, finally and indisputably, the cause of the Thresher, we have 
already responded to the accident. We have already made decisions in the wake of a 
terrible accident. This has meant organizational changes, new programs, safety concepts 
doctrines, procedures and adaptations—all in the absence of certainty. 
Worst cases should make organizations humble, says Lee Clarke.365 During times 
of crisis and catastrophe, notes Clarke, America turns to and relies on organizations 
because they are able to command greater resources and tackle larger problems that 
individuals acting alone. But worst cases and unbounded risk mean that homeland 
security agencies need to acquire greater honesty about their limitations. Reconciling 
homeland security to unbounded risk means no longer promising levels of safety and 
security that are beyond the reach of organizations. 
C. ORGANIZING FOR UNBOUNDED RISKS 
“Huge, concentrated bureaucracies are unlikely to fail gracefully,” says Lee 
Clarke.366 The centralization of function, and the construction of more and more efficient 
management processes means that disruptions in the system of bureaucratic management 
are easily multiplied across a tightly coupled organization. And yet, as argued in this 
thesis, the trend in national preparedness planning and operations is toward more national 
uniformity, and the creation of huge, concentrated, ad hoc bureaucracies that span 
geographic boundaries and political jurisdictions. 
The war fighting doctrines of the United States Army have begun to respond to 
the evolving nature of risks. Writing in 2012 on the behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
General Martin Dempsey contended that the joint operations environment into the year 
                                                 
365 Clarke, Worst Cases, 181. 




2020 will be dynamic, fast paced, and volatile.367 Responding in a, “competitive and 
interconnected world” means responding to an expanding list of asymmetric threats that 
span borders and challenge established doctrines.368 This reality, according to Dempsey, 
calls for a corresponding evolution in military doctrine toward mission command. Briefly 
summarized, mission command is the decentralized execution of military missions.369 
Departing from the older, Westphalian model of military campaign management, mission 
command provides a more nimble, variable structure that delegates considerable 
responsibility and improvisational authority to the level of subordinate commanders, 
encouraging initiative across echelons. 
Within the concept of mission command, “the commander is the central 
figure.”370 However, evaluating the accelerating changes in an increasingly 
interconnected world of threats, Dempsey concludes that smaller, lighter forces operating 
in an environment of increased uncertainty, complexity and competitiveness will require 
freedom of action to develop the situation and rapidly exploit opportunities. 
Decentralization will occur beyond current comfort levels and habits of practice.”371 
Retired General Stanley Mcchrystal recognized a similar change in the 
environment of war, and argues for a corresponding change in the organizational 
approach to operations, teamwork and leadership. In Team of Teams, Mcchrystal 
considers the organizational imperatives that follow unbounded risks. Volatile risks 
required a shift from the traditional model of military organization toward a more 
decentralized approach. Managing this decentralized approach, rather than permitting a 
detached form of leadership, required Mcchrystal to be differently, but more engaged. 
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Adopting an, “eyes on, hands off” approach, Mcchrystal managed Joint Special 
Operations Command not in the manner of an omniscient leader moving chess pieces on 
a board, but as a gardener, creating the conditions for coordination between teams. 
Managing and cultivating a “Team of Teams” approach required a shift towards 
organizational transparency, shared consciousness and self-knowledge. 
But homeland security has doubled down on scientific management as a means 
for crisis response, emergency management, and national incident management. In the 
face of unbounded risk, we have continued an investment in NIMS and ICS that 
presupposes an outcome of national uniformity. I have argued in this thesis that such 
uniformity is illusory and unattainable. It is also a liability—eliminating diversity in favor 
of regularity, but rendering emergency management organizations insensitive and slow to 
respond to changes by reducing operational elements to efficient executors of centrally 
defined functions within a larger system. 
Rather, homeland security may require something other than a common tongue or 
structure. “Over time,” says Gary Hart, “closed systems produce fewer and fewer 
innovations, because closed systems by definition are based on certain increasingly 
unchallengeable fundamental principles.”372 As the risk environment around NIMS 
challenges the fundamental assumptions of its structured approach, and undermines 
aspects of its principles, the concept of a national incident management system (enforced 
through the passive means of grant eligibility) is decreasing the innovative capacity of 
homeland security by attempting to establish such a closed system. The system of 
unbounded risks is open. 
D. RESISTING UNIFORMITY: THE FORTRESS OF FEDERALISM 
American government is a tangled system of overlapping authorities and spheres 
of responsibility. In a tactical sense, this creates enormous challenges around 
interoperability and coordination for crisis management. But perhaps, paradoxically, that 
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makes America much safer. James Madison concludes Federalist No. 39 by examining 
the differences between the exercise of national power, and the structuring of that power 
under a federal model: 
The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national 
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is 
federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the 
government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the 
operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, 
again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of 
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly 
national.373 
The paper itself has a greater elegance than this summary suggests. Taken as a 
whole, No. 39 in the series of published papers that argued for the ratification of the 
Constitution provides one of the clearest summaries of the essential character of 
Federalism, with Madison exploring the difference between a national and a federal 
government: 
In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and 
may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the 
local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of 
the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the 
general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its 
own sphere.374 
American government was to be national in the operation of its powers (applying 
to every American), but federal in the extent of those powers (limited and enumerated in 
its powers). Emergency managers will recognize this principle reflected in the structure 
of Presidential Disaster Declarations made under the Stafford Act, which requires that, 
“All requests for a declaration by the President that a major disaster exists shall be made 
by the Governor of the affected State.”375 
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This principle is replicated across the homeland security enterprise. Federal and 
non-federal coordination is a dominant theme in advancing the provision of domestic 
security. And we recognize the struggle in its failures. Central to the 9/11 Commission 
Report recommendations was the call for interoperable communications and unified 
incident command structures.376 Hesitance on the part of the Federal government 
influenced the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform act. More recently, after 
action reporting on the 2013 Navy Yard shooting in Washington, DC concluded that local 
and federal law enforcement failed to share key pieces of information such as the 
availability of live video within the building.377 
These failures make simplicity appealing. They seem to support an argument for 
more uniformity in operational capability, but perhaps also a more national approach to 
domestic crisis management. Perhaps they even suggest that the U.S. would be better 
served by a single domestic preparedness agency. At the very least, they suggest that 
aspects of Federalism are modern security liabilities. In the bargain of individual liberty 
we’ve purchased a form of insecurity, which works against a reliable governmental 
response to danger and threat. 
But perhaps the opposite is true. Federalism is a great deconcentrator. Inherent in 
the maddening challenges of interoperability is a kind of modularity that distributes 
strengths along with vulnerabilities. State, local, tribal, community and individual 
responsibilities produce an inherent redundancy and an inherent distribution of 
vulnerability. This mirrors Charles Perrow’s observation: 
We will never do well with prevention, remediation, and recovery from 
natural, industrials/technological, and terrorist disasters. Our organizations 
and our political system are simply not up to it. The best we can do is to 
reduce the size of the targets of nature’s wrath, industrial errors, and 
terrorist attacks. The vast disaster literature rarely examines the 
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possibilities of deconcentrating populations in risky areas, hazardous 
materials concentrations, and reducing the power of the huge 
organizations that sit astride our critical infrastructure. We should reduce 
our vulnerabilities by reducing the size of that which is vulnerable.378 
Federalism may be the ultimate antifragile system of government. But current 
approaches in NIMS and ICS work against it. Homeland security professionals have 
pursued national uniformity, and attempted to establish increasingly broad theatres of 
unified command, recognizing that the universality of doctrine, and the separation of 
federalism impede one another in cross-jurisdictional incidents. Perhaps a reorientation is 
in order. 
Federalism was and remains a system uniquely designed to resist uniformity. If 
homeland security can remember how to engage it, our national network of governance is 
a system highly suited to adaptability and innovation.  
1. The End of Disciplines: Interstitial Security 
Unbounded risk presents daunting challenges to the science and practice of risk 
management, as well as the efficient models of command and control and the uniformity 
doctrines of NIMS. But it does not undermine them altogether. 
Risk is still the essential underpinning of modern society, and managing risk is 
still effective in the large scale and over time. The challenge of homeland security is the 
management of outliers. For this reason, the focus of security organizations must evolve 
to be less concerned with the centralization of specific practices, and more about 
understanding and building systems that permit strangers to work with strangers more 
effectively. 
This is a different set of skills, and the focus of this kind of security is about 
managing the connection points between practices and cultures. Decentralized risks, and 
network centric, federal structures require an approach to homeland security disciplines 
that is about managing the connections of the network, not simply the nodes. The central 
                                                 





task of homeland security management and organizational design becomes less about the 
establishment of organizational efficiency, and more about the creation of systems which 
are increasingly aware of themselves, and able to adapt and incorporate other systems. 
I call this “interstitial security.” The doctrine of multivalence requires an 
interstitial approach that is homeland security at the borders of disciplines. It is about 
establishing means to connect fire and police, bomb squad and geospatial risk analyst. 
Rather than command and control organizations, we might argue that domestic security 
particularly requires the opposite: a domestic crisis response architecture focused on the 
uncommon partner. Because the problems of unbounded risk cut across artificial 
distinctions between political boundaries and disciplines, the necessary organizational 
response cannot be centralized with a specific discipline or capability. 
2. Consider the Mouse 
Conservative estimates on the losses associated with Australia’s 1993 mouse 
plague are upwards of AU$64.5 million.379 And the losses have a cyclical, probabilistic 
cycle as well, observed to be around once every four years.380 Mouse plagues do not 
occur on the same scale in the US, although there are interesting parallels between the 
governmental approach to managing pest animal outbreaks and some of the other disaster 
aid management programs available in the US. 
In addition to being an enormous economic stress on rural agricultural areas, 
mouse plagues are difficult to predict and manage. Scientists have difficulty monitoring 
mouse population densities during and before the growing season.381 Often the onset of 
the plagues is so sudden, it is not recognized as a plague until the mouse population has 
reached plague numbers, creating challenges for those who have to respond with mouse 
                                                 







bait, and even creating shortages in mouse bait.382 In one instance a month long backlog 
of mouse bait highlighted that entire crops can be lost in the span of days, while farmers 
waited for the delivery of poison for weeks.383 
In 2011 the government of south Australia convened and responded to 
recommendations from a “state mouse working party” on how to provide a better 
framework for delivering governmental assistance to farmers. The recommendations are 
interesting, and parallel many of the challenges of U.S. management of complicated risks 
between public and private sector interests, and encouraging private investment to 
manage public risks. 
The recommendations include regulatory relief for farmers to be able to mix 
pesticides on their own property, easing licensure requirements for specialists who mix 
the zinc phosphide bait into the soil, and other means of improving knowledge and 
application of baiting technology in rural areas. In addition, the recommendations tackle 
an interesting issue of biosecurity—identifying methods and mechanisms by which to 
collect and transmit agricultural intelligence products on the state of mouse populations 
and their potential threat to the environment.384  
There are significant lessons that the U.S. can learn in terms of establishing and 
being ready to repurpose intelligence architecture to respond to weird threats and hazards. 
In particular, the U.S. learned this lesson during the 2014 Ebola outbreak, as public health 
threats highlighted the need to provide medical intelligence to CBP. 
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I dream’d in a dream, I saw a city invincible to the attacks of the whole of 
the rest of the earth 
—Walt Whitman385 
Faced with expanding uncertainty, security agencies have sought expanded 
rationality. Faced with complexity, security agencies have sought regularity. Wrestling 
with disparate arrangements across jurisdictions and sectors, security efforts have sought 
to build national uniformity. However, uncertainty endures, complexity seems inevitable, 
and American government was designed specifically to resist the centralization of 
efficient power, uniform national systems of crisis management, or the centralized 
command of resources during disasters. It is the inherent nature of unbounded risks to 
defy efforts at uniformity and control. In one sense, this is simply to recognize that the 
margin of what remains unknown is of particular import to homeland security agencies 
and efforts. The unlikely rail accident, the unthinkable airline crash, and the worst-case 
earthquake or pandemic is specifically the province of agencies and organizations 
responsible for national preparedness. Perfect security remains, as the poet Walt 
Whitman saw it, a dream. 
However, the national capabilities and approaches currently in use are not 
optimized for the management of outliers, or for living with unbounded risks. Designed 
around assumptions of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, the architecture of 
homeland security decision-making is less attuned to situations where this information is 
unavailable. The establishment of efficient incident management organizations occludes 
the means of perception necessary to make sense of incident complexity. The necessary 
repurposing of intelligence means and methods to work with uncommon partners during 
pandemics, or other volatile threats are impeded by current precautionary approaches. 
The dominant modes of planning build detailed task objectives, task lists, and maps for 
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incidents that inevitably unfold differently. In this environment it is difficult to know how 
much safer security efforts make America. 
This does not mean the end of risk management. Unbounded risk should teach 
security agencies and professionals to cultivate a new set of skills alongside traditional 
risk management practices, specifically designed for the management of uncertainty, 
threat, and worst-case catastrophe. This suggests a conclusion in two parts—one 
incremental, the other more dramatic. 
1. Incremental Recommendation 
Multivalence and national adaptability are characteristics that can augment 
current security practices. Patrick Lagadec’s concept of a “rapid reflection force” is an 
example of the way in which this kind of thinking can be brought in not to override or 
change existing practice but to augment and support existing practice with the kind of 
thinking that unbounded risk requires. This is not limited to incident management, but 
should also pervade the way that security organizations approach planning, the review of 
policy and the development of procedures. In this thesis I have proposed four aspects to 
multivalence, and the cultivation of these capacities alongside existing security processes 
may improve security sensitivity to volatile and uncertain risk. The Lac-Mégantic rail 
accident, and the challenges of providing insurance controls for terrorism risk highlight 
necessary incremental adaptations to unbounded risks. Security organizations must orient 
themselves more fully to the unknown.  
2. Thoroughgoing Changes 
Unbounded risk suggests the need for drastic changes. Reconfiguring planning 
practices to produce “fake book” plans—plans that did not attempt to predict future 
conditions but instead provided a common framework for improvising in uncertainty—
would mean dramatic changes in a culture that demands and produces unconscionable 
maps. This thesis suggests that such adaptability planning is more useful to the security 
professional, but as Lee Clarke has argued, it is important to understand that plans—as 




citizens—serve more than merely practical purposes. Implementing this change would 
mean fewer plans that propose a grand design. Recognizing that organizations are 
directed to produce grand operational plans, this means a shift in the political expectation 
for such plans, not simply the operational impulse to produce them. 
The reassertion of American federalism against the tide of national uniformity is 
no less drastic. This thesis suggests that the impediments to achieving national uniformity 
have not been greatly reduced, merely disguised by existing efforts to produce a national 
incident management system. The skills still wanting for achieving interoperability and 
effective joint efforts across jurisdictions, it seems, have less to do with the establishment 
of a common system, and more to do with an improved ability to work effectively with 
strangers, and to navigate the complex networks of risk and governance. 
Centralization and efficiency have a curious revenge effect—they also create 
vulnerabilities. Understanding that the tragedy of Germanwings 9525 was made possible 
by robust, complicated fortifications means recognizing that the centralization, even of 
strengths, makes room for unbounded risk. Finding and cultivating means to distribute 
both vulnerabilities and strengths means a broad, national effort at dismantling 
criticalities that come with complex systems. But unbounded risks suggest that just such 
drastic undertakings are necessary in order to push back against catastrophic 
possibilities—from climate disaster to terrorist attack. Abandoning the pursuit of NIMS, 
or the command and control doctrines of ICS is an unlikely proposition, and yet the 
dynamic nature of modern risk may require it. 
American government is uniquely structured to adapt to dynamic risks, and 
equally to resist nationally uniform security measures. A grand design for homeland 
security will not produce grand security. Rather, improved security may rest on the 
staggered strengths of federalism and the management of connections in a security 
network. 
The end of homeland security may be to manage the unmanageable. This means 




inheriting unbounded risk may mean turning away from the manufactured insecurities 
that accompany unconscionable maps, and toward a better means of living with danger. 
It is likely that adaptable, decentralized systems will make America safer. Rather 
than embracing organizational doctrine meant to impose artificial command and control, 
federalism needs a security rebirth. Homeland security needs fewer scripted plans and 
more improvisation, more diversity, less uniformity, less training with partners and more 
learning to work with strangers. These things will make us safer, but they will not make 
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